The Eastern Mediterranean Sea is a complex region where coastal states have made many overlapping territorial and maritime claims. Despite this, regional states have made considerable progress in recent years in resolving disputes and forming cooperative agreements, particularly over seabed energy resources. Cyprus and Egypt were the first to delimit their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) in 2003. Cyprus then made similar agreements with Lebanon and Israel. The three agreements include procedures for dealing with overlapping hydrocarbon resources. The EEZ delimitation agreement signed by Greece and Egypt in 2020 also follows this model.

After 12 years of negotiations, Israel and Lebanon reached an agreement to establish their EEZ in October 2022. The agreement solidifies the trend towards maritime delimitation and transboundary cooperation over seabed resources in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. It is a pioneering achievement in the region. If implemented in good faith, it stands to contribute to peace and prosperity between the two states and the region as a whole.   

A Groundbreaking Agreement

The Lebanon-Israel Agreement breaks new ground in at least four ways. First, it is the first maritime boundary agreement reached between two states that do not have diplomatic relations. Lebanon does not recognize Israel as a state and the two countries have been at war for almost 75 years, with tensions frequently escalating. The demarcation of the land boundary remains disputed: a temporary line of ceasefire and withdrawal (the “Blue Line”) has been monitored by the United Nations since 2000. The Lebanon-Israel Agreement recognizes that the land boundary remains unresolved and treats the waters of the territorial sea immediately adjacent to the land boundary as “undelimited”, namely, subject to future delimitation between the parties. This means that the agreement does not prejudice either party’s rights or obligations under international law in regards to determining the exact location of the terrestrial boundary on land and the territorial sea boundary immediately adjacent to the coasts. A maritime area of 3.1 miles is provisionally demarcated by buoys to serve as a security zone. 

Second, the deal is the first maritime delimitation agreement reached between adjacent states in the Eastern Mediterranean. The previous delimitation agreements in the region involved opposite states: Cyprus–Egypt, Cyprus–Lebanon, Cyprus–Israel, and Greece–Egypt. The Lebanon-Israel Agreement could provide guidance for the future delimitation of other adjacent coastal boundaries in the region, such as those between Syria–Turkey, Syria–Lebanon, and Egypt–Libya. 

Third, it is the first maritime boundary dispute in the Eastern Mediterranean, and possibly around the world, resolved solely through indirect negotiations. The United States facilitated the mediation process, and the agreement is not a direct agreement between Israel and Lebanon. It takes the form of two separate agreements with Washington: one between Israel and the United States and one between Lebanon and the United States. The agreement only names Lebanon and Israel as “parties”. This means that the two countries have signed two separate documents, but the combined effect of those two documents is an international treaty between Lebanon and Israel.

While this method of treaty-making is unusual, it complies with international law. A treaty is valid under international law if it is based on mutual consent through which the parties assume an express legal commitment to establish a “permanent and equitable” maritime boundary between them. The text of the Lebanon-Israel Agreement confirms the parties’ commitment to this, and enshrines that Lebanon and Israel both have a clear and unchanging understanding of their common maritime boundary. Lebanon’s President, Michel Aoun, stated that the agreement “satisfies Lebanon, meets its demands, and preserves its rights to its natural resources.” Israel’s former Prime Minister, Yair Lapid, called the agreement “a historic achievement that will strengthen Israel’s security, bring billions into Israel’s economy and ensure stability on the northern border.” The UN Security Council also released a statement saying that the boundary agreement “will contribute to the stability, the security, and the prosperity of the region.” 

Fourth, the agreed upon boundary clarifies the maritime areas under the jurisdiction of Lebanon and Israel. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and customary international law allow states to delimit freely their maritime boundaries where maritime jurisdictional zones overlap. UNCLOS envisages an agreement between neighboring states as the primary method for delimiting maritime boundaries, including the EEZ (Article 74, paragraph 1). UNCLOS does not dictate any method for determining the boundary; it only requires that the method arrives at an equitable solution. Unlike maritime boundaries typically determined through a judicial process, the Lebanon-Israel boundary is not based on mathematical calculations drawn from coastal geographical base points. However, both Lebanon and Israel perceived the delimited boundary to be “equitable”.  It was freely negotiated and agreed to, which is what international law requires. 

The parties reached this result through a process of amicable compromises aimed at safeguarding vital national interests. For Israel, this included enabling the safe and uninterrupted development of its gas fields, south of the new boundary. For Lebanon, this included convincing international energy companies to invest within its maritime areas, including on resources straddling the new line. 

What the agreement does

The Lebanon-Israel Agreement outlines the terms for exploring and exploiting a hydrocarbon prospect, referred to as the Qana Prospect, which may extend on both sides of the agreed boundary. The agreement states that Lebanon will be responsible for exploring and exploiting the Qana Prospect “exclusively for Lebanon”, based on a financial agreement to be reached with Israel on Israel’s “economic rights” in the prospect. Thus, Lebanon can authorize an international operator to develop the Qana Prospect; it can manage the area by applying its own licensing and regulatory procedures, while Israel maintains an entitlement to “economic rights”. In other words, the agreement allows Lebanon, as the designated managing state, to appoint a contractor to develop the Qana Prospect, on the condition that the contractor pays an agreed compensation to Israel. 

Pursuant to this provision, on 15 November—only two weeks after the adoption of the Lebanon-Israel Agreement—the Lebanese-appointed contractor, TotalEnergies, and its partner ENI announced that they “have signed, with the State of Israel, a Framework Agreement to implement the agreement on maritime boundary which has been reached between Israel and Lebanon on October 27, 2022”. 

The Framework Agreement outlines the compensation payment that TotalEnergies and ENI will make to Israel for its “economic rights” in the Qana Prospect, as well as information-sharing requirements and procedures for Lebanese-appointed companies operating on the Israeli side of the boundary. Lebanese-appointed companies will be required to follow Israeli laws and regulations when operating on the Israeli side of the boundary. 

The Lebanon-Israel Agreement also includes provisions for the exploration and exploitation of all other transboundary hydrocarbon deposits “other than the Qana Prospect” that may be discovered in the future. If such fields are discovered, the parties agree not to take unilateral action and, instead, to notify the United States so that it can facilitate  arrangements for the most effective exploration and exploitation of the transboundary deposit. If, for example, an Israeli-appointed operator drills a well on the Israeli side of the maritime boundary and discovers that this well may exploit seabed resources flowing from Lebanon to Israel, Israel must share this information with the United States and engage in discussions to facilitate the coordinated development and exploitation of the transboundary resource. 

This is consistent with regional state practice in the Eastern Mediterranean and general international law: no state can exploit a common deposit before negotiating the matter in good faith with neighboring states with a view to concluding an agreement. For instance, the Cyprus–Egypt 2013 Framework Agreement established that, where hydrocarbon reservoirs are discovered which straddle the boundary laid down by the Cyprus-Egypt 2003 EEZ delimitation agreement, the two states and their respective operators will establish a mutual framework of cooperation, exchange of information and coordination. Both states pledged to notify the other when a hydrocarbon reservoir is identified in the vicinity of the EEZ boundary and provide the other party with all necessary information, results, and data pertinent to hydrocarbon discoveries in the “Near-by Area” —an area up to 10 km from the EEZ limit. This provision was successfully tested when ENI discovered a “world-class supergiant” gas field (“Zohr”) offshore Egypt in 2015. Egypt fulfilled its obligation to grant technical information to Cyprus regarding the gas field.

Managing Future Disagreements

The Lebanon-Israel Agreement stipulates that any differences in the interpretation and implementation of the agreement must be resolved “through discussion facilitated by the United States”. This raises the question of what would happen if the parties refused to work with the United States. Further, is the United States legally bound by the terms of the Agreement? The clause is not technically a legally binding form of dispute resolution and may be open to interpretation. It could include anything from direct or indirect consultation, negotiation with the United States, mediation, and/or expert determination. The broad language of the clause may lead to every disagreement about the performance of cooperation being elevated to a formal U.S.-facilitated procedure of negotiation or mediation. This could negatively impact the commercial purpose of the agreement and any subsequent hydrocarbon arrangements adopted under it.

The clause does not specify a procedure to follow if “U.S.-facilitated discussions” between the parties and private sector operators on the commercialization and allocation of economic benefits fail to reach a resolution. This may also create uncertainty and delays in resolving disputes, particularly on complex and sensitive issues such as determining the exact proportions of a straddling hydrocarbon deposit on either side. This could also lead to prolonged stalemates, as shown by recent examples in the Eastern Mediterranean. 

A win-win-win, if implemented in good faith

The Lebanon-Israel Agreement is not perfect. Many provisions are open to interpretation and there is no binding form of dispute resolution. The Lebanon-Israel Agreement, unlike previous agreements in the region, has faced heightened legal scrutiny from public interest and civil society groups in both Israel and Lebanon. 

In Israel, the government’s ability to conclude the agreement was challenged before the country’s Supreme Court. In Kohelet Forum v. Prime Minister, the petitioners argued that the agreement involves “a transfer of sovereignty over Israeli territory” and, therefore, should have been put to a national referendum and to a vote before the Israeli Knesset. The Supreme Court unanimously rejected these claims. The Court found that delimiting the country’s EEZ boundary does not transfer territorial sovereignty because the sovereignty of the coastal state does not extend to the EEZ. Moreover, the small section of territorial sea area affected by the agreement (located 3-12 miles from the coast) is not subject to Israeli law.

In Lebanon, civil society organizations have been concerned about the government’s decision to allow private-sector companies, like TotalEnergies and ENI, to negotiate and make hydrocarbon deals with Israel in relation to the Qana Prospect, without any involvement or input from Lebanon. This raises public concerns about a lack of transparency and accountability. 

Nevertheless, the Lebanon-Israel Agreement may well be a win-win-win proposition, not just for Israel and Lebanon, but also the Eastern Mediterranean region more broadly. If implemented in good faith, the agreement can promote security, stability and mutual economic benefits for Israel, Lebanon and the whole Eastern Mediterranean region. The agreement promotes the rule of international law in the peaceful settlement of disputes. It allows both states to invite companies and coordinate exploration and exploitation activities to determine the size, quality, and quantity of any hydrocarbon resources in the agreed area. If the main aim of the parties was securing sovereign rights over hydrocarbon resources on either side of, or across, their common boundary and, at the same time, preventing missing out on future economic benefits, the agreement fulfills that aim. 

The Lebanon-Israel Agreement may not guarantee that the hydrocarbon resources discovered in the seabed will be significant or of commercial value. However, the deal provides incentives for both sides to work together to realize fully the economic potential of their respective maritime areas. Hydrocarbon resources, whether known or suspected, should not hamper the peaceful settlement of disputes, as the development of these resources is uncertain and subject to change. An international maritime boundary, on the other hand, is a permanent and unchanging reality that symbolizes peace and stability. This is what Eastern Mediterranean states need most. The agreement ensures that Lebanon and Israel can continue exploring their energy potentials while avoiding disputes over competing sovereign rights and access to transboundary resources. Even if they may discover less than expected, or  if the discovered resources have a limited commercial value, the maritime boundary established by the agreement is worth more than the resources themselves.