For most of its modern history, Syria has been in the grip of regimes which embodied ‘security-states’—crushing dissent, waging violence on civilians, and controlling all aspects of society. This style of authoritarian governance, which has existed in the country for about five decades, has eliminated the ability to apply a conventional policy framework to the recent ousting of Bashar al-Assad from his entrenched presidency. To understand the events which took place in Syria, it is crucial to contextualize the country’s history, what it means to implement a revolution built on freedom, and if the new government’s plan embodies these ideals. 

One Swift Stroke: Regime Collapses

On December 8, 2024, Bashar al-Assad was officially removed from power, forcing him to flee and seek asylum in Russia. The battle against the Syrian regime began on November 27, meaning that the entire operation took only 11 days. There were a number of groups involved in the opposition against Assad but the main offensive was headed by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). HTS rose to prominence in 2011 during the Syrian Civil War as a direct affiliate of al-Qaeda until 2016, when the two officially broke ties. 

HTS led the coalition of opposition forces against Assad under the banner of the Military Operations Command (MOC). Despite their successful disposal of Bashar al-Assad they remain on the U.S. list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO), and getting removed might prove to be an uphill battle for the former prisoner of Camp Bucca and erstwhile ally of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. More importantly, HTS leader Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa is at the forefront of a new era in Syrian politics. After the confirmation of Assad’s removal, Syrians took to the streets to celebrate. There is reason for the Syrian population to be optimistic as they can now say goodbye to the regime that was responsible for the death of over 200,000 civilians, including 23,058 children and 12,010 women. However, there are still many lingering questions regarding the country’s path forward. 

‘Common sense’ is No Longer Applicable in Syria

To answer some of these questions, the Middle Eastern Studies Program at the American University in Cairo held a talk led by Hani Sayed, Associate Professor in the Law Department. “How do we situate this moment philosophically, politically, historically?” he asked the audience. Sayed pointed out that it is common practice in academia to analyze case studies through the lens of policy prescription; for instance, to examine the recent rise of HTS one would instinctively put themselves in the place of policy advisor to al-Sharaa. This would be the practical approach, or as Sayed put it, the application of “common sense”.

Sayed defines ‘common sense’ as a “way of understanding how the world is governed after WWII”; and, moreover, how policy tools are used to mediate political tensions and prevent the outbreak of war.  He believes the ‘common sense’ approach to Syrian policy has been in crisis for decades.  However, at one point in history, there was impetus for hope in Syria—ironically, led by the recently removed Ba’ath party. 

The Ba’ath party was founded in 1947 on the basis of socialism and Arab nationalism, and promoted the slogan of “Unity, Freedom and Socialism“. More specifically, they believed that their party needed to be distinctly “revolutionary”(also known as inqilab)—a pillar outlined in Article 6 of the Ba’ath Constitution. While the founders of the party always advocated for an external struggle against forces that had undermined the Arab people, they also believed in a metaphysical and internal revolution that would facilitate the reconstruction of Syrian politics. 

This altruistic ideology of inqilab was short lived as the Ba’ath party would soon become an embodiment of civil strife for the Syrian people. Following the Ba’ath party’s seizure of power in 1963, the original leaders of the Ba’ath party were ousted in 1966 by a group of young Alawites—an offshoot of Shiite Islam who currently make up the second largest religious group in Syria, composing around 15% of the population. As a result, one of the officers involved, Hafez al-Assad, took the position of Minister of Defense. In the subsequent years, and due to the politicized role of the military, Hafez al-Assad was able to manipulate his way to the presidency through violence, arrests, and a bloodless coup in 1970. 

Given this history, the Syrian security-state has been “unfolding since 1976” explained Sayed. In June of that year, tensions began to grow over Hafez al-Assad’s policy toward Palestine and Lebanon, leading to public protests and violent attacks against members of the regime. In 1982, when an Islamist rebel uprising broke out in the city of Hama, Hafez al-Assad responded with an iron fist—fierce artillery fire and bombardment killed around 20,000 civilians and left thousands missing. 

“This is the structure of power that exists in the torture chain…this is the idea that the ruler has the power to break your bones, to heal your bones, and to break them again,” Sayed said.

Al-Assad sought to quell dissent through military control and internal security forces. In 1982, Syrian defense and internal security cost “an estimated $2.4 billion, or 58.5 percent of government expenditure and almost 30 percent of the total budget”. Ultimately, he desired a regime that was “coup-proof”, and a population with a broken spirit rendering a revolution against his rule impossible.

When Al-Assad’s son Bashar took power in 2001, the initial stages of his presidency implied hope for a better future, one that addressed corruption, loosened the grip of the security state, and opened up the economy to the free market. Ultimately, however, the security-state model was not lost on Hafez al-Assad’s successor, and the only thing that changed was Bashar’s move toward economic liberalization, development, privatization, and modernization. For example, the four main security agencies created by Hafez continued into Bashar al-Assad’s rule. The continuation of this model saw numerous violent responses to civil unrest. 

Following the self-immolation of a Tunisian, man protesting his government’s corruption in December 2010, 15 boys in the city of Dara’a spray painted the words “Down with the regime” on a high school wall. The boys were arrested and tortured, sparking massive upheaval. Assad responded by conducting raids in several cities in an attempt to quiet dissent. Eventually, enough military officers defected to create the Free Syrian Army (FSA), marking the beginning of a long and bloody civil war that saw both the rebels and Syrian military committing war crimes. 

In 2013, the U.S. Congress confirmed that chemical weapons were used against civilians in the Ghouta area of Damascus. Multiple international bodies that monitor cases of human rights violations accused Bashar al-Assad’s regime of crimes that occurred over the course of the Civil War such as torture, enforced disappearances, the use of illegal weaponry, and many others. Civilians who lived in government occupied areas were also subjected to attacks by the opposition—including HTS and other non-state armed groups.

The ‘common sense’ approach, which argued that newly independent countries could grasp economic and liberal freedoms, was not possible under the Ba’athist security state. Under their rule, Sayed said, “economy, society, education, health” were all controlled. Despite early indications that under Bashar al-Assad’s Syria would become a liberalized economy free of corruption, he decided to use his power to subjugate public sector workers and reward loyalist investors. It should thus come as no surprise that Bashar al-Assad’s regime fell in under 2 weeks; Sayed explained that this was the culmination of a post-colonial state that had been deteriorating for 54 years. 

How Should This Recent ‘Revolution’ Be Examined? 

Practical policy approaches are insufficient to explain the Syrian political landscape. In other words, the securitized nature of the father-son Assad regime erased all vestiges of ‘common sense’. How then can one examine the recent events in Syria? In his lecture, Sayed highlighted this problem, “when common sense is in crisis, your political possibilities are narrow”, which forces the analyst “to create a new way of looking at the world”. To do so, Sayed asserted that we must contend with the etymology of the term “revolution”. 

In her book On Revolution, Hannah Arendt, 20th century German-American historian and philosopher,  describes how the term ‘revolution’ can only be invoked when it is on the basis of freedom and when it ushers in a completely new era of politics. “Crucial, then, to any understanding of revolutions in the modern age is that the idea of freedom and the experience of a new beginning should coincide.”  More specifically, freedom means “participation in public affairs, or admission to the public realm”.  

Sayed detailed how a similar definition of revolution became apparent in Arabic starting in 1921. Thawra (revolution) became something that “articulated a movement of people in order to achieve their fundamental rights, political participation, [and] anti-colonial struggle”, Sayed explained.

The etymological origin of revolution places al-Sharaa’s rise to power in context. To be a revolution, al-Sharaa must introduce a new order of politics which gives Syrians freedom—political participation, involvement in public affairs, and human rights. 

On January 22, 2025, al-Sharaa held a conference that was dubbed “Conference for Announcing the Victory of the Syrian Revolution” where he was announced as Syria’s president for a “transitional period”. This connotes the idea that Bashar al-Assad’s removal was a means to an end for the rebel alliance, focused more on putting themselves in power rather than ushering in a new age of freedom. Al-Sharaa is presenting the revolution as an event which has been successfully concluded. Sayed elucidates that we must be “suspicious” by the declaration that the revolution was “won” as al-Sharaa can use his successful revolution as a tool to legitimize his rule, without giving Syrians the freedom that revolution promises. Sayed argued that there is “no revolution now, not yet”.

Al-Sharaa’s Domestic Policy Plan

In a recent interview with The Economist, al-Sharaa laid out his vision for Syria. When asked if Syria was going to be a democratic state, he responded by saying “If democracy means that the people decide who will rule them and who represents them in the parliament, then yes, Syria is going in this direction.” He also plans to have elections that are “free and fair”, and to implement a constitutional declaration that will “define the identity of the state”. Checks and balances will be ensured according to al-Sharaa, “there is the High Judicial Council and the Supreme Constitutional Court…the president does not have the authority to say ‘I want this law or that law passed’”. These plans seem to fit into Arendt’s idea of ‘revolution’, painting a potentially hopeful picture for Syrians. 

Furthermore, al-Sharaa has insisted that he wants to prevent sectarian tensions from heightening. He has promised that in no less than three months a “diverse government” will be formed, with participation from different parts of society and selection based on merit, not ethnicity. He also wants to establish complete state control over all weapons and to have all rebel military factions who helped topple Assad join the “new Syrian army”. It is crucial for al-Sharaa to maintain control over different militias to prevent the events that unraveled during the Lebanese Civil War—where a decentralized military and easy access to weapons allowed militias to engage in sectarian warfare.

On Palestine

The issue of Palestine has often had the ability to transcend regional borders and offer a point of compromise for many Arab states. Most recently, countries united against Trump’s plan to displace Palestinians and relocate them to Egypt and Jordan. Arab League chief Ahmed Aboul Gheit explained that Trump’s plan for Palestine “is unacceptable to the Arab world, which has fought this idea for 100 years”. How al-Sharaa navigates his support for Palestinians could make or break his legitimacy in Syria. 

Palestine and Syria have had a historically complex and tumultuous relationship. To illustrate this, Sayed shared with the audience that “Palestinians killed by the Syrian regime are equal or more than the number of Palestinians killed by Israel”. Thousands of Syrian-Palestinians were killed by Bashar al-Assad’s regime over the course of the Civil War. On the flip side, still fresh in the mind of the Syrian people is Hamas’ former alliance with Assad, and how Syrian rebels were abandoned by Hamas in the fight against Assad.

The civilian populations of each respective side do not necessarily share the same animosity as their governments. Ammar Musarea, Syrian journalist for the Washington Institute, states that “Syrians as a whole empathize with Palestinians and reject the killing and forced displacement of Palestinians and destruction of their homes”. Syrians see parallels between themselves and the plight of the Palestinians. In October 2023, while Gaza was being bombed by Israeli forces and Idlib by the Syrian regime, Syrian demonstrators took to the streets waving Free Syria flags with Palestinian ones while holding banners that read “Our people are in Gaza, your blood is our blood, your lives are our lives”.

It could be that the al-Sharaa’s presidency will entail new hope for Syrian-Palestinian relations, and provide the Palestinian people with a formidable ally. Al-Sharaa responded to the Trump plan that would eliminate any hope for a future Palestinian state by stating that it was “a very huge crime that cannot happen”. In fact, Hamas congratulated the Syrian rebels following Assad’s downfall. Maintaining stable relations with Palestine and helping its people on their path to freedom has been an absent element in previous Syrian governments, but it remains crucial if al-Sharaa desires a successful revolution.  

Foreign Policy

For the newly instated president’s leadership to be legitimized, he must seek recognition from powers outside the Middle East. At the top of the Syrian president’s foreign policy task list is to convince the international community to lift its sanctions on the country. Shortly after his military victory over the Syrian regime, al-Sharaa pleaded in an interview with France24 saying “We Syrians, the victims, are being punished for the acts of our executioner, who is no longer with us”. He even went on to say that he did not care if he was on the U.S. FTO list or subjected to personal sanctions as long as the sanctions were lifted on the Syrian people. 

Some strides have been made, as just recently the European Union decided to lift economic sanctions in Syria in key sectors such as oil, gas, transport, and energy. The Biden administration also eliminated a long-standing 10 million dollar bounty on al-Sharaa’s head. The decision came following very “productive” talks between HTS representatives and the U.S. delegation. That same week France, Germany, and the U.K. all sent delegations to Syria to engage with al-Sharaa. Still, many sanctions remain in place, many of which came in the 2000s, crippling the Syrian infrastructure.

Barbara Leaf, who led the U.S. delegation, explained that amicable U.S.-Syrian relations hinge on the inclusivity of the new government, the level of human rights, and most importantly, its regional threat level and its relationship to local terrorist groups. Whether or not al-Sharaa fulfills these benchmarks remains to be seen, but if he wants sanctions to be lifted, he must appease Western powers to some degree.

With Trump now in office, the political landscape has undergone a seismic shift. Trump has long held a position of non-interference with Syria. His cabinet members assert that non-interference is a broad policy platform for the Middle East, as National Security Advisor Mike Waltz explained, “President Trump was elected with an overwhelming mandate to not get the United States dug into any more Middle Eastern wars”. 

Al-Sharaa desperately needs Trump to lift the remaining sanctions and help him facilitate Syria’s global integration. During his confirmation hearing, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio offered a glimpse into the Trump administration’s current foreign policy approach. He insisted on the desire to protect and support Kurdish forces, uphold the rights of religious minorities, and prevent Iran’s use of a “terrorist corridor” for Hezbollah to use to access Lebanon. However, when speaking about the potential removal of sanctions in Syria he gave a conflicting response. He outlined that the United States now has “sanctions in place against the government that no longer exists” and continued by saying that Washington should explore the use of sanctions (and the potential removal of them) as a policy tool, but noted that there are many roadblocks still at play that could prevent lifting them. 

Trump himself has yet to comment on potentially extending the six-month sanction relief that was issued on January 6, 2025. Considering the Trump administration’s foreign policy, sanction relief might be a slow process. This relief could not come any sooner for Syrians who recently sent a letter to Trump urging him to lift the sanctions in the name of human rights. To undo the atrocities of the previous regime, and to implement freedoms necessary for a successful ‘revolution’, the new Syrian government will have to lean on the international community for support. 

How Should We View The Future of Syria?

HTS faces a significant challenge: consolidating control over a deeply divided country. The question is whether the new government attempts to bridge sectarian divides through peace or intensify them through violence. While the overthrow of al-Assad happened with relatively little bloodshed, there is still the chance that remnants of the old regime or other groups may resist. In fact, this has happened recently on the northwest Syrian coast when Assad loyalists attacked Syrian security forces. What followed was hundreds of civilian casualties, with Assad loyalists killing 211 civilians and the Syrian security forces responsible for 396.  Gruesome stories shared by Alawite civilians detail “revenge killings” at the hands of gunmen linked to the current Syrian government. 

This is a concerning development for the president’s international and domestic legitimacy. While al-Sharaa claims that these killings were not government sanctioned and were the result of individual actions, many, including The United States, U.N., and human rights monitoring groups, still hold the new government responsible. This may signal that HTS is struggling to control the multiple factions that make up its coalition—many different groups have been implicated in the worst violence since before the fall of Assad, including “Syrian National Army factions, foreign fighters, and random civilians,” along with “some HTS forces”, according to the Washington Institute. A fractured military, sectarian divides, and armed civilians is a recipe for a grim turn of events.

In the past, leadership changes have brought hope for Syrians. The 1963 Ba’athist coup saw the potential of inqilab, a revolution that would raise the Arab spirit of the nation. What followed was a regime that used internal security forces to violently crush dissent. Many thought in 2001 that free market economics and anti-corruption initiatives would start a new chapter in Syria. This was unfortunately not the case, and what ensued was a Civil War riddled with humanitarian violations and familiar measures to silence protests. 

Sayed’s advice regarding the state of affairs in Syria: “We’re cautiously optimistic”. The previous leaders in Syria destroyed a ‘common sense’ analytical framework in Syria as previous security regimes controlled all aspects of society. A revolution should not simply mean the collapse of a leader but the introduction of a new political order built on the idea of freedom. Al-Sharaa’s government has shown signs of inclusivity but how this plays out in the long-term remains to be seen, and many external factors are still at play. Whether or not a free Syria actually means freedom for Syrians depends on whether the work of the revolution has stopped, or is just beginning.