Horror has been unleashed on Gaza and its people for over four months now. The imprisoned inhabitants of the narrow strip are cruelly the targets of the heaviest and most lethal bombs and missiles from land, air, and sea. By the end of January 2024, some 26,000 Palestinians had been killed and close to 60,000 maimed and wounded, the vast majority children, women, and non-combatant men. The International Court of Justice has issued multiple provisional measures against Israel regarding the prevention of genocidal activities in response to accusations by South Africa. Israeli strategy is based on an impossible premise: ensure peace through obtaining absolute security. In reality, peace is unattainable when Israeli security is being pursued through the brutal destruction of civilian lives and infrastructure.

The Palestinians have clamored for an immediate ceasefire. Their pleas are echoed by protesters demonstrating in support of the embattled Palestinians all over the globe. The vast majority of the United Nations member states have also called for immediate ceasefire, be it only for humanitarian purposes, as evidenced by the vote on the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution adopted on December 12, 2023. The UNGA resolutions, being mere recommendations, were ignored by Israel. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the only organ with the authority to order and enforce its resolutions, could not adopt a ceasefire resolution. The United States vetoed several draft resolutions submitted to the UNSC calling for the ceasefire.

An immediate ceasefire was the prominent bone of contention, but it did not keep both its proponents and opponents from thinking in the longer term. Whether in relation to the ceasefire or not, two competing concepts for long-term prospects for security and peace in the Middle East have emerged. The first concept was proposed by Israel. The second, with considerable variations, was espoused by the other parties directly or indirectly concerned with the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, and therefore can be considered an international concept.

Israel’s Concept for Realizing Security and Peace in the Middle East
Israel’s concept, as articulated by Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu and far right members of his government, identifies security as their utmost, if not exclusive, concern. Two parts constitute this concept: First, Israel alone will guarantee Gaza’s security; it cannot trust any other organization with it. Israel will take control of security in Gaza and its forces will enter the Strip any time it wishes in the future. Hamas’ leaders will be killed and the movement will be completely destroyed. The Palestinian Authority, headquartered in Ramallah, will not return to Gaza or participate in running it.

This first part of Israel’s concept of security is not surprising. Israel has put it into practice during its five wars in Gaza (2006, 2008, 2012, 2014, 2023-24) since it withdrew forces from the Strip in 2005. The only difference lies in the exceptional violence used to enforce security and the huge number of victims it produced in the current war. The violence deployed in the war in Gaza and the disdain of international humanitarian law reveal that Israel is not only after Hamas’ leaders or the movement as an organization, but is intent on systematically stifling any Palestinian drive to resist or to even question its actions.

It is the second part of Israel’s concept that is novel, or rather, revitalized, after several decades of relative inaction. Shifting its bombardments between different regions of Gaza, the pursued result was to push the inhabitants toward Gaza’s borders with Egypt. The Israeli prime minister declared that he wanted Israel to be in full control of the two sides, Palestinian and Egyptian, of the Philadelphia corridor running along the border between Gaza and Egypt.

At the same time, statements from former Israeli officials were made that Egypt should receive the Palestinian inhabitants of Gaza in the Sinai Peninsula. A concept paper with this plan, produced by the Israeli Intelligence Ministry, was revealed at the end of October. Another concept document went to the extent of identifying uninhabited housing projects in Egypt where the Palestinians could be relocated. A major Israeli politician boldly considered that crossing the border to Egypt would be an act of voluntary migration by the Palestinians that his country should facilitate, rather than a migration forced by the 65,000 tons of explosives dropped on Gaza by Israel.

The plan to forcibly transfer Palestinians out of what remains of Historic Palestine is now underway. The plan does not stop at pushing the Palestinians toward Egypt, however; Israeli voices have called on European countries to accept the resettlement of Gaza Palestinians in their territories.

In the first days of 2024, the Israeli press announced that the Israeli government had held talks with a number of countries and that specifically the Republic of the Congo had agreed to take in thousands of Palestinian migrants from Gaza. In the same week, Netanyahu told a faction of his Likud party that he was working on facilitating the voluntary migration of Gazans to other countries. Other voices, such as those of the National Security Minister and the Finance Minister, have called for the return of Israeli settlers who had evacuated Gaza in 2005. These comments, while condemned by the U.S. government, have gone without reprimand from the prime minister. Israel’s first concept, the pursuit of security, was thus an opportunity to resuscitate the old Zionist ambition of colonizing the entirety of Palestine. In case the incessant bombing failed to quell their determination, Gaza would be emptied of its Palestinian inhabitants. This would ensure Israel’s security and further the realization of Zionism’s designs.

The most recent Israeli plan for the governance of Gaza after the war, outlined by the Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant, corroborates Israel’s concept of security and peace in the region. It slightly differs with the second part of the concept, as it discards any idea of Jewish resettlement in Gaza. However, while it stops short of referring to the forced displacement of the Gazan people, the plan does not deny the possibility of this option. The plan confirms that the Palestinian Authority will not return to Gaza, and that the governance of Gaza will rather be entrusted to Palestinian committees, the members of which must be approved by Israel. An international force composed of moderate Arab countries, the United States, and Europe will assume responsibility for the reconstruction and economic rehabilitation of the territory. However, Israel will be free to operate militarily in the Gaza strip.

In Israel’s concept, peace is absent. The word was not uttered by any of its leaders since the Gaza war erupted. However, its security, as it defines and ensures it, is the peace that Israel pursues. In this peace, there is no place for a Palestinian state.

The International Concept for Security and Peace in the Middle East
The many variants of the international concept for security and peace are united by the prospect of the so-called two-state solution. According to this concept, an internationally recognized Palestinian state should be established. It would recognize Israel’s right to exist and live in peace alongside it.

In one variant, chiefly expressed by the United States and supported by the United Kingdom and a small number of European states, this prospect can only be realized after Hamas has been wiped out. By exercising its veto right in the UNSC, the United States allows Israel the time it needs to eradicate Hamas and to impose its vision of security on the Palestinian people and the entire region. But, as President Joe Biden and Secretary of State Anthony Blinken articulated, this variant also critically departs from Israel’s vision for Gaza.

In an op-ed in the Washington Post on November 18, Biden outlined that Israel should not occupy Gaza again; the inhabitants of Gaza will not be forcibly displaced; Gaza’s surface area will not be diminished; there will be no delinking between the West Bank and Gaza; the responsibility for Gaza would be taken up by a reinvigorated Palestinian Authority; and, finally, a Palestinian state would be established. Biden had already expressed “our view” of “a two-state solution” in a joint press conference with Australia’s Prime Minister Anthony Albanese in the White House on October 25. Commenting on the situation in Gaza, he stressed that “there’s no going back to the status quo as it stood on October 6”. This is a stark, if unadmitted, recognition that the aim of Israel’s post-October 7 mission is rooted in occupation and in the denial of the right of the Palestinian people to govern themselves in an independent state of their own. It is a clear departure from Israel’s perspective.

A European variant of the concept, slightly different from the American approach, does not accept the unbounded violence Israel metes out to Gaza, even if it still wants Hamas eradicated. In a statement issued after their meeting in Brussels on October 27, European Union leaders said that they were “ready to contribute to reviving a political process on the basis of the two-state solution”. They added that the EU “welcomes diplomatic peace and security initiatives and supports the holding of an international peace conference soon”.

The third variant is that of the vast majority of the United Nations member states. By 153 votes in favor, 10 against, and 23 abstentions, the 10th emergency special session of the UN General Assembly adopted the December 12 resolution calling for a humanitarian ceasefire without condemning Hamas or making any specific reference to it. This was an overwhelmingly Global South vote. Interestingly, except for seven, all the EU member states voted for the resolution. The UNGA resolution did not include any reference to a two-state or any other long-term solution.      However, this resolution has to be read in conjunction with the one previously adopted by the emergency special session on October 27. That resolution, adopted by fewer but still overwhelmingly with 121 votes for, 14 against, and 44 abstentions, reaffirmed in its paragraph 13 that “a just and lasting solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict can only be achieved by peaceful means, based on the relevant United Nations resolutions and in accordance with international law, and on the basis of the two-state solution”. This resolution did not make any mention of Hamas either.

The fourth variant, expectedly the most aligned in letter with Palestinian interests, was expressed by the joint summit of the League of Arab States (LAS) and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) held on November 11. The summit’s resolution, recalling the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative (API), reiterated that the conditions for peace and establishing normal relations with Israel are predicated on the end of its occupation of all Palestinian and Arab territories, the independence of a fully sovereign Palestinian state within the demarcation lines of June 4, 1967—with its capital in East Jerusalem—and the recognition of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people. It also included at its core the right of Palestinian self-determination, and the right of return (or to reparations) for the Palestinian refugees in accordance with UNGA resolution no. 194 of 1948.

The joint summit resolution called on the international community to immediately launch a serious peace process meant to enable the two-state solution that would result in the establishment of the above Palestinian state that would exist in security and peace alongside Israel. The resolution also stressed that the absence of a solution to the Palestinian question was the root cause for the deterioration of security and stability in the region. Significantly, the resolution stressed that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. It did not mention Hamas. This may be considered a reflection of the mutual hostility between some Arab states and the Islamist movement.

The Palestinian Authority espouses the variant adopted by the Arab-Islamic summit, the essence of which is the two-state solution. This is the variant consistent with and derived from the Oslo Accords, signed in Washington D.C. in 1993 by the late Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat, chairman of the PLO and first president of the Palestinian Authority. It also stems from a November 1988 proclamation made by the Palestinian National Council—then based in Algiers— of an independent Palestinian state. Arafat reiterated this proclamation at a UNGA meeting in Geneva in December 1988, coupling it with the acceptance by the PLO of all relevant UN resolutions, explicitly mentioning UNSC Resolution 242. This later resolution recognized the rights of all states of the region, including Israel, to sovereignty. Moreover, the Arab-Islamic variant is based on the 2002 API in whose adoption the PLO was a party.

The real fifth variant is that of Hamas. The main way it differs from the Arab-Islamic variant, shared by the Palestinian Authority, is that it does not explicitly recognize Israel’s right to exist. However, Hamas’ 2017 charter accepts the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on the territories behind the demarcation lines of June 4, 1967, with East Jerusalem as its capital. This acceptance is an implicit recognition of the Israeli state on the territories on the other side of these lines, which is one-half of the prerequisite for a two-state solution

The (Im)possible Realization of the Two-State Solution `
The above analysis shows that Israel is alone in not recognizing its occupation of the Palestinian territories as the cause of the October 7 operation that breached its security and resulted in the death of its people. The continued expansion of the settlements in the West Bank and the settlers’ and Israeli army’s lethal aggressiveness toward the Palestinians are condemned by the international community, but Israel does not see these violations of international law as the reasons for the Palestinian anger that finally resulted in the October 7 Hamas attack. In the meantime, Israel continues to promote the forced migration of Palestinians from Gaza—a policy denounced by all parties, including its protector, the United States.

The Israeli approach to these three issues will be discussed before turning to the two-state solution—considered by all concerned parties the appropriate avenue to ensure security for all peoples and states in the Middle East, realize peace, and ensure stability in the region—which Israel rejects.

Israel’s refusal to recognize that the breach of its security emanated from its effective occupation of Gaza can only mean that it does not want to put an end to this occupation. For Israel, occupation and security are not mutually exclusive. Israel has used extreme violence to prove the continued validity of this proposition. The collapse of this proposition is tantamount to changing the entire mindset on which it was built.

Israel wants to ensure its security on its own terms. Without saying it outright, for Israel, the condition for peace in the Middle East is its own absolute security, immune from any possible threat. Apart from the fact that nothing is absolute in human endeavors, the ironic result is that, for Israel, occupation and peace, like occupation and security, are also not mutually exclusive. The desire for absolute security is at the center of this fallacious reasoning. One party ensuring its absolute security alone will necessarily encroach on the security of others, without ever truly guaranteeing its own. Thus, Israel’s concept is fundamentally a denial of any foundation for a possible peace.

The international community has condemned the colonization and the aggression of settlers against the Palestinians in the occupied West Bank. Yet, Israel continues expanding the settlements and does not restrain the settlers, but rather abets their violence with its army’s support. This is another indication of Israel’s pursuit of security while maintaining and deepening occupation.       

The proposition of settling Israelis in Gaza and the forced displacement of the Palestinians from the Strip, which Israel calls “voluntary migration”, are denounced by the international community. These ideas are a flagrant violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilians in times of war. Article 49 of the convention unequivocally states that “the Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies”. It also prohibits the “individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory”. Since the 1950s, the Palestinians have refused to leave their land.

Now, assuming that the devastating Israeli destruction since October 2023 has changed their minds, the Palestinians would not qualify for refugee status. The 1951 convention on the Status of Refugees excludes the Palestinian refugees from its scope. Article 1D of the convention says that it does not apply to persons receiving protection or assistance from a UN organ other than the United Nations Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). In 1951, UNRWA provided assistance and the now-disappeared United Nations Conciliation Commission furnished protection to the Palestinian refugees.

It is inconceivable that Israel would now accede to encompassing the Palestinian refugees by the 1951 convention so as to facilitate their resettlement. Along with resettlement, the 1951 convention envisages two other durable solutions for refugees: voluntary repatriation and local integration. The Gaza Palestinians would not ask for better than that, since 80 percent of them are refugees who were displaced in 1948. Israel would not voluntarily take this initiative, which is possibly the reason for the use of the concept of “voluntary migration”. Current times are marked by restricted voluntary migration and of hostility toward migrant flows. The migration of millions of Palestinians is just unimaginable. The idea of “voluntary migration” out of Gaza is disingenuous, outrageous, and illegal.

The plan outlined by Gallant, to establish an Israeli-controlled committee of Palestinians to govern Gaza, is far-fetched, to say the least. After the brutality it inflicted on the people of Gaza, Israeli approval of the committee’s membership will hinder its ability to run Gaza with any sense of legitimacy and therefore deprive it from effective functioning.

The idea of establishing such committees also runs counter to the U.S. proposal to return the reinvigorated Palestinian Authority to Gaza to administer its affairs. Additionally, Gallant’s plan to have international forces assume responsibility for the reconstruction and economic rehabilitation of Gaza is a strange proposition. Reconstruction and rehabilitation do not need forces. Armed forces have external security and, exceptionally, internal security functions. In fact, in this plan, Israel wishes to attract the United States and Arab and European countries to take up internal security responsibilities in Gaza at a time when the Israeli military may enter the Strip when it wishes. The United States and the Arab and European countries cannot agree to be Israel’s accomplices.

In the face of Israeli attempts to outmaneuver global consensus, the international community, except Israel, calls for the two-state solution. It may be recalled that one element of the rationale for this solution was to preserve Israel from the prospect of one state where the majority of the population would be Arab. The Arab and Islamic countries and the EU have called for an international conference to settle the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and to give effect to the two-state solution. A protracted approach, such as the failed peace processes of the last three decades, is obviously not an option. Thus, a draft resolution should be tabled at the UNSC to convene the conference.

The differences in the variants of the international concept of the two-state solution can be addressed at that point. The outcome of the conference should not be prejudged. However, some basic parameters should be written into the resolution, such as the indivisibility of the occupied Palestinian territories, the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people, and the guaranteed security of all states in the region.

The main problem would obviously be the question of Palestinian representation at the conference. The Israeli rejection of the Palestinian Authority’s participation cannot be sustained. While the need for the Palestinian Authority is advocated by the United States, the proponents of the two-state solution may find themselves divided over the participation of Hamas— whether within a delegation of a revitalized Palestinian Authority or separately. The outcome of the current war should condition Hamas’ participation. But clearly the effectiveness of any negotiated agreements depend on the participation of the significant parties to the conflict in their negotiations. Britain, it may be recalled, ended up negotiating with its bitter enemy, the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Distinguishing between the military and political wings of the IRA may be a useful lesson to keep in mind.

The United States cannot be in a position to veto a draft UNSC resolution calling for an international conference that is supported by the majority of the UN membership and which could result in operationalizing the two-state solution it calls for. The United States should only weigh on Israel to accept it. Rejecting the conference would put the United States and Israel at odds with the entire world. It would also leave Gaza, the Palestinian people, Israel, and the region in the same situation they were in on October 6 and before.

The failure of seeking to realize the two-state solution would give credit to the argument, held by a considerable number of observers, that the solution has long been dead.