As the magnitude of the Hamas attacks of October 7 became clear, Israeli officials were quick to put out and endlessly repeat a phrase, particularly to global audiences: “Hamas is ISIL”. They would go on to explain that Hamas, like ISIL, has proven beyond any doubt that it is an evil terror organization, sowing and feeding off hatred among the civilian population, and intent on killing civilians in the name of Islam.

Drawing from that, they conclude that Hamas is not an Israeli problem alone, but one for the whole world, on behalf of which Israel is fighting. The only one way to deal with Hamas, the Israelis said, was to crush it completely using maximum force, allowing no room for compromise, denying those who undertook those attacks any semblance of success, and thus decisively discouraging any attempt to repeat them.

Standing next to U.S Secretary of State Anthony Blinken in a joint press conference during his visit to Israel on October 12, 2023, only five days after the attacks, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said: “Hamas is ISIS, and just as ISIS was crushed, so too will Hamas be crushed. And Hamas should be treated exactly the way ISIS was treated. They should be spit out from the community of nations. No leader should meet them. No country should harbor them. And those that do should be sanctioned.”

In a later news conference with visiting Romanian Prime Minister Marcel Ciolacu on October 17, 2023, he elaborated further: “We are not fighting just our war, we’re fighting the war of all civilized countries and all civilized peoples. And just as the civilized world united in fighting the Nazis, united in fighting Daesh, ISIS, then the civilized world should unite behind Israel in fighting and eradicating Hamas.”

This idea tries to create a perfect congruence with the war launched by the United States and the coalition powers against ISIL in 2014–2017, and especially the battles of Raqqa (Syria) and Mosul (Iraq), the main centers of the “Caliphate”.

The “Hamas is ISIL” idea was quickly picked up as an established fact by many in the West who support Israel’s hard line, as well as many well-meaning analysts and observers. Most importantly, though, is its adoption as the official position by major Western governments, including the United States, immediately backing it up with strong diplomatic, military, and moral support for Israel. This was done under the justification that Israel has the right, and indeed the duty, to defend itself in this particularly extreme method, as the only means to protect itself from the repetition of such attacks.

Accepting the “Hamas is ISIL” proposition by Western governments was crucial in providing Israel with the cover and means it needed to impose its suffocating hermetic siege of the Strip that cut the supply of food, water, electricity and fuel, and to pursue its relentless bombing campaign, and the subsequent ground offensive, allowing only a trickle of humanitarian aid—so tiny that it meets a small fraction of the needs of the 2.3 million Palestinian inhabitants of the Strip.

The subsequent operation by one of the world’s strongest and most sophisticated militaries against a scantily manned and armed enemy and 2.3 million helpless civilians was not just massive, but also paid no attention to civilian casualties and the destruction it continues to inflict on this destitute region.

Nor did it care for international law and international humanitarian law. The result of Israel’s military campaign is, at the time of writing, close to 28,000 deaths, a third of which are children, and many more injuries; the destruction of more than half of Gaza’s residential and services buildings; the displacement of 1.8 million civilians; and a humanitarian catastrophe on a massive scale.

All this carnage was predicated on and justified by the “Hamas is ISIL” proposition. No other rationalization would have justified inflicting such a calamity on a civilian population under occupation by the occupying power, with total support from Western capitals.

This war had to be explained by something far bigger than a terrorist attack: the need to uproot an enemy of this uniquely dangerous and irrational type, as an existential and global threat, in order to gain enough international legitimacy and support. Therefore, an examination of this comparison between Hamas and ISIL as terrorist organizations—and its implications—is in order.

Context Matters
First, it might be appropriate to recall how terrorism is defined, to draw a line separating it from other related activities, such as political pressure, acts of war, or regular violent crime. In fact, there is no single clear-cut universally accepted definition of terrorism, and the United Nations has failed to reach such a definition despite repeated attempts.

However, there were several instances where the UN or one of its organs managed to develop language that provides something close to a definition to serve a specific purpose or be used in a specific context. For example, Article 2.1.b of The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, signed on 9 December 1999, includes the following text describing terrorism in this context as being an act “intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act”.

Similarly, the United Nations Security Council, in its October 2004 Resolution 1566—which dealt with international cooperation against terrorism without specifically attempting to define it—included wording describing what would be considered terrorist acts as:

“criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.”

On the other hand, on a non-political level, the Oxford Dictionary provided its own definition of terrorism as being “the unlawful use of violence and intimidation, especially against civilians, in the pursuit of political aims”, while the Encyclopedia Britannica defined it as “the calculated use of violence to create a general climate of fear in a population and thereby to bring about a particular political objective”.

Based on those definitions, the comparison between Hamas and ISIL might seem to have some merit. Both share fundamentalist religious ideology. Both draw on the frustrations of their relevant constituencies, particularly the youth, and their willingness to sacrifice their miserable lives for what each considers a “just and noble” cause and, in the process, gain eternal peace and happiness.

But most relevant to our topic is that both of them resort to violence to achieve their political goals by means that seem to fit the different definitions of terrorism, particularly in terms of the effects of violence on civilians. However, the leap from this to considering them “terrorist organizations” of the same fabric and nature is where problems arise.

In fact, there are no similarly clear definitions of what a terrorist organization is. Is it any organization that practices terrorism, no matter how integral it is to its overall mission and activities, and regardless of the context within which it commits its terrorist acts? Or can organizations that commit terrorist acts as defined earlier be divided into terrorist organizations, and organizations that have significantly broader and legitimate missions and therefore merit less incriminating treatment as organizations, without legitimizing their terrorist acts?

These questions have no legal answer in international law, but history shows a clear inclination to make these distinctions and treat the two groups differently.

In practice, designating terrorist organizations is a political decision, made mainly unilaterally by states, and only in rare cases collectively by international and regional organizations. In this context is the notable designation of Al-Qaeda and ISIL as terrorist organizations by the United Nations.

This absence of a broadly accepted definition, and the variance of designating organizations as terrorist among states, stems from the different answers to the questions mentioned above. Namely, these are how to handle the difference between organizations that commit terrorism in their pursuit of objectives or causes that enjoy little or no legitimacy, and organizations that represent legitimate causes, and have a much wider range of activities, but also commit acts of terror as they pursue those causes.

Resisting Occupation
Suffice it to say that countries of the Global South—most of which had a history of resisting occupation themselves, in large part through organizations which were described as terrorist at the time—are more inclined to make this distinction, and bestow significant legitimacy on national liberation movements. Western countries, on the other hand, tend to be more skeptical and less tolerant of the use of force in resisting occupation, having been on the receiving end of similar movements in the past.

However, there is wide agreement that the first type include organizations like Baader-Meinhof of Germany, the Red Brigades of Italy, the Red Army of Japan, and the pan-Islamic Al-Qaeda and ISIL. Such organizations live on and off terrorism, which is their core activity and main content, while their ideological or political cause is just a shell that, to them, justifies their struggle, but is simply not shared outside the organization at any significant level.

Examples of the latter include organizations such as the National Liberation Front (FLN) of Algeria, the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), and the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Such organizations, besides resisting oppression/occupation, engage in significant social, political, and economic activities, making them the embodiment of a whole people or a nation, or a major part thereof. The instances where they use force, including what would be defined as terrorism, are aimed almost exclusively at the oppressive or occupying power.

All such organizations were described as terrorist organizations, particularly by their oppressors. It is one way the oppressor/occupier tries to level the moral playing field with the people they oppress/occupy, and a means to justify the use of severe and unjust force against them.

It is also true that virtually all liberation movements in history resorted, at one point or the other, to some kind of terrorist activity as a means to redress the massive power imbalance with the occupier/oppressor and to prevent their oppressor/occupier from becoming too comfortable in the status quo, thereby forcing it to change its policy and become more willing to loosen its oppressive grip.

This is where the slogan “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” comes from: the oppressors/occupiers and their allies would invariably call those who resist “terrorists”, while those who recognize the legitimacy of their cause call them “freedom fighters”, without necessarily condoning some of their tactics. Indeed, many authoritarian regimes find the terrorism label a convenient way to unjustly defame their democratic opposition.

Applying those points to the Hamas–ISIL comparison shows major differences in character and activities that completely rebut the notion that Hamas is similar to ISIL and should therefore receive the ISIL treatment.

The fundamental and original difference that distinguishes between the two organizations is the cause to which each is dedicated. ISIL’s cause, for which it uses violence, is to establish an Islamic Caliphate, apply its own version of Sharia, or Islamic jurisprudence, and engage the world of unbelievers, including those with different interpretations of Islam, in a religious war with the objective of conquest. It is this objective of sole domination that leads it to eternal war and renders any political engagement with it pointless.

Hamas, on the other hand, is essentially a national liberation movement, albeit with an Islamist character, as demonstrated by its full name, the “Islamic Resistance Movement”. It emerged from within Palestinian society in the late 1980s with the specific goal of resisting the Israeli occupation. It also believes in armed struggle for Palestinian liberation, which is legitimate as a matter of principle in international law. It aspires to “liberate” all of Palestine, although it later declared its willingness to accept an independent state in the territories occupied in 1967, with Jerusalem as its capital, which corresponds to the international consensus and the requirements of UN Security Council resolutions.

Its objective and its enemy are both limited and clearly defined by the occupation, and its area of action is confined to the territory of Historic Palestine, all of which is now under Israeli control. Hamas never declared war on any other opponent but Israel, and never intentionally acted violently against citizens of other countries. Those characteristics are very similar to most other national liberation organizations the world has known, many of which end up being glorified as freedom fighters, particularly after they succeed in obtaining freedom.

But Hamas has also been playing a major political, economic, and social role in Palestinian society under occupation—running schools, universities, hospitals, and social support networks, and taking charge of governance in the Gaza Strip for the past seventeen years. The fact that Hamas is dedicated to a national liberation cause shows how different a type of organization it is compared to ISIL and other terrorist organizations, notwithstanding any terrorist activities it might have committed.

It also shows how similar Hamas is to the long list of national liberation movements that were called terrorist organizations before they ultimately helped their people win their freedom and lose their radical edge along the way. The objective of such organizations—that is more specific and legitimate compared to the former type of organizations—can render itself to political engagement, where a political settlement allowing self-determination is a feasible means of ending the violence.

Accordingly, it might be more appropriate to consider Palestinian armed resistance movements such as Hamas, like other similar movements, combatants as defined in international law, and thus bound by its limitations no less than any country engaging in warfare, but also not more.

Israel’s Asymmetric Occupation and Acts of Violence
This brings up another equally important comparison, which is the one between Palestinian resistance movements—including Hamas—that are accused of committing terrorism, and Israel with its practices against Palestinians. The question here is whether any side stands on a higher moral ground, or enjoys more legitimacy than the other in their decades-long confrontation. This comparison is made by many supporters of the Palestinian cause, who point to a long list of potentially illegitimate or illegal actions by Israel—over and above the original sin of occupation—which they believe eclipse those of Hamas and the other Palestinian resistance movements.

Israeli actions are continuous and not confined to flare-ups of violence. They include building settlements in the territories that are internationally recognized as being occupied, extrajudicial killings and administrative detentions of Palestinians, illegal expropriation of property and water resources, arming illegal settlers and allowing them to terrorize the local population of the occupied territories, the siege of civilian populations and cutting the flow of food, water, and fuel. Most egregious of all is the use of indiscriminate and massive military force and collective punishment against civilians and civilian targets under Israeli occupation, including the illegal use of weapons and ammunition, and temporary and permanent forcible displacement.

Israel claims that civilian casualties are collateral damage to its pursuit of self-defense, a right that international law does not, in fact, extend to occupying powers vis-a-vis the occupied. Otherwise, they have little else by way of legitimate justification for the other allegations. Even the collateral damage claim is undermined by countless incidents which are backed by public statements from senior Israeli political and military leaders. These statements indicate the deliberate use of indiscriminate force to inflict maximum pain on the civilian population as reprisal or punishment for their presumed support of Hamas—or even to forcibly displace them out of the Gaza Strip altogether, going as far as showing intentions to annex the territory and populate it with Israelis.

In fact, Israeli officials have been warning the Lebanese militant organization, Hezbollah, to refrain from attacking Israel, and threatening—not to attack its bases or destroy its infrastructure—but to turn Lebanon’s capital city, Beirut, into Khan Younis, a Palestinian city Israel almost completely destroyed in the current war. This is retribution and blackmail, not self-defense, not unlike what is taking place in Gaza. Even if the state of Lebanon itself engages Israel in war, Israel is bound by international law not to attack civilians or civilian targets.

Here, too, we are confronted with allegations of war crimes that deserve to be independently investigated, as much as the allegations leveled at Hamas deserve to be independently investigated. Until this happens, we have to be cautious in accepting the allegations made by either party, particularly those presented without verifiable evidence or independent confirmation. But it has to be clear that we cannot legitimately hold Palestinian resistance accountable for its actions unless Israel, too, is held accountable for its actions.

But even as we compare the actions and infractions of both sides, we also have to remember that Hamas and Israel—as parties in this conflict—are not on equal footing. Among the many differences that are relevant to this matter, three critical ones stand out.

First, as alluded to earlier, as long as the Palestinian people are resisting occupation, while Israel is fighting to maintain it, there can be no equivalence in legitimacy or morality between the two sides. There is no way to equate infractions committed to resist oppression with those committed to maintain it.

Second, national liberation movements resort to tactics with questionable legitimacy not out of preference, but because they lack military capabilities that match their occupier. Had those movements possessed tanks and fighter aircraft, and high precision and potent missiles and artillery, reconnaissance equipment, and the space to organize a proper military to stand up to the occupying military, there is little doubt this would have been their preferred choice.

This is not only because it is more honorable, but also because it would be far more effective in inflicting pain and loss on the occupier, and—more crucially—in weakening the tool with which it maintains the occupation, which is its military.

Third, there is uniformly a huge discrepancy in strength and destructive power between the Israeli occupier and resistance movements like Hamas. While the occupier denies the occupied their right to exist in freedom, and can subject the population to massive hardship—as the war in Gaza spectacularly demonstrates—terrorist acts can never constitute an existential threat to the occupier, no matter how big and shocking they are. They serve as one of a very few options available to exact a price on the occupier for its occupation, without which there will remain no incentive for it to grant the rights of the occupied.

Why It Matters
The arguments made above hinge, to a large extent, on recalling that the Palestinian cause is a national liberation struggle, similar to the ones that defined the middle of the twentieth century. The entire discussion would have been less controversial had it occurred in the two decades that followed the Second World War, when the tide of national liberation was engulfing the Global South, and the world had a completely different understanding of armed resistance to colonialism.

But all this changed with the tapering off of colonialism, and more importantly after the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the emergence of ISIL, which made the “Global War on Terror” a defining factor in international relations. Israel is trying to connect Hamas to the Islamist terrorist organization ISIL, to shift focus away from the Palestinian cause of liberation and self-determination, and to garner as much international sympathy and support, especially in the West, as possible for this war condition.

Those who accept Israel’s logic, whether or not they are aware of its fallaciousness, are not just committing a grave error of judgment that costs more innocent lives and makes it harder to resolve this conflict, but are also complicating the efforts to combat terrorism. Terrorist organizations would want nothing more than confirming their identification with Palestinian national liberation movements, which will be a boon to their recruitment and fundraising efforts, and their drive to gain legitimacy and build public support. In reality, defeating such organizations with public support requires distinguishing them from movements that have legitimate causes and public sympathy; otherwise, the efforts to combat terrorism will lose a lot of credibility.

Nothing in the above discussion is intended to minimize the gravity of targeting innocent civilians. Nor is it aimed at trivializing the dangers of terrorism or the use of force to achieve political objectives. What it basically attempts is to engage and analyze the comparison Israel made between Hamas and ISIL, and the opposite comparison made between actions by Israel and Hamas, and to reach more sensible conclusions that can better put an end to the dangerous cycle of violence that ultimately spares no one.