The ongoing Israeli war on Gaza has escalated into a multifaceted conflict involving not only Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas but also key regional actors such as Iran, Lebanon’s Hezbollah, and Yemen’s Houthi rebels. The recent Israeli military actions against the Houthis in the Yemeni port city of Hodeidah, against Hezbollah in Beirut, and in Tehran against Hamas-linked entities, underscore the growing complexity of the Gaza War. The involvement of multiple regional actors, each with its own interests and alliances, has transformed the Gaza crisis into a potential trigger for a larger regional war. Operating from Yemen, for instance, the Houthis have the capability to target vital maritime routes and energy infrastructure in the region, which could have significant economic repercussions. Iran’s role as a major supporter of Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis is particularly crucial in this context because it raises the stakes significantly. Any confrontation between Israel and Iran, whether through proxy forces or directly, could rapidly escalate into a broader regional conflict, drawing in other Middle Eastern countries. The repercussions of such a conflict would destabilize an already volatile region, potentially leading to further large-scale humanitarian crises, mass displacement, and economic disruption.

In parallel, the United States, Russia, and European powers all have significant interests in the Middle East, whether in terms of energy security, military alliances, or broader geopolitical strategy. The United States, for instance, has steadfastly supported Israel and has a vested interest in ensuring the security of its regional allies. A broader conflict could force the United States to become more directly involved, possibly leading to a confrontation with Iran. Russia, which has cultivated ties with Iran and Syria, could also be drawn into the conflict, particularly if its interests in the region are threatened. Moreover, the involvement of global powers in the Gaza crisis could deepen existing global tensions, particularly between the United States and its allies on one side, and Iran and its allies on the other. One region that stands out as particularly sensitive, and a catalyst of potential further global tensions, is the Red Sea.

The response of Red Sea countries to the conflict involving the Houthis and the broader regional tensions has been marked by caution and strategic calculation. While the United States has pushed for a joint military response, many countries in the region have opted for a more restrained approach, prioritizing diplomatic efforts, internal stability, and humanitarian concerns. This reluctance underscores the complexity of the Red Sea’s security environment, where regional actors must navigate a web of alliances, threats, and interests in a volatile geopolitical landscape.

Connecting the World

The sea serves as a critical maritime route for global trade and energy transportation, making it a hot spot for geopolitical power struggles, regional conflicts, and international interventions, as recent Israeli and Houthi activity demonstrates. 

Having become one of the most important shipping routes for merchant ships, especially since the Suez Canal’s inauguration in 1869, the Red Sea has a special strategic significance, connecting the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea via the Suez Canal in the north and the Gulf of Aden through the Bab al-Mandab Strait in the south. 

One of the consequences of insecurity in the Red Sea is a major increase in the cost of global trade and global energy transportation. An oil tanker leaving the Gulf would reach the port of London, 12,000 kilometers away, in fourteen days (at a speed of twenty-two knots) via the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea. If that route was unavailable, the tanker would have to go around the southern tip of Africa—a 24-day journey covering 20,900 kilometers.

This is critical when taking into account that approximately 20,000 ships pass through the Suez Canal annually, and approximately 12%-15% of the world’s trade volume originates yearly from the Red Sea basin. Additionally, four of the seven major oil hubs in the world are in the Middle East, and three of them are linked to the Red Sea.

The Bab al-Mandab Strait between Yemen in the Middle East and Djibouti in the Horn of Africa is one of the world’s busiest oil transit points. It’s a historically significant trade transit route whose proximity to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf reduces shipping distances and facilitates trade. About 33,000 merchant ships pass through the strait every year.

After World War II, the Red Sea became a highly competitive area, especially between the Soviet Union and the United States. In the 1950s, the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in a global struggle for influence, and their competition played out in various ways across the world, including in the MENA region.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in efforts to influence the political direction of various countries by supporting different factions, governments, or revolutionary movements.

The Soviet Union often supported revolutionary movements that aimed to overthrow colonial or pro-Western governments. For example, the regime that emerged out of Egypt’s 1952 revolution, led by Gamal Abdel Nasser, was supported by the Soviet Union as the Egyptian leader adopted policies that were anti-imperialist and socialist in nature.

Conversely, the United States typically supported existing regimes or counter-revolutionary forces that were aligned with Western interests and opposed the spread of communism. This included support for monarchies and conservative governments in countries like Saudi Arabia.

Sudan remained close to the socialist bloc for a while but then moved closer to the American bloc. Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel have been U.S. outposts from the beginning. Yemen, on the other hand, was divided into North Yemen and South Yemen. Djibouti is another important country in the region due to its strategic location. Until recently, it was under French occupation as an ally of the West.

The regimes that emerged often became heavily dependent on either the United States or the Soviet Union for military and economic support. This dependency made these governments vulnerable to changes in international relations or shifts in superpower policies. Many of the regimes that came to power during this period did so with significant external support, which undermined their legitimacy in the eyes of their own people. This lack of legitimacy often contributed to ongoing instability as these governments struggled to maintain control without widespread popular support.

Today, powerful states still maintain a military presence in Red Sea countries. For example, Djibouti became independent from France in 1977, but through a series of treaties, France was given the right to maintain military bases in the country. Then, after four years of the dissolution of the USSR, the United States established two military bases in Eritrea in the cities of Asmara and Massava.

Beyond the Red Sea, Russia has retained a significant military presence in Syria, particularly through its naval facility in Tartus and the Hmeimim Airbase near Latakia. The United Kingdom retained sovereign military bases in Cyprus since the island gained independence in 1960. The United States has significant military bases in several Gulf countries, including Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait. 

Most of the neighboring crisis regions, which are essential topics in global and regional politics, are linked in some way to the Red Sea. Regional crises such as the Arab Spring, the Yemen crisis, and the Sudan and Qatar blockades directly impact Red Sea stability. During Yemen’s civil war, the Arab coalition’s operation against the Houthis through Djibouti caused severe problems for the country. Similarly, during the 2017 Qatar blockade, the UAE and Saudi Arabia pressured countries such as Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Eritrea to take their side, affecting the regional balance. Somalia’s neutrality on the issue has resulted in the UAE supporting separatists in the autonomous regions of northern Somalia (Puntland and Jubaland). The occupation of Palestine had similar consequences for the region, with Red Sea countries like Eritrea facing pressure from Israel. As a result, every Middle Eastern political, economic, and strategic developments affects the countries bordering the Red Sea in some way.

An Arena for Geopolitics

The ongoing conflicts between and within countries in the region present the greatest threats to the Red Sea region. Disputes over the affiliation of islands, border disputes, territorial claims, conflicting economic interests, ideological differences, and ethnic divisions have been cited as the main reasons for the ongoing wars and internal conflicts in the basin. Additionally, terrorism, civil war, regional competition, political and economic instability, piracy, and the spread of crime all impede opportunities in the Red Sea basin. Regional political, financial, and social issues in neighboring Red Sea countries are also increasing regional tensions. 

As a security hotspot, the Red Sea draws in countries that sit on either side of it, such as Yemen and Eritrea, as well as countries much farther afield, such as the United States and China. Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, China, the United States, Italy, France, and Japan all have military bases in the area to protect oil and merchant shipping.  Transit and trade projects in recent years have sought to either integrate the Red Sea in its plans—namely China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the EU’s Global Gateway—or replace it, such as with the US-backed India – Middle East – Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), and Iraq’s Development Road project. The Red Sea is, therefore, an area where complex global relations can play out. Transit routes, islands, waterways, and other sites within the Red Sea borders have less clear legal status internationally and stand out as areas that riparian states and some global actors seek to dominate. The situation has long been controversial, but recently discovered underground resources and struggles for control of energy routes have put the Red Sea back at the center of geopolitical calculations. So, politics and, above all, military developments and alliances are changing the Red Sea.

The Bab al-Mandab Strait, for example, located at the southern entrance to the Red Sea, is a critical choke point in global maritime trade, particularly for oil and gas shipments. The legal status of the strait is governed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which designates it as an international strait. This means that all vessels, including military ships, have the right of transit passage, which cannot be impeded by the bordering states (Yemen and Djibouti). However, the strait’s proximity to conflict zones, particularly Yemen, where the Houthi rebels have targeted shipping, complicates its security. The presence of non-state actors and the involvement of regional powers like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran exacerbate the legal and security issues surrounding the strait.

Under UNCLOS, coastal states have the right to establish exclusive economic zones (EEZs) extending 200 nautical miles from their shores, within which they have sovereign rights over natural resources. However, in the narrow waters of the Red Sea, the establishment of EEZs often leads to overlapping claims. These overlaps can lead to disputes, especially when valuable resources like hydrocarbons are at stake. Countries like Sudan, Eritrea, and Saudi Arabia have overlapping claims, and these disputes are often complicated by the lack of clear legal frameworks or bilateral agreements.

The Hanish Islands, located in the southern Red Sea, are another example of territorial dispute between Yemen and Eritrea. In the 1990s, a brief military conflict occurred over control of these islands. The dispute was eventually resolved through international arbitration, which awarded most of the islands to Yemen. However, tensions remain due to the islands’ strategic location near the Bab al-Mandab Strait.

In the same vein, the Tiran and Sanafir islands, located at the entrance of the Gulf of Aqaba, have historically been under Egyptian control. However, in 2016, Egypt agreed to transfer sovereignty over the islands to Saudi Arabia, a move that was controversial both domestically and regionally. The legal status of this transfer was subject to judicial review in Egypt and sparked debates about the islands’ strategic importance, especially regarding access to the Gulf of Aqaba and Israel’s maritime routes.

The Rise of Non-state Armed Groups

The Houthis are currently the Red Sea basin’s most pressing security concern. Backed by Iran, they’ve been involved in armed conflicts with the Saudi and Emirati-backed Yemeni government. The civil war has exposed the country to foreign intervention: in 2015, the United States supported Saudi Arabia’s intervention to prevent the Houthis from invading all of Yemen.

However, this is not to say that the Houthis are a monolithic entity with a single common agenda; they are a complex and volatile coalition. Houthi soldiers have hounded, assaulted, and taken control of many ships since 2016. Their earliest techniques, such as rocket-propelled grenades, were not very sophisticated, but their strategies have evolved to be more hazardous and successful. They have employed mines, drones, and anti-ship missiles. The biggest casualty of their attacks are Saudi ships and ports. Since October 2023, the tactics employed by the group have significantly evolved, featuring a mix of diverse and adaptable methods. These tactics include the utilization of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), as well as for one-way explosive attacks. Additionally, the group has employed anti-ship ballistic missiles and land-attack missiles, while also integrating multidomain and multi-access attacks. This strategic shift highlights the Houthis’ capacity for quick adaptation and refinement of their tactics, which presents new challenges for their adversaries, particularly the United States and its allies operating in the region.

Besides the Houthis, the activity of non-state armed groups is increasing day by day, especially in Yemen and Somalia, south of the Red Sea. Organizations such as al-Hirak, Yemen’s al-Qaeda, Somalia’s al-Shabab, and Ansar al-Sharia will continue to cause problems for the region. The presence of armed groups such as the Islamic State Sinai Province, formerly Ansar Bait al-Maqdis, affected not only Egypt’s domestic security, but also the stability of the Red Sea. The fact that some states either ignore these groups or actively support certain groups indicates that non-state armed groups operating in the region play a significant role in its stability, or lack thereof. These non-state armed groups may receive support from local factions or regional and global powers. The manipulation of regional ethnic and religious differences for political gain creates an environment ripe for terrorism. 

As part of its “global war on terror”, the United States built a military presence at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti in 2002. It serves as a key hub for U.S. counterterrorism operations, particularly against al-Shabaab in Somalia and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen. The base supports drone strikes, surveillance missions, and special operations forces deployments. It helps safeguard U.S. and allied economic interests in the region, particularly the flow of oil and gas from the Gulf states through the Red Sea and Suez Canal, which proved its vital role in the global economy after the attacks on the ships in the region. 

Human Trafficking, Smuggling, and Piracy

The routes used for human trafficking and smuggling of various types of goods are often a source of funding for civil wars and terrorist activities in the region. The increase in unemployment, displaced persons, and refugees has led to the emergence of many organized crime groups with political, ideological, or commercial motives. The Red Sea, due to its location as a transit point near conflict zones, is one of the regions with the highest concentrations of arms and human traffickers. The influence of the illegal sector has had a detrimental impact on regional stability and has resulted in the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives. 

Piracy is also a significant issue in the Red Sea, particularly in and around the Gulf of Aden, which impacts global trade and regional stability. While piracy was more prevalent around 2008 and 2009, practical efforts by NATO, the European Union, and the United Nations have significantly decreased such attacks. Despite the challenging geopolitical environment, the movement of vessels has remained largely unrestricted and secure in recent years. Recent events with the Houthis have raised concerns about the previously assumed safety of the Red Sea passageway, as it becomes apparent that there may be potential for new disturbances.

The region has combined task forces (CTFs) to solve security problems with 45 volunteer nations from all continents. CTF 150 covers regions beyond the Arabian Gulf, CTF 151 concentrates on combating piracy, and CTF 152 covers activities inside the Arabian Gulf. Previously, the organization had three task forces with particular geographical areas or tasks. The Red Sea is the main topic of the newest fourth task force, CTF 153, established in April 2022. It covers some of the world’s most important shipping lanes, including those through the Suez Canal, Bab al-Mandab Strait, and the Arabian Sea. The task force is crucial in ensuring these routes remain safe and open, protecting the flow of global commerce, including energy supplies. Vice Admiral Brad Cooper of the U.S. Navy stated that the goal of CTF 153 is to “improve security and stability” in the area, adding that the mission also includes preventing human trafficking and the smuggling of drugs and weapons. Houthi marine assaults are undoubtedly another risk that the task force would try to prevent, even if authorities have not been clear about the task force’s involvement in fending off threats from Houthi troops in Yemen.

Growing interest in the area, fueled by piracy in the Indian Ocean and the Gaza War, has sparked a considerable increase in military action. The free flow of business and essential collaboration between nations with shared interests in regional security fall under this category. CTF 153 and The EU’s Operation Atalanta are crucial examples. Operation Atalanta is the EU’s counter-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia that launched in 2008. Its primary objectives are to protect World Food Programme (WFP) vessels delivering aid to Somalia, deter and prevent piracy, and safeguard other vulnerable vessels in the region.

In response to the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, new multilateral initiatives were created. Operation Prosperity Guardian was established in December 2023. The U.S.-led Red Sea coalition, involving almost 20 nations, is a maritime security initiative designed to address growing security concerns in the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab Strait, and Gulf of Aden—strategic waterways crucial for global trade. The Aspides Mission was established by the EU in February 2024. It provides maritime situational awareness, accompanies vessels, and protects them against possible multidomain attacks at sea in the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, and the Gulf of Oman.

Diplomacy and Competition: An International Game

The seriousness of the regional power conflict has shown itself with the establishment of the Red Sea Council in 2020. It emerged with the establishment of the “Council of Arab and African States Bordering the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden”, signed in Riyadh in January 2020 by Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, Eritrea, Egypt, Yemen, and Jordan, which have borders on the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The Council aims to maintain security and stability in the Red Sea and consult and coordinate to combat the dangers encountered, but does not constitute a military alliance. It was established through the Egyptian–Saudi Arabian initiative with the support of the European Union, Germany, and the African Union.

The platform-building initiatives, which were initially carried out under the leadership of Egypt, have been passed into the purview of Saudi Arabia since mid-2018. The formation of the Red Sea Council was completed at the beginning of 2020, despite various disputes over membership, goals, finance, and procedures. The multidimensional collaboration platform is not intended to create a military alliance against Iran and Ethiopia. It is organized to prevent any potential conflicts in the region. Its scope will be limited to the defense of the riparian countries to keep threats away and to address the necessary preventative measures within the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea.

Without the participation of a central country, namely Ethiopia, in the council, new tensions could be created rather than cooperation between the region’s countries. Based on Saudi Arabia’s economic power and political authority, it would be seen as a new instrument of the regional power struggle rather than an effective, unifying platform. Accordingly, it is believed that the new council is aimed at limiting the ability of Qatar and Türkiye, along with Iran, to move into the Red Sea.

The Red Sea Council is meant to be a new regional instrument. However, it has not been able to prevent the militarization of the Red Sea corridor—one of its mandates. This is due to a lack of support from the international community and historical tensions between the Red Sea states over territorial issues.

While many nations have competing interests, they all have a stake in the Red Sea region’s security and freedom of navigation. For instance, Washington and Beijing battle for influence in Africa and the Middle East while simultaneously wanting functional trade lines. Egypt seeks support in maintaining security but also wants to preserve its independence and restrict the influence of non-littoral powers. The Gulf Cooperation Council countries are spending money to increase their naval capabilities, but although they have much in common, their goals differ. For instance, Saudi Arabia prioritizes maritime border security, whereas the UAE generally strives to secure commercial vessels. Maritime security will be more crucial as more players try to advance their influence and safeguard their interests in the Red Sea region. Increased coordination and collaboration between adversaries and allies with shared interests are necessary to ensure security.

A new era of reliance on security has started as foreign nations attempt to gain control of strategic ports in the region. These external parties seek to establish connections between important sea lanes by negotiating with the Red Sea states, and sometimes exploiting their vulnerabilities. This new period of turmoil could lead to various events, as we have seen with the coup in Sudan, the emergence of the radical right wing in Israel, and the war in Gaza. These potential outcomes will not only impact the stability of the countries bordering the Red Sea but also global safety in terms of freedom of navigation, supply chain management, and reliance on resources.