At the “Israel at 75: The Views From Latin America” conference held at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC in June 2023, Guatemala’s Ambassador to the United States Alfonso Quiñonez said, “Being a friend of Israel pays off.”

In less than six months, however, such sentiments would be challenged by a growing number of Latin American countries expressing concern, and some severing ties, over Israel’s targeting of civilians and infrastructure, its blocking of international aid, and charges of genocide and war crimes in Gaza.

As more Latin American countries elect leftist leaders who grow publicly more impatient with Israel’s military conduct in Palestine, the once-strong alliances with Tel Aviv in the region appear to be diminishing. This shift illustrates the decreasing allure of once unwavering friendship as Latin American countries prefer distancing themselves from, rather than cozying up to, Israel. It also presents opportunities that must be seized by Arab countries to deepen strategic relations with Latin America. 

To fully understand these opportunities, it is essential to examine both the history and current state of Latin American ties with Israel and the Arab World, and the growing challenges faced by the “reactionary international”, defined by sociologist Juan Gabriel Tokatlian as a growing network of transnational alliances between right-wing political actors.

Israel–Latin America Relations from Founding to Floundering

Israel–Latin America relations date back to the 1947 UN vote on General Assembly Resolution 181 (II), recommending Partition of Mandatory Palestine, and the subsequent establishment of diplomatic ties. 

Of the fifty-seven UN member states in 1947, twenty were Latin American countries. Out of the thirty-three votes for partitioning Palestine, thirteen came from Latin America, accounting for a third of the necessary positive votes. This led to the opening of embassies in the newly established Israeli state the following year.

The reasons behind Latin American support for the partition plan vary. Political scientist Edward Glick highlighted the influence of Zionist elites and Arab diasporas in the vote for or against the partition plan to push votes toward their preferred outcome.

Former CIA officer Kermit Roosevelt suggested that Israeli lobbying successfully swayed the United States to support the plan, with Washington’s influence remaining significant against the backdrop of 1930s interventions in Central America and therefore influencing the outcome of Latin American votes. Contrary to Glick, historian Ignacio Klich argued that the Argentine government’s policies at the time were based on national interests rather than the lobbying by specific groups. 

In subsequent years, Israel actively pursued foreign policy initiatives to establish and strengthen ties with developing nations. Former Israeli director of international cooperation and affairs Amir Shimeon argued as early as 1974 that Israel “committed its experience and skill to projects of cooperation with other developing nations”. 

Conversely, political scientist Bishara Bahbah emphasized Latin America’s importance to the Israeli military industry as an export destination. Human rights advocate and public intellectual Israel Shahak highlighted the problematic nature of Israeli weapons transfers when delivered “to the most contemptible and hated regimes in the world”, such as Guatemala. Israel provided technical, logistical, and material support to Guatemala’s military-led government during the country’s bloody civil war. The support provided by Israel contributed to “scorched earth campaigns, the bombing, burning and bulldozing of entire villages in the countryside, and death squad killings in the city”, leading to the deaths of 200,000 people, Bahbah said.

In that regard, the benefits of Israel–Latin America relations were unevenly distributed, favoring conservative elites and non-democratic regimes.

This legacy persisted despite political shifts in Latin America. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute reported that Israel provided El Salvador with eighty-three percent of the weapons acquired by the bureaucratic-authoritarian Third Revolutionary Junta in 1980.

The military hardware was used to equip death squads and paramilitaries involved in human rights violations, such as the U.S.-trained Atlácatl Battalion responsible for El Mozote and El Calabozo massacres where over a thousand civilians were killed. Such ties were also representative of Israeli relations with Costa Rica, among other South American authoritarian-bureaucratic regimes. Interestingly, Argentine governments, regardless of regime type and their political orientation, engaged with the Israeli military industry throughout the 1970s and 1980s—demonstrating how interests oftentimes come before ideology in the calculations of policymakers.

In the 1990s, terrorist attacks, including those on the Israeli embassy and Argentine Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA) in Buenos Aires, and the Alas Chiricanas Flight 00901 explosion in Panama, prompted a securitization of Israeli interests in Latin America. Manipulated investigations and unsubstantiated accusations against Iran and Hezbollah led Israel to denounce their presence in the Latin America region and advocate for Hezbollah’s designation by Latin American states as a terrorist organization.

The Pink Tide 

Understanding Israel’s interest in Latin America also requires considering the legacy of the Pink Tide—a political movement characterized by the ascendency of left-wing governments, deeper regional integration, and reduced U.S. influence. During this period, most Latin American countries between 2005 and 2018 recognized Palestinian statehood—with a few exceptions such as Barbados, the Bahamas, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Suriname, and Trinidad & Tobago—thanks to Arab diaspora lobbying in Brazil and Argentina, among other places, and the ideological alignment with the Pink Tide’s values of decolonization, a core principle for leftist governments. 

The establishment of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) in 2008, and subsequent recognition of Palestine by eight of its twelve member states between December 2010 and March 2011, reflects the high level of regional integration and policy coordination achieved under the Pink Tide. As U.S. influence waned, Latin American countries began to exert greater political autonomy and muscle.

Brazil’s role in challenging neoliberal policies at the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its opposition, alongside Argentina, Venezuela, and Bolivia, to a hemispheric free trade agreement at the Fourth Summit of the Americas—along with the establishment of UNASUR and other regional mechanisms—illustrates this shift.

Enhanced Latin American political autonomy has strengthened Arab-Latin America relations through a desire to diversify partnerships and reduce reliance on the West. However, the decision was not automatic. Former Brazilian foreign minister Celso Amorim cited the stalled peace process and Israel’s refusal to halt settlement expansion as contributing factors to the recognition of Palestinian statehood. The disproportionate Israeli response to the October 7 Hamas attacks has also fueled public criticism from Latin American countries. 

While Bolivia and Venezuela have been known to criticize Israel, La Paz went a step further and severed relations with Israel, citing crimes against humanity while Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro denounced Israel as committing genocide. Brazil, Chile, and Colombia recalled their ambassadors from Tel Aviv.

This points to a new low in Israel–Latin America relations, challenging the narrative that Israeli friendship must be sought after. In fact, recent developments reveal a widening gap in values and principles with regards to life, dignity, and human rights. The International Court of Justice’s genocide deliberations and the International Criminal Court’s chief prosecutor’s request for arrest warrants for Israeli officials have further strained relations as Mexico joined South Africa’s case at the ICJ against Israel. Most notably, Colombian President Gustavo Petro has suspended the purchase of Israeli weapons.

The Reactionary International 

But there are countercurrents to the leftist criticism of Israel’s policies in Palestine, and in Gaza specifically. The rise of some right-wing pro-U.S. governments in Latin America since 2009 presented Israel with an opportunity to deepen its influence in the region. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s 2018 Latin America tour, the first by a sitting Israeli premier, aimed to recoup loss of influence sustained in the early 21st century, and reset Israel–Latin America relations.

The trip also sought to strengthen relationships with the ‘Reactionary International’ right-wing elite such as Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil and Mauricio Macri in Argentina, with Nayib Bukele and Javier Milei emerging later in El Salvador and Argentina respectively. 

Netanyahu’s 2018 tour sought to counter earlier setbacks and reinforce ties with these new governments, including visits to Argentina, Paraguay, Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil. Bolsonaro’s enthusiastic support for and visit to Israel, and Netanyahu attending the former’s inauguration in 2019, exemplified the emergence of this new alignment between reactionary counterparts.

Tokatlian characterizes the reactionary international as nostalgic, self-righteous, blaming progressive thinking for the world’s problems, and as having a “negative, even anger-driven, populist perspective on history, politics and morality”. This lens helps explain the connections and mutual support between the Trump and Netanyahu administrations, as well as the good relations between political leaders Santiago Abascal, Marine Le Pen, Giorgia Meloni, Mauricio Macri, Bolsonaro, and Milei, among others. 

The proliferation of the Reactionary International in Latin America has been challenged and slowed due to the current rise of leftist governments in Chile, Colombia, Brazil, and Mexico, coupled with the United States’ increasing focus on China and Russia and away from Latin America. This has breathed new life in regional integration and autonomy, going hand in hand with public criticism of current Israeli policies in Palestine. Most importantly, it presents an opportunity for revitalized Arab–Latin American relations, advancing strategic interests for both sides.

The State of Arab-Latino Relations

The aforementioned shifts present an opportunity to advance Arab strategic interests through international cooperation and commerce. Not only do they offer a chance to further take advantage of longstanding cultural connections for commercial purposes, they frame bilateral relations within a broader interregional context, enhancing political autonomy for both parties through international cooperation.

Arab–-Latin American relations originated from significant Arab migration waves in the late 19th and early 20th century. The cultural link is substantial: an estimated eighteen million Brazilians, representing about nine percent of the population (and four times the size of the Arab community in the United States), —can trace their ancestry to Syria or Lebanon. This is a percentage mirrored in Argentina. Additionally, Latin America is host to the largest Palestinian diaspora outside the Middle East.

Cultural exchange between Arabs and Latin Americans is evident in various aspects. South America’s mate, a caffeinated tea-like drink, is enjoyed throughout the Levant, while Argentine and Brazilian football jerseys are popular in the region. Conversely, Levantine sfiha (flatbread with minced meat) has become a staple in Latin American bakeries, and Arab descendants have succeeded in various professional fields, including the highest political offices in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Paraguay and El Salvador.

Despite this rich cultural exchange, Arab–Latin American relations do not fully indicate successful interregional integration, and their renewal in the 21st century warrants particular attention.

Brazilian President Lula da Silva’s active foreign policy between 2003 and 2011, for example, focused on fostering diplomatic and commercial relations with developing countries and led to renewed and unique Arab–Latin American relations. His efforts were bolstered by a favorable South American political climate, the Pink Tide, and manifested through the creation of UNASUR, a key institution and counterpart to the League of Arab State (LAS) at the South American-Arab Countries (ASPA) summits from 2005 to 2015.

On the Arab side, the fallout from the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and the 2007 global financial crisis drove Arab countries to seek new allies and markets beyond the Global North. Consequently, trade between Brazil and MENA countries grew between 2003 and 2008 from 5.5 billion to 20.3 billion U.S. dollars, and the ASPA summits offered a formalized space for policy coordination and conflict resolution.

For Latin America, developing relations with Arab countries—among others—contributed to political autonomy from the United States by finding new allies in international forums and diversifying export markets. This was reflected in Lula’s and former Argentine President Cristina Fernandez’s foreign policies, which targeted the Middle East and North Africa through state visits, new diplomatic offices, and business missions.

Moreover, investment was directed toward infrastructure and food staples in line with Arab strategic interests associated with food security.

According to researcher Abas Tanus Mafud, Argentina received a total of six billion dollars in investment from the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, the Investment Corporation of Dubai and Abu Dhabi Fund for Development, and the Qatar Investment Authority for the construction of aqueducts, development of maritime ports and hydroelectric energy, and food commodities respectively during the period between 2010 and 2015. Moreover, “commercial exchanges between the GCC and Mercosur grew by 330 percent between 2001 and 2010,” reported political scientist Cecilia Baeza.

This commercial growth is mirrored by the proliferation of chambers of commerce during the first decades of the 21st century. Arab chambers of commerce were reactivated in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, while the UAE and Qatar established new chambers throughout Latin America, and Egypt signed a free trade agreement with the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) in 2010. These developments signify an expansion in Arab–Latin American commerce and trade as Gulf countries add to Levant and North African countries.

However, challenges persist. One significant issue is policy coordination. For instance, during the vote on the LAS-sponsored UN Security Council Resolution 1973 in 2011 and which called for armed intervention in Libya, Brazil abstained while Colombia voted in favor—highlighting the difficulty in achieving regional consensus in Latin America to support Arab initiatives. Arab countries must recognize that Latin America’s diversity and Washington’s political influence complicate regional foreign policy coordination. In fact, not all Latin American countries adhered to the values espoused by the Pink Tide of deeper regional integration, greater policy coordination, and increasing autonomy from the United States.

Another challenge is the engagement of Arab countries with right-wing Latin American governments that promote anti-Arab and anti-Muslim narratives and policies. For example, former Brazilian President Bolsonaro made racist remarks about Muslims, and the Macri administration falsely accused Arab diaspora members of terrorism. Despite this, Bolsonaro visited Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, and Macri was received by then-crown prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan. These issues went unaddressed during these visits, suggesting a pragmatic approach at best or a lack of understanding at worst.

Finally, the commercial dimension of Arab–Latin American relations contributes to social and economic inequality. Scholar Kevin Funk noted that “existing interregional connections largely serve to buttress global capitalism (and the role of corporate actors therein), while also extending its reach deeper into the Global South and reshaping it through the rise of South-South chains of accumulation.” This capitalist focus is most evident when considering, for example, the absence of academic exchange programs between the regions. While Latin American universities offer respected graduate programs focused on the MENA region, there are no similar academic initiatives in Arab countries, and existing agreements between Arab and Latin American universities are limited to public events.

An Opportunity 

The criticism of current Israeli military conduct in Palestine expressed by leftist Latin American governments points to declining Israel–Latin America relations and challenges the solidarity built by the Reactionary International. 

At this juncture, the potential benefits that Arab countries may extract from stronger interregional political and commercial cooperation with Latin American peers go beyond financial considerations. For example, a majority of Latin American countries supported UN General Assembly resolutions calling for a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. Furthermore, the slow but steady growth and diversification of interregional commerce has contributed to Arab food security since the early 2000s.

To unlock further benefits, interregional cooperation must exceed the political and economic dimensions to venture into soft power by focusing synergies in the education sector, for one. 

Currently, there is a surprising lack of contact between the leading academic institutions in Latin America and MENA countries. This can be remedied by focusing on two areas of strength. First, the regions have developed political and economic relations over the base of cultural relations, as previously noted. Second, there are respected education institutions with widespread international cooperation and networks in both regions.

These include Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Lebanese University, Qatar University, and Universidad Nacional de México excel for arts & humanities; King Fahd University of Petroleum & Minerals, The American University in Cairo, Instituto Tecnológico de Buenos Aires, and Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro for petroleum engineering; King Abdulaziz University and Universidade de São Paulo for science & medicine; El Colegio de México and Holy Spirit University of Kaslik for area studies; Ain Shams University and Universitario de Idiomas for language courses; The American University of Beirut and Universidad Torcuato Di Tella for politics and international relations, among others.

Many of these leading institutions teach courses in English, offer compatible graduate programs, or developed area studies research programs enabling initial student exchange programs, institutional academic agreements, and graduate research cooperation. 

Improving mutual knowledge leads to a better understanding of the other’s general and specific strategic interests. This is fundamental to finding new opportunities for greater political cooperation and economic trade. Enhanced more robust relations in the field of collaborative education should be viewed as potential policy for developing Arab–Latino relations as part of something bigger. 

“Instead of a clash [of civilizations], there is a phenomenal [power] readjustment at a global level. Unprecedented! Because the transfer of power has always been within the West. Now, it is shifting to a part of the world about which we have a profound ignorance,” explained Tokatlian. Most importantly, he suggested a complete overhaul of the education system and advocated for students and business people to study and visit the East “to understand the other”. He underlines his argument by pointing to the growing importance of Asian economies in Argentina’s international commerce.

In that sense, the role of the ministries of foreign affairs and education on both ends of the relationship are especially important for setting the basis and standards leading to successful Arab–Latino academic cooperation, exchanges, and research. In other words, it is the development of soft power that will guarantee a brighter future for Arab–Latin American relations.

Within a context of greater Arab–Latino solidarity rising from concerns over Israeli military conduct in Palestine, it is time for policy makers to make a fresh push for stronger interregional relations. Most importantly, the effort must focus on education to improve mutual understanding and unlock new opportunities for political cooperation and economic development that may underpin social and political stability at a time of significant global upheaval and potential power redistribution.