Social change, from political movements to cultural shifts, all relate to the concept of knowledge, or, more specifically, to the actors who produce knowledge. For Africa, this framework of knowledge production can be used to understand three key developments which occurred in the post-colonial era as the continent explored its new regional governance: a fundamental reframing of security, the promotion of human rights, and the expansion of relations with Asia.  

Sociologists trace the concept of the social construction of knowledge to the French scholar Émile Durkheim, who pointed to the social foundations of knowledge and the individual’s “inherited” ways of “acting, thinking and feeling” stemming from their location within the social structure. These scholars also allude to Karl Marx’s contention that the constraints of social structure and the individual’s “social being … determines their consciousness”. 

These ideas were later expanded upon by Hungarian sociologist Karl Mannheim who identified systems of knowledge as shaped by social existence and claimed that different ideas arise out of various group locations within the social structure. Unlike European thinkers who reflected on, and theorized about, society in general, many post-colonial African thinkers, such as Kwame Nkrumah (former president of Ghana), Julius Nyerere (former president of Tanzania), and Gamal Abdel Nasser (former president of Egypt), shouldered the extra responsibilities of creating political movements and shaping newly established states. 

Knowledge Production in Africa

Utilizing the sociological concept of the social construction of knowledge, we argue that international organizations, such as the African Union (AU), created in 2002, and its predecessor the Organization of African Unity (OAU), established in 1963, are both products and producers of knowledge. 

The AU is grounded in pan-Africanism, a form of knowledge that has reflected different visions of the people of African descent at various times since early in the 20th century. In our book, The African Union: Addressing the challenges of peace, security, and governance, Dr.  Wafula Okumu of the Nairobi-based Borders Institute, Associate Professor of African studies and International Relations David Mickler of Curtin University, and I argued that “knowledge production is a social and political process that reflects the historical, cultural, and institutional milieu of its producers. Knowledge is constructed for a social, scientific or political purpose, and for a community of scholars or policy makers.” 

Earlier, the late Professor Ali A. Mazrui, who was the Director of the Institute of Global Cultural Studies at Binghamton University, had argued in Principled World Politics: The Challenge of Normative International Relations that “The entire international system of stratification has come to be based not on ‘who owns what’ but on ‘who knows what’”. Moreover, Mazrui’s 1986 BBC documentary, The Africans: A Triple Heritage underlined the view that Africa’s values and knowledge were derived from a combination of African, European, and Islamic bases. 

The visions of pan-Africanism that underpinned the OAU/AU were further articulated by various political leaders, such as the aforementioned, and intellectuals, such as African-American sociologist W.E.B DuBois, as well as French-speaking Afro-Caribbean psychiatrist and philosopher Frantz Fanon. 

While they all sought to capture the aspirations of Africans in the diaspora and on the African continent, they differed in important ways and their ideas were contestable. Their work illustrates the sociological observation that knowledge producers generate knowledge that is relevant to, and reflective of, their unique circumstances. Produced by socially embedded and unequally empowered actors and groups, knowledge is partial and reflects the values, norms, and social and political interests of those who are involved in its production. 

While knowledge is constructed from several standpoints, the understandings and values of dominant groups become legitimized forms of knowledge. The production of knowledge in Africa, as elsewhere, reflects, reinforces and, sometimes, challenges relations of power. While dominant understandings shape and define social life and become institutionalized definitions of social reality, subaltern groups often seek to challenge these understandings. African leaders and intellectuals challenged hegemonic views of the world and the black people’s place in it. They generated knowledge that was influenced by imperialism, colonialism and racism. 

The generation of knowledge is a social process that reproduces social structure, reinforcing the rules, values, and norms of society, including its formal institutions and laws. The creation of the OAU in 1963, for example, assumed the form it did only after the African leaders aligned with former Ghanaian President Nkrumah had been outmanoeuvred and isolated. Nkrumah, who proposed the immediate creation of a continental government (the United States of Africa), argued that he was “prepared to serve in a political union of free African states under any leader who [was] able to offer the proper guidance”, but his peers were incredulous. They ultimately settled on a compromise; the OAU would pursue a gradual approach to regional integration.

Inclusion and Exclusion

Indeed, hegemonic understandings of knowledge create boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, dominance and subordination. The knowledge of dominant groups become visible and repeatable, while subordinated groups are situated as objects of knowledge. Certain forms of knowledge become valid and are seen as natural while others remain subordinated. Thus, the apparently natural and neutral knowledge of human life, including African organizations, is produced through relations of power. 

However, as Michel Foucault claimed, resistance to power is an important element of the production of knowledge and the operation of power. Valid understandings shift over time, reflecting continuing intergroup relations of domination and resistance. This explains why when it came to discussing the “Consideration of a proposal for the establishment of a Union Government of Africa”, submitted by Ghana, the 1964 Cairo summit simply referred it to “the Specialized Commission” of the OAU. This understanding of the processes of knowledge production helps explain why some African leaders advocated for a continental government prior to the creation of the AU in 2002.

Thus, the 1964 OAU summit in Cairo was a product, as well as a producer, of knowledge for Africa’s prevailing geopolitical circumstances. It sought to promote some perspectives while suppressing others. The conference also tried to ensure that the OAU would serve the interests of most of the states that participated in it. While it canvassed many issues, three important themes emerged that continue to influence African politics and global diplomacy: racism and its impact on peace and security; Afro-Asian unity or Global South solidarity; and borders and their effects on the sovereignty and stability of African states. Therefore, any serious analysis of knowledge production in the evolution of African unity needs to take note of these issues and how they have informed subsequent knowledge construction and political debates in Africa as well as Africa’s relations with the rest of the world.

Reframing Security

The Cairo conference’s resolution AHG/Res. 6(I), for example, related to knowledge about how racism had disadvantaged Africans globally, characterised white-black relations in African colonies, and was continuing to deny black South Africans equal opportunities for advancement. DuBois had argued in 1903 that “the problem of the twentieth century [was] the problem of the color line”. Reflecting this sentiment, the 1964 Cairo summit reaffirmed the view that apartheid in South Africa, which legitimated a system of ranking the country’s people along racial lines, with whites at the top, represented a serious threat to peace and international security. The OAU’s linking of racism to the global threats to peace and security was designed to challenge the Western-centric view of security. The Cairo summit claimed that South Africa, “whose policy [was] incompatible with its political and moral obligations as a member … of the United Nations”, constituted “a grave danger to stability and peace in Africa and the world”. Ironically, when Westerners embraced the non-military sources of insecurity at the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, they gave no credit to the Africans who had advocated for the same approach two decades earlier.

Any opposition to racism has to be viewed within the prism of universal human rights, but African states and the OAU ignored the violations of human rights by African governments. Although the OAU adopted the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights in Nairobi, Kenya, in 1981, which came into force in 1986, the organization did not enforce it. 

However, following the end of the Cold War, and the replacement of the OAU with the AU, the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights has pursued its purpose of promoting and protecting rights and basic freedoms. The re-activation of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights was largely due to global geopolitical changes that compelled the OAU and African leaders to re-examine their stances on sovereignty and rights. It reflected a broader shift in international society where an increased emphasis on human rights underpinned a conception of sovereignty grounded in these rights.

In February 1990, African political leaders met in Arusha, Tanzania, to sign the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation. This meeting was shortly followed by another in Kampala, Uganda. The subsequent Kampala Forum re-emphasized the Cairo conference’s linking of human rights with security by claiming that human rights, peace, and development were the bases of security. It observed that the democratic deficit, injustice, and rights violations were causes of insecurity and, accordingly, proposed new guidelines under which African states would be governed by adherence to the rule of law and popular participation. The Arusha and Kampala meetings were among many in the 1990s that sought to replace the OAU with an organization that was willing to promote human rights. Hence, the creation of the AU in 2002.

Promoting Human Rights

The AU’s architects gave it authority to intervene in member states to uphold rights under certain circumstances. For example, Article 4(h) of the AU’s Constitutive Act gives the organization “the right…to intervene in a member state…in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”. Moreover, Article 3(g) of the Constitutive Act seeks to promote “democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance”, while Article 3(h) seeks to promote and protect “human and people’s rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights and other human rights instruments”. Thus, by the early 2000s, there was evidence that African states and citizens had re-defined sovereignty in favour of human rights.

At least five AU agencies have responsibilities regarding human rights. The first is the AU Commission, which is also the administrative arm of the organization. The second is the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights. The third is the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which was established in 1987. Its main function is to monitor the implementation of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights. The fourth instrument is the African Court on Human and People’s Rights. The court’s mandate is to complement and reinforce the work of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The fifth instrument is the African Peer Review Mechanism, which was created in 2003 to monitor the participating AU members in four areas which are crucial for the promotion of rights: democracy and political governance; economic governance and management; corporate governance; and socio-economic development.

Moreover, in 2007, the AU adopted its African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, whose objective is to promote adherence to “the universal values and principles of democracy and respect for human rights”. The AU has also adopted other instruments for the enhancement of rights, including the Guidelines for African Union Electoral Observation and Monitoring Missions, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, and the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa.

As the AU marked the 40th anniversary of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights in June 2021, it claimed that the charter’s “challenges stem from the aftermath of colonial exploitation; issues of state sovereignty; weak enforcement and accountability measures, limited resources for effective implementation of the human rights standards exacerbated by conflicts, corruption, competing priorities at the domestic level, and more recently, the COVID-19 pandemic”. It pointed out that these problems had “led to a democratic governance deficit; poverty and deepening inequality; pervasive gender oppression; rising insecurity and violence; conflict over resources brought about by climate change and displacement of people as refugees and internally displaced persons; and the deprivation of the means of livelihood, human dignity and hope for African citizenry”.

However, the AU’s definition of human rights remains limited. Although there is widespread knowledge about the existence of other rights, the AU is yet to take measures to ensure the respect and recognition of all human rights, including those relating to gender and sexuality. It continues to resist the validity of these rights as international norms that are now institutionalized in international law. It could be assumed that one of its resistance strategies is to pretend to not know of their existence.

Defining Borders

The second important issue that emerged out of the 1964 Cairo conference related to the nature of African borders and their impact on stability, peace, and security on the continent. After considering that border problems constituted a grave and permanent factor of dissention in Africa, resolution AHG/Res. 16(I) claimed that “the borders of African States, on the day of their independence, constitute[d] a tangible reality”. It accordingly declared that all OAU “member states pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence.” However, this statement has been criticized over its effectiveness. 

In a 2010 article, researcher on territorial disputes, Wafula Okumu, argued that “this OAU decision has maintained a ‘false peace’ over border disputes” because “numerous border disputes have continued to rumble on between African states”. Nonetheless, since its adoption, most African state borders have remained unchanged with a few exceptions, including the separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia in 1991 and South Sudan’s independence in 2011. 

One notable point of contention is Western Sahara, a former Spanish colony that declared independence in 1975 and which the AU calls the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) and to which the AU has given full membership. However, the UN, in a move of non-compliance with the OAU/AU, still lists Western Sahara as a non-self-governing territory. Meanwhile, Morocco continues to claim that Western Sahara is its own territory.

In another interesting case, Somaliland Republic, which seceded from Somalia in 1991, has not received international recognition by either organization. Both the UN and the AU base their decisions on OAU resolution AHG/Res. 16(I) of 1964, which requires that member states will respect the borders established when the country achieved independence. Somaliland Republic and the rest of Somalia, which were British and Italian colonies respectively, attained independence separately and on different dates before they united into one country. British Somaliland achieved independence on 26 June 1960 while Italian Somalia became independent on 1 July 1960. The two “united” into one country, the Somali Democratic Republic, in July 1960 and remained so for 31 years. Somaliland Republic has been self-governing for a longer period than it was a part of Somalia. If the AU and UN were to go by the letter of the 1964 Cairo resolution, there would be nothing to hinder the recognition of Somaliland Republic as a separate and independent country. What appears to underpin the AU and UN positions is the lack of conviction to admit that the 1964 Cairo resolution is an inappropriate tool in this situation.

Developing Relations with Asia

The third major theme out of the 1964 Cairo summit relates to Africa’s interest in seeking closer relations with Asian countries. This was a continuation of the dialogue established at the Afro-Asian conference in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955. The Bandung conference, which brought together 29 African and Asian leaders, focused on self-determination, sovereignty, and human rights. It was a forerunner of the “Global South” solidarity, which morphed into other groupings in the 1960s and 1970s, including the Non-Aligned movement and the Group of 77 within the UN system. At the 1964 Cairo conference, Algeria offered to convene the follow-up to the Bandung conference. Hence, resolution AHG/Res. 14(I) stated that the summit had accepted “the generous offer of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria to play host to the Second Conference of African and Asian States”.

Much diplomatic and economic activity between the OAU/AU and Asian states has taken place following these early efforts. One important example is the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), the latest of which took place in early September 2024. FOCAC was established in 2000 at the request of African states seeking greater coordination with China. It has since evolved into a major diplomatic framework between China and African states. FOCAC is held once every three years, alternating between China and an African state as a host. This dialogue and collaboration between China and African states reflects how the OAU and AU have evolved since the 1964 Cairo summit. Indeed, China’s construction of the USD$200 million AU headquarters, which was inaugurated in January 2012, can partly be seen within the context of shifting Afro-Asian relations. The entire project was funded by China and involved 1200 workers, half of whom were Chinese.

FOCAC has been central to China’s engagement with African states and the OAU/AU. Through this forum, China has offered African states significant development projects covering economic, political, and social domains. Many of these projects have been organized around specific themes, such as health, agriculture, education, trade and investment, peace and security, industrial cooperation, infrastructure, climate change, and people-to-people exchanges. As Yixin Yu observed in The Diplomat on 30 August 2024: “Financial commitments, a hallmark of FOCAC conferences, often capture the most attention—such as the $60 billion in new financing announced in 2018 and the $40 billion pledge in 2021. These commitments reflect the scale and scope of China’s engagement with the continent.” 

Moreover, the growing diplomatic ties between African states and the Asian economic giants, including with India and Japan, can partly be traced to the early efforts to consolidate Afro-Asian links. These relationships have involved the sharing of knowledge, goods, and services, but they have also led to a decline in democratic accountability in some African states.

All in all, knowledge production has played a significant role in shaping the OAU/AU since the 1964 Cairo summit. In reflecting on the OAU/AU’s evolution over a 60-year period, it is important to note that knowledge is contestable, often reflects the positions of hegemonic actors, and requires constant attention to ensure that it serves Africa’s core interests. One of the important lessons from the evolution of the OAU and AU in the past 60 years is that Africa needs to construct its own intellectual framework or paradigm for generating knowledge with which it can effectively address human rights, development needs, diplomacy, peace, and security. Just as pan-Africanism benefitted from ideas produced by black people in the diaspora, Africa’s paradigm should utilize ideas produced in Africa and outside the continent to generate useful knowledge.