More than 11 months have passed since Hamas’ October 7 attack, which claimed the lives of hundreds of Israeli soldiers and civilians. Since then, Israeli military and economic retaliation has subjected Gaza and its mostly civilian population to systematic obliteration and genocide. The flood of reports from human rights organizations, charity institutions, and relief agencies uncovering Israel’s policies to starve, maim, and ethnically cleanse Palestinians has shocked the world. Even United Nations relief infrastructures have not been spared in this conflict; warehouses have been targeted and relief workers and volunteers have been killed. As a result, a number of UN agencies are accusing Israel of violating international law and are continuing to demand an immediate ceasefire.

Meanwhile, unwavering American support for Israel and general Western complacency to compel it to accept a ceasefire have prompted  states from the Global South, including Chile, Columbia, Nicaragua, and South Africa, to file accusations of genocide against Israel at the International Court of Justice. At the same time, regional groups aligned with the “Axis of Resistance“, including Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, and Yemen’s Houthis, have engaged militarily in various ways. 

The short- and long-term consequences are evident through five closely linked ramifications of the relentless Israeli genocide. These include the erosion of the international rule-based order, regional de-democratization (encouraged by the West), increased regional and global radicalization, rising threat of conflict spillover, and the strengthening of Iranian ideology in the region.

The End of Rules-Based Order?

The question that emerges from the ongoing genocide is its impact on a global order which has been traditionally claimed to be founded on international law and humanitarian principles. There is growing skepticism about the continuity of such an order in light of Israel’s campaign in Gaza. The faltering of this system can be seen in other conflicts; Russia exploits the post-Gaza “unorder” to deflect criticism of its violations of the rules-based order regarding its invasion of Ukraine. The world has regressed to an era of “might makes right”.

The rupture in trust between the Global South and North has severely undermined this rules-based international order, especially regarding the shared values of human dignity, rights, and security. The schism has been evident since the beginning of the conflict: In November 2023, 120 countries in the UN voted for a humanitarian truce in Gaza, 14 voted against, and 45 abstained. In general, the lines of division were clear: The Global South supported the resolution; the Global North did not. 

Israel’s violations of the order have continued to strain the international community; by targeting civilians, shelters, hospitals, places of worship, schools, and other non-military infrastructure, Israel’s military campaign is in violation of the Geneva Conventions and its additional protocols. In a firm reaction to these violations, as early as October 24, 2023, UN Secretary-General António Guterres stated, “Even war has rules” during a speech calling for a ceasefire and adherence to international law.

“We must demand that all parties uphold and respect their obligations under international humanitarian law; take constant care in the conduct of military operations to spare civilians; and respect and protect hospitals and respect the inviolability of UN facilities which today are sheltering more than 600,000 Palestinians.”

A week later, Philippe Lazzarini, Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), warned “an entire population is being dehumanized” in Gaza. And yet, Israel’s military campaign appears relentless and unstoppable.

Despite numerous draft resolutions from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) calling for an end to Israel’s campaign, the United States repeatedly utilized its veto power to protect Israel’s continued assault on the Palestinian population in Gaza. Even when the United States finally abstained and allowed a ceasefire resolution to pass, Israel disregarded the UNSC order. Consequently, adherence to international law, UNSC resolutions, and ICJ rules, has waned. The outcome of this genocide remains uncertain, but one thing is clear: the rules-based order, originally conceived as a mechanism for conflict resolution, global security, and the protection of human rights, is not enough and requires reinforcement. This echoes what General Secretary of Amnesty International Agnes Callamard said when she argued that the post-Gaza era means the end of the rules-based order in its current form. This, in combination with the weakening presence of democratization in the region, poses serious human rights concerns. 

De-democratization

While Western countries have long claimed to be advocates for democratization and political reform in the Middle East and North Africa, Israel’s war on Gaza and the ensuing regional instability have forced them to compromise and bolster governments which had been criticized for their sub-par human rights record. For a long time, economic assistance from the West to these countries was contingent on improving and protecting human rights. In light of the Israeli war on Gaza, discussions about fundamental rights and democracy have been sidelined while conversations about stability and security have taken precedence. 

A number of countries in the region have benefited from this shift. Qatar, which had previously been criticized for its record of human rights violations (as seen in the controversy surrounding the World Cup 2022), is now being praised as an honest and peace-loving country working to stabilize the region. Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman has been embraced by the West as a friend and influential figure while Egypt has received financial assistance from the World Bank and a financial package of over €7 billion from the European Union. 

However, this shift comes at a cost. It will widen the gap between the people and their governments, both in the West and in Arab states. In the MENA region, Europe has begun supporting what it has long fought against, the Chinese model, where the state controls economic development while suppressing political freedoms. This model prioritizes the ideas of safety, stability, and economic development at the expense of democracy, liberalism, and freedom of speech and participation. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt are among those countries that have been aiming to adopt and market this model. As the conflict persists, this trend appears to be solidifying as Western countries continue to ensure the political and economic security of MENA countries while intentionally sidelining concerns of human rights. This has contributed to de-democratization, erosion of the rule of law, and decreased political participation both at the individual and civil society levels.

Radicalization of Youth

A notable repercussion of the ongoing genocide is the radicalization of younger generations. This does not necessarily connote an embrace of Islamist ideologies or similar doctrines, but rather a rejection of peaceful solutions such as the two-state model to the Palestinian issue. This trend is not confined solely to Palestinian youth but also extends to Arab youth in the region and beyond. 

These shifts are underscored by a 2024 survey conducted in 16 Arab countries by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS), which revealed that 59% of respondents firmly believed there was no prospect for peace with Israel, while 14% harbored serious doubts, and 9% had never believed in the possibility of peace with Israel to begin with.

As a result, any endeavors toward peace that do not address Israeli colonization and illegal settlements are bound to fail in deterring youth from radicalization, irrespective of the methods of struggle they may adopt. For the Palestinians, the armed struggle, non-violent resistance, and Sumud will continue. Beyond Palestine, intellectual and political resistance will continue to grow. These frustrations may develop into the use of violent methods and recruiting fodder for such groups as the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda.

These fears come into focus amid the turmoil engulfing countries neighboring Palestine and Israel, where social and economic pressures piggyback on the current Gaza War. For instance, Jordan is simmering with tension and any missteps by the government could yield undesirable outcomes. When protests erupted in October 2023, they were swiftly quelled out of fear that they might escalate into anti-government demonstrations. However, anger, frustration, and the relentless images of Gazans being killed during Ramadan, the holiest month for Muslims, prompted tens of thousands of Jordanian protesters to flood the streets of the capital Amman, where they gathered near the Israeli embassy for nights on end. Jordanian security forces beat protesters with batons, used tear gas on the crowds, and detained hundreds. 

The chasm of distrust between the people, particularly the youth, and the governments and politicians of the region is widening significantly as the Gaza War continues with no peaceful resolution in sight, and is likely to fuel further radicalization. Despite diminished resources and influence, even marginal political actors (such as Sunni Islamic groups like the Islamic State or far-left ideological groups) at local, national, or regional levels may find it easier to mobilize, recruit, and establish a support base.

Long-term Regional Tensions and Wars

Given the status of the intricate dynamics of Israeli politics, including his ongoing corruption trials, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appears to be heeding the advice of right-wing, ultranationalist members of his cabinet such as Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir, who has called for the resettlement of the Gaza Strip. Despite international and domestic pressure to prioritize ceasefire negotiations over continuing the military campaign, Israel recently assassinated Hezbollah leader Fuad Shukr in Beirut, increasing the likelihood of continued violent engagement with Lebanon. Shortly after, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated in Tehran (Israel has not formally taken responsibility for the killing). More recently, Israel launched rockets into Lebanon claiming to be preventing an imminent Hezbollah attack; Lebanon responded with its own attack. The exchange did not trigger a war, however tensions remain high between the two. The assassination of Haniyeh and attacks in Lebanon clearly indicate that Netanyhu is prepared to escalate the conflict rather than resolve it, which could drag the United States into a military confrontation it does not want with Iran and its allies.

In response to Haniyeh’s assassination, Iran has stated that it will only refrain from severe retaliation against Israel if a ceasefire in Gaza is reached. In the face of this unprecedented risk of escalation, the United States has been pushing hard for the deal and sent Secretary of State Anthony Blinken to Tel Aviv to assist in the talks. However, discussions ended with no deal, meaning an Iranian attack is still very possible. Additionally, even if a ceasefire is achieved, there is still a remaining risk that the Houthis, Hezbollah, or Iran may attack Israel in the future, especially if Israel resumes its attacks on Gaza after the hostages are freed.  

Regarding Lebanon, although we do not know exactly how an all-out Israeli war with Hezbollah will develop, we do know that regional actors will be engaged. The “Known Unknowns” of the situation include how Iran would respond to an Israeli attack on Lebanon and Hezbollah. Iran considers Hezbollah a strategic asset, carefully cultivated over decades; allowing Israel to dismantle it is not an option. Consequently, Iran would likely activate its proxies from Yemen to Iraq at full capacity to support and relieve pressure on Hezbollah.

While Israel’s war on Gaza has already become regionalized (Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iraqi groups have all launched attacks linked to achieving a complete ceasefire), the conflict could still expand further. An attack on Lebanon could open the Syrian front, leading to a direct confrontation between Iran and Israel as Iran deploys troops from its proxies in Syria (such as the Pakistani Zeynabiyoun Brigade and the Afghani Fatemiyoun Division).

A war on Lebanon or Iran may exert pressure and consequences on countries that have normalized relations with Israel, such as Egypt and Jordan (as already seen with Jordan’s domestic unrest). If Israel were to employ the same level of force in Lebanon as it has in Gaza, including targeting civilian populations and infrastructure in similar genocidal tactics, it could lead to heightened tensions and strain diplomatic relations further. 

While a complete severance of diplomatic ties may not currently be on the table, it may be forced if Gazans were to be ethnically cleansed toward Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula. Although such ethnic cleansing has not yet occurred, the potential for catastrophic consequences remains even in the absence of forced displacement out of Gaza. 

In May, Israel seized control of the Rafah border crossing. In response, Egypt deployed armored personnel carriers mounted with combat gear to its border with Gaza, despite this being a violation of the Camp David peace agreement and its annexes. Tensions have continued to rise since then as Netanyahu recently announced Israel’s intention to take control of the Philadelphi Corridor (the buffer zone between Egypt and Gaza). Egypt responded by emphasizing that such an action would violate their peace agreement and that Egypt would defend its national security interests if Israel pursues such goals. 

Increasingly strained relations with Jordan and Egypt indicate that even those countries which have normalized ties with Israel seem prepared for relations to rapidly deteriorate. As the region balances on the brink of war, Iran’s influence is filling the vacuum left by Arab leadership to end the Gaza war, and has consequently grown significantly.

The Strengthening of Iranian Islamic Ideology

With all the scenarios and developments outlined above, one conclusion is evident: the Middle East that existed before October 7 has been forever changed by the Gaza genocide. The apparent winner in this transformation is likely to be the Islamic ideology of the Iranian regime.

Should Hamas’s military become incapacitated and incapable of mounting any future military resistance against the ongoing genocide, an already angry, frustrated, and radicalized generation will be emboldened to rally behind the long-standing calls of Iran, Palestinian resistance movements, and other radical groups for a military struggle against Israel. 

Such sentiments have long been a counterpoint and recently gained further traction to the peace process agenda. In January, a survey by the ACRPS of 16 Arab countries found that 63% of the Arab population expressed support for Hamas, 92% expressed that the Palestinian question is a critical issue for all Arabs, and 89% rejected recognition of Israel. Compared to Turkey, China, and Russia, Iran received the most support, with 48% of the Arab population considering it positively. 

Conversely, if Hamas continues to maintain control over the Gaza Strip and emerges from the current conflict with its political and minimal military capacity intact, Iran—as its principal backer—will also claim a victory of sorts. In this scenario, Hamas will continue to govern, while Israel retains control of Gaza’s entrances and exits, transforming the Strip into a concentration camp and creating a calculated humanitarian catastrophe. Iran’s call to resist Israel’s control of Palestine will still remain a popular sentiment.

A national unity government and return of the Palestinian Authority is not  feasible at this stage since Fatah and President Mahmoud Abbas are presenting barriers to reconciliation. Abbas and Fatah require that Hamas ratify all the agreements the PLO has previously made with Israel, including the Oslo Accords, which Hamas has rejected. 

The most recent deal signed in China by Fatah and Hamas (promising to end their division) has yet to materialize any tangible outcomes, suggesting it is merely another symbolic agreement and the two groups will remain separate. This outcome, particularly the isolation of Hamas, would solidify Iran’s relationship with the group, allowing it to demonstrate its role as a steadfast ally that never abandons its partners. 

While Tehran has supported Hamas as a response to the U.S. (and Arab allies) blacklisting and cash-strapping of the organization in 2003, Hamas is not a proxy of Iran in the literal sense but retains a degree of political independence. While Hamas’ military wing has the closest and most open relationship with Tehran, Iran’s influence is minimal at best. It appears that Iran is actively working to reshape the region, based on the ongoing coordination, meetings, and messages exchanged with the various sections of the Axis of Resistance, including the Palestinian forces (Hamas and the Islamic Jihad), Hezbollah, Iraqi militant groups, the Houthis. This influence may be extending further, as reports of the Houthis connecting with Al Shabab groups in Somalia may indicate Iran is angling for a new foothold in Africa. 

While Israel’s war on Gaza is ongoing and the outcome is far from being determined, it is clear that the conflict has caused major disruptions to the status quo by destabilizing regional powers and allowing Iran to grow its influence. The United States and its partners in the region are working feverishly to head off a war with Iran and/or its proxies that grows more likely with Netanyahu’s intransigence in the face of global efforts for a ceasefire. Former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert directly blames Netanyahu for the prolonged conflict and has accused him of wanting an all-out war.

Washington seems to be running out of ideas to prevent a widening conflict, instead rehashing an old script that has proven to be a set of temporary measures for new and worsening realities in the past 11 months. Regardless of when and how the war ends, it is evident that both local and international players are engaging a region that has been irrevocably changed. With domestic pressures against Netanyahu increasing and a U.S. presidential election just two months away, time is running out to stave off a devastating turn in the Middle East.