Lebanon and Syria seem to share a fatal attraction of the geopolitical kind. Lebanon’s current economic crisis, for example, has driven three-quarters of the population into poverty and seen the Lebanese pound devalued by 90 percent. Eighty-two percent of the population lives in multidimensional poverty, the result of lack of access to social services, such as healthcare and education, in addition to low income. Rampant government corruption under Prime Minister Najib Mikati, who took office in September, is exacerbated by cuts to subsidies on essential goods, such as fuel and medicine. 

Lebanon ranks 149 out of 180 nations in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, while Syria ranks 178, above South Sudan and Somalia. 

After a decade of ongoing conflict in Syria, a record-breaking 60 percent, or 12.4 million, of the Syrian population experiences food insecurity. The United Nations underscores the impact of the financial crisis in neighboring Lebanon, the declining value of the Syrian pound, and the long-term effects of COVID-19 as contributors to Syria’s most recent economic crisis which began in tandem with Lebanon’s in October 2019.

Syria in Lebanon

Founding Dean of the School of Global Affairs and Public Policy Nabil Fahmy spoke with panelists in the latest installation of the Tahrir Dialogue webinar series, “Syrian and Lebanese Crises in a Mirror,” about the convergence of the two crises. 

Generally, Syria’s role in Lebanon today is much weaker than during the Syrian government’s presence in the country from 1976 to 2005. Their bilateral relationship, however, is political rather than economic as no trade project was built during this time period, Samir Aita, a Syrian academic and president of the Circle of Arab Economists emphasized. Additionally, Lebanon has witnessed an influx of an estimated 1.5 million Syrian refugees since 2011.

Lebanon in Syria

Syria has always been considered a domestic political issue in Lebanon for historical, sociological, political, and economic reasons, Nassif Hitti, former Lebanese Minister of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants, said. Their mutually dependent economies are linked through entrenched networks of patronage and corruption reliant on informal business connections and family ties. Furthermore, the 1989 Taif Agreement, which ended the fifteen-year Lebanese civil war but instigated conflict between Sunnis and Shiites in the country, appointed Syria as Lebanon’s official powerbroker. 

After the withdrawal of Syrian forces in 2005 and the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, Sunni-Shiite relations within Lebanon worsened, and further deteriorated after the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011. Thus, “for many [in Lebanon], Syria is an enemy today, was a friend yesterday. And Syria as a friend yesterday was an enemy the day before yesterday,” he said.

Mirror Image

Though both Syria and Lebanon have chosen different trajectories, Aita said, “their bonds remain deep despite the different perspectives and different crises they went through.” Laying out three areas of overlap, Aita highlighted similarities in economic crises, politics, and foreign interventions into both countries. Economically, the exchange rate in Lebanon has plunged, leading to ramifications on the Syrian currency—and not for the first time. The 2020 U.S. Caesar Act sanctions, which targeted external supporters of the Syrian regime, also led to a drop in oil prices and a subsequent dip in the exchange rate of both the Syrian and Lebanese currencies.

While there is less political mirroring, both countries suffer from a divide-to-rule strategy implemented by political authorities, Aita summarized. “They are fragmenting the countries’ forces to a great extent in order to be able to rule,” he said, resulting in an imbalance between the capital and the rest of the country. For example, major geographical disparities exist in housing construction completed during the conflict, Aita wrote in 2019. Furthermore, an inability to criticize the government “is negatively impacting both countries on all levels”. Manipulation of the law, and a parallel inability to address corruption through reforms, continues to spell disaster for a better future.

Both geostrategic countries suffer deep interventions from other states, and their futures hinge on how conflicts between these powers play out. On Lebanon, Hitti said: “We’re the country that’s the least influential in the region in terms of power politics, and the most influenced in the region. We’re extremely vulnerable, and we invite all forms of intervention.” Punctuating his point, he joked: “The Lebanese state is the most neutral state in the world, it doesn’t even interfere in its own domestic affairs.” He argued Lebanon serves as a “mailbox”—an arena for sending war messages by proxy. The country has long hosted microcosms of regional conflicts, including between Iran and Saudi Arabia, Iranian-backed Hezbollah and Israel, and spillover of the Syrian civil war, to name a few.

On Syria, he said, “Actors do change but the kind of attractiveness—fatalistic attractiveness—of Syria’s geopolitical location remains the same.” Throughout its long history as a borderland, Syria has often been dissected by its neighbors, remaining internally fragmented and geographically vulnerable. The Syrian conflict, which began as a domestic rebuke of corruption and brutality, was transformed into a theater for regional and international power struggles, notably the “cold war” between Riyadh and Tehran.

The countries, of course, are not identical. Ramzy Ezzeldin Ramzy, former Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations and Deputy Envoy for Syria, noted the difference between Syria’s centralized political system and Lebanon’s multifaceted society with a historically weak government. Though after ten years of war, the Syrian state is also weak, Aita added. Moreover, while Lebanon’s melange of sectarian identities is well known, “Syria is also a mosaic but no one talks about it,” he noted. “I always make the joke: somebody from Homs would never marry someone from Hama, and the towns are 43 [kilometers] away.”

A Balancing Act

Lebanon suffers from “a sort of political fatalism” which requires the country to rely on its foreign allies to gain traction in the “emerging regional configuration of power,” Hitti argued. “So there’s always this look outside,” he said. “On the Syrian chessboard, we see different alliances and different points of confrontation,” he continued. Four broad networks operate within the country: pro-government forces, opposition forces, the Islamic State, and the Kurdish People’s Defense Units. As of writing, the northwestern Idlib province is controlled by opposition forces, while the remainder of the country is under the control of President Bashar Al-Assad and government forces.

Amid the possibility of regional realignment, the solution in Syria and Lebanon requires myriad agreements on national, regional, and global levels. While there is a need for action on the part of superpowers, namely the United States, Russia, and China, Arab countries must play the major role, particularly those directly affected, such as Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq, Aita said. “There is a dis-arabization of any attempt at playing a role to move Syria into the Arab fold and to help Syria in getting out of the situation as well as Lebanon,” Hitti added. Fahmy agreed. “Unless Arabs re-engage on their issues, they will only have themselves to blame…because the regional players, or the global ones, are not taking them seriously,” he said.

This Arab role must not only be present, but energized. “Without an Arab role, I find it very difficult for the non-Arab regional powers, or for the United States and Russia, to give enough interest and enough will to find a settlement,” Ramzy said. Current international efforts to reach an agreement in Syria, now stalled, revolve around UN Resolution 2254 which provides a roadmap to a political settlement. All panelists agreed that there must be an understanding among the external powers involved in both countries, as exampled in the trilateral Astana process between Iran, Russia, and Turkey.

Looking Forward

The third and thirty-fourth ranked most fragile states in the world are spiraling in parallel. Both countries need a new social contract to reformulate, or rephrase, the relationship between the ruling power and the people, Aita argued. Secondly, they both need to undergo an all-encompassing reconstruction process that tackles the economic, financial, and political crises at hand. “Lebanon’s financial monetary crisis is a reflection of an economic crisis—a model that’s not functioning as it should function—which is in turn a reflection of a deep political crisis. We need to revisit the whole system,” Hitti said.

Is Syria the solution key?

There was debate over whether Syria could serve as a “key” to regional dialogue or if it will have to wait until other regional conflicts are resolved. “The importance of Syria—it remains in the heart of the conflict of the region because of its geostrategic location, for the nth time,” Hitti said, but it does not have to wait until other conflicts in the region are settled to begin reforms. He argued for an external compromise modeled after the Taif Agreement aimed at establishing an understanding among intervening forces. This could unlock dialogue between a wider, more inclusive group of power holders in Syria, and not only non-Arab forces, Hitti finished. “I think that the major role has to be taken by the Arab countries that are the most interested in the solution in Syria and Lebanon, which are precisely Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq, supported by other Arab countries who wanted to play the role to support this,” Aita argued. That way, a systemic approach to Syria can make progress on a solution to the Lebanese crisis and the rest of the region.

Looking ahead, overtures to Syria, exemplified by a recent visit from the United Arab Emirates’ top diplomat, could spark rapprochement between the country and other Arab nations. In Lebanon, upcoming elections are scheduled for March 2022, although they are unlikely to “make the expected change,” Hitti said. Above all, there is danger of complete collapse in both countries, Aita stressed. “In the long-run, things could only get worse, both in Syria and Lebanon.”