Last June’s United Nations Security Council Resolution 2735 brought hope that Israel’s assault on Gaza would come to an end, and the beginning of a path to peace paved. Over a month later, that hope remains unrealized, with the Palestinian death toll surpassing 39,000 directly killed by Israel since October 7. The resolution, put forward by the United States, after it had vetoed three others which had also called for a ceasefire, was groundbreaking in that it was the first coming out of the Security Council to call for an “immediate, full, and complete ceasefire”. It also contained a reflection of the position of the international community on solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It reiterated

its unwavering commitment to the vision of the two-State solution where two democratic States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side in peace within secure and recognized borders, consistent with international law and relevant UN resolutions, and in this regard stresse[d] the importance of unifying the Gaza Strip with the West Bank under the Palestinian Authority.

But this position is reflective of the international community’s problematic approach toward ‘solving the conflict’. United Nations experts have declared what is happening in Gaza as genocide, and many international law scholars believe that the International Court of Justice will eventually find that the legal standard for genocidal intent exists in South Africa v. Israel.

While the resolution does call for a ceasefire, it fails to recognize the well-known issues of power asymmetry during negotiations and Israel’s longstanding policy of imposing faits accomplis, which have been thoroughly demonstrated by the failures of the Oslo Accords. However, there is a more fundamental issue pertaining to today’s two-state solution: denying the Palestinian people their right to self-determination.

By reiterating its commitment to the two-state solution under Palestinian Authority (PA) rule, even if “revitalized”, the international community places the proverbial cart before the horse; it seeks to pursue bilateral negotiations leading to an eventual political settlement with the promise of Palestinian statehood, and through a Palestinian state achieve self-determination for (a portion of) its people.

This is, to differing degrees, a common thread across all solutions discussed today in policy circles, whether two-state, one-state, or something else. It is characterized by a degree of dismissal of Palestinian agency and their rights under international law.

The Framework of Self-Determination

Self-determination is enshrined as a principle in the United Nations Charter in Article 1(2) which states that one of the purposes of the UN is to “develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples”.

It was further refined as a legal norm with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, both adopted in 1966 and entered into force in 1976. Both treaties stated that “[a]ll peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development.”

In other words, self-determination is the right of a people to determine their own pursuits, namely their political status, or as the Princeton Encyclopedia of Self-Determination put it: “a community’s right to choose its political destiny”.

It has been considered an enshrined right in international law for a while. For instance, International law scholar Hurst Hannum concluded in 1993 that “self-determination has undoubtedly attained the status of a ‘right’ in international law”. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) described it as “one of the essential principles of contemporary international law” in 1995. And while debates continue to this day regarding the nature of the concept, what constitutes a ‘people’, and who is entitled to ‘external’ as opposed to ‘internal’ self-determination, the longstanding international consensus is that Palestinians are a people with a right to self-determination.

However, the outcome of a two-state solution, formulated by this same consensus and informed by prevailing political realities, must not be assumed by the international community to be the natural, automatic, or indeed lawful route to pursue.

As the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations put it,

The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an independent State, or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that people.

The Solution Delusion

The practical shortcomings of the two-state solution have been discussed extensively. Despite this, the international community still insists on pursuing it, with Resolution 2735 as its latest expression of such pursuit. However, new life may have been breathed into it by the ICJ’s recent advisory’s opinion, ‘Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem’. The advisory opinion concluded that Israel must evacuate its unlawful settlers from the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt). Nevertheless, what policymakers have only partially recognized is that October 7 and Israel’s genocidal response represents a paradigm shift that is as much structural and systematic as it is current; there is a justified recognition of the PA as a failed entity in need of significant revamp, but missing is the more important recognition of the need for an assessment by the Palestinian people regarding whether or not this entity’s existence is desired, and how they wish to proceed. The PA, of course, is the representation and champion of the two-state solution in the Palestinian sphere.

The notion that Palestinians are not represented by the PA, and that Palestinian self-determination is actively denied, is supported by several facts. First of all, the ICJ concluded in its advisory opinion that Israel’s actions have led to “prolonged deprivation of the Palestinian people of its right to self-determination”.  Second, there has neither been a legislative nor a presidential election in the oPt in nearly twenty years. Third, the majority of the Palestinian population in the oPt was not old enough to vote, and many not even born, when the last elections took place in 2005 and 2006. Fourth, the elections did not represent the will of the totality of the Palestinian people as UNRWA-registered refugees in neighboring countries, other Palestinians in the diaspora, and Palestinian citizens of Israel did not vote. Related to this is the fact that the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), long seen as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, has since Oslo been increasingly marginalized by the Fatah-dominated PA. Fifth, the will of the people in the oPt expressed through the 2006 legislative elections was quickly undermined as governance of the oPt was split between Hamas and Fatah. Sixth, polling shows most Palestinians are against a two-state solution. Seventh, and most importantly, the sheer ferocity and destruction being inflicted by Israel on the people of Gaza, and the distress and trauma Palestinians outside of Gaza are suffering, offers more than enough of a strategic and humanitarian paradigm shift to invoke the need to reaffirm Palestinian collective will regarding their future by exercising their right to self-determination.

Unfortunately, all ‘day after’ analyses, including this one, look to the future at the same time that Palestinians in Gaza are suffering from constant attacks, bombardment, displacement, massive destruction of infrastructure, and starvation, and have been for over nine months. Palestinians in the West Bank are facing an existential crisis of their own, with settler and army violence mounting against them since October 7, and the largest land seizures since Oslo taking place in 2024.

This is emblematic of the attitudes of various policy circles around the world, looking at the plight of Palestinians through the lens of national interest or regional peace and stability—both important lenses—while neglecting law, rights, and justice. Policymakers and analysts often look to find a solution to an ever-worsening landscape of conflict and destruction but fail to raise the question of how such solutions would be received by a scattered, traumatized, and deeply wounded Palestinian polity when the fundamental economic, demographic, and topographic changes inflicted by Israel’s campaigns on Gaza and the West Bank would need decades to address. The already unacceptable status quo of dysfunctional bantustans is being pulled from under them and yet the Palestinian people are expected to positively and passively receive a solution in which they had no role in shaping. This is not only impractical policymaking, it is delusional and disrespects Palestinians’ right to self-determination.

Even the one-state solution—wherein Muslims, Christians, and Jews live within one state, which is more noticeably advocated for in Palestinian policy circles compared to the two-state solution—faces the avant-horse issue and subsequent challenges as a result. The most basic hurdle is deciding whether this pursued state should be binational or secular democratic. Edward Said called for pursuing a binational state back in the ‘90s, while others see a traditional democratic model with equal rights and responsibilities as the best option. Each has its advantages and drawbacks. These policymaking challenges become oversized and longstanding when the underlying structures of Palestinian decisionmaking hinder rather than uphold the expression of the collective Palestinian will.

By its very nature, pursuing the one-state solution would require a collective decision by the Palestinian polity because it would be a change of course from the official PA-PLO position of a two-state solution. It would also effectively dismantle or reorient existing PA institutions created under Oslo. To do so requires either unlikely unilateral action by the Fatah-controlled PA to radically change itself and its dominance over the PLO, or some sort of referendum, or similar political process.

Rights Before Politics

However, this political process must seek to answer more fundamental questions before tackling the question of one state or two. Otherwise, the structural issues that were skirted by Oslo regarding comprehensive Palestinian representation and decisionmaking mechanisms, refugee return, and modes of resistance to Israeli violations of existing agreements and international law linger. Pertinent, especially to Palestinian citizens of Israel, is the question of who exactly (oPt residents, UNRWA refugees, other diaspora, Palestinian citizens of Israel) is part of the Palestinian polity and therefore has a right to participate in shaping the political direction of the Palestinian people. Another is how the different segments of the people will be represented and exercise their rights in the polity. Further questions regarding institutions, representation, voting mechanisms, fora for debate and discussion, and the PLO’s role in all of this naturally arise.

Therefore, a vote cannot simply come in the context of some sort of one-off referendum or election held by the PA or an international actor after Gaza has been flattened; it must be a genuine and constant process of the exercise of collective political will to determine how the Palestinians as a people wish to proceed at any given historical moment amid a constantly changing array of variables, values, and priorities. It is the only way to ensure a sustainable and representative Palestinian political existence. It also upholds the notion that the exercise of self-determination is a legal right not contingent on the existence or political recognition of a state. This is one of the three challenges Palestinian political scientist Leila Farsakh pointed out in 2011 regarding the one-state solution: “re-situating the Palestinian struggle for self-determination within a ‘rights’ paradigm…  [shifting] political goals from establishing an independent Palestinian state toward the achievement of equal political rights within a single polity.”

In this regard, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace took the first genuine step toward conceptualizing policy options for a rights-based approach in a 2021 paper. According to its authors, this approach would “prioritize protecting the rights and human security of Palestinians and Israelis over maintaining a peace process and attempting short-term fixes”. They argue that it would contribute to changing the political calculations of Palestinians and Israelis. “Essentially, a rights-based approach necessitates accountability for violations of people’s rights and of international law.” And though safeguarding the right to self-determination is not explicitly discussed, it is implied and expected.

A rights-based, self-determination–centered approach strengthens the one-state process by refocusing the Palestinian political movement in a way that is uncontestable except from the inside. In fact, it strengthens any approach taken to ‘solving the conflict’ as it builds a representative Palestinian-driven foundation for decisionmaking that has been absent for at least twenty years. It also sets up potential negotiations on more equal footing, as it implies that the elements constituting free exercise of self-determination must be made present. One may look to the ICJ’s advisory opinion for examples: territorial continuity, protection from dispersal and undermining the population’s integrity as a people, permanent sovereignty over natural resources, and the right of a people to freely determine its political status. The latter element, the focus of this analysis, cannot be achieved in isolation from the constituent manifestations of self-determination. Only when the Palestinians have these minimum conditions could they be said to have the right to exercise their self-determination and a foundation for decisionmaking.

The point is that the path taken is theirs to decide and we, in policy circles and in the international community, should work to facilitate the decisionmaking process without attempting to influence the outcome.

Such a seemingly basic notion appears quite radical upon deeper inquiry, as it requires states to support a process without expecting any strategic benefit in return or developing ulterior motives along the way—something the United States was not able to do in the oPt in 2006 (or Libya in 2011 for that matter). In other words, there is a need to act altruistically and not simply appear to do so under the conditions of the status quo.

All solutions put forward by analysts necessitate democracy in some shape or form. However, it is the ontological rationale of democracy in the context of such solutions that creates tensions; one cannot be expected to fully respect the will of the people while attempting to control it. By boxing Palestinians in the framework and structures of a particular outcome and having democracy as its fulfillment—rather than the vehicle through which the decision made to pursue the outcome is made—designers of such a situation manufacture a state of tension that can only be described as performative democracy. It is a democracy where the people are only allowed to exercise their collective will on certain issues that are neither structural nor fundamental, as those have already been decided for them. In other words, democracy sans self-determination.

Accordingly, an ontology that looks to legality before politics is the only way to create a situation where the tensions are tackled head on. This would mean facilitating a process through which Palestinians are able to decide on how they wish to approach the issues of occupation, statehood, oppression, and Palestinian rights. Rather than the international community deciding on their behalf based on prevailing political realities, the Palestinians will take into account such realities, including entrenched injustices and the extremism of the Israeli government, when expressing their collective will. It would serve to provide a missing, real clarity in the regional arena as well as in any future negotiations. Even if the positions between the Palestinians and the Israelis prove to be more distant than the internationally-imposed solution, they are at least the real positions that—as history has proven—would come to appear in any case as long as violence and oppression are still present and injustice left unaddressed. Moreover, in the context of the peace process, it gives the Israelis a Palestinian negotiating partner that is legitimate and can deliver.

This does not mean that we should abandon the Palestinians, on the contrary. It means that the international community should do its utmost to support Palestinians not just in achieving their rightful national aspirations, but to first support them in deciding what those aspirations are and how to go about pursuing them.

Policy to Empower

An emphasis on Palestinian self-determination entails a ceasefire by default. How are Palestinians in Gaza expected to contribute to making decisions regarding their political trajectory as a nation when their lives are threatened by famine and constant bombardment and Israeli attacks?

On this front, the vast majority of the international community are on the same page, but many feel that much more can still be done. Israel can be pressured into compliance through economic and diplomatic sanctions, an arms embargo, boycotts and divestment, rebuke and isolation in international fora, peacekeeping measures, legal avenues such as those pursued by South Africa and Nicuaragua, and any other measures at their disposal. Much of this has already been recommended by UN Special Rapporteur for the oPt Francesca Albanese in the advance unedited version of her report back in March. Unfortunately, few states will risk the ire of the U.S. and Zionist lobbies without significant public pressure. Policy circles could have a role to play in this regard by bringing these courses of action into the mainstream of the discourse.

Furthermore, there is a large focus on rebuilding Gaza when a ceasefire is in place. Phase three of the ceasefire plan put forward by Resolution 2735 includes “the start of a major multi-year reconstruction plan for Gaza”. Indeed, Gaza must be rebuilt. The question of who will fund the operations is one which others have discussed. However, an equally important question is who decides exactly how it will be rebuilt. The answer should undoubtedly be the Palestinians. It is their land, after all, but who represents the Palestinians? Thus, it becomes clear that a reaffirmation of Palestinian self-determination is not only an intellectual exercise, but a policy need. It is now also a legal one, as the ICJ has concluded in its advisory opinion, that “[i]t is for all States […] to ensure that any impediment resulting from the illegal presence of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory to the exercise of the Palestinian people of its right to self-determination is brought to an end”.

An election process facilitated by the international community must take place, but for the functions of the more representative PLO as opposed to the PA, and not just voted for by Palestinians of the oPt, but by all Palestinians. Much complexity and many difficulties undoubtedly hamper such an endeavor, but such is the eventual reality of any solution pursued. The PLO is provisionally sufficient to facilitate Palestinian collective decisionmaking because of its already existing structures and its international standing as the representative of the Palestinian people. From there, the Palestinians may choose to alter the structures of the organization as they see fit.

An important point to note is that this approach neither unravels the limited progress made under the two-state solution nor should it serve as a pretense for Israel to swallow up the remainder of Palestinian land should the Palestinians elect a person or render a decision that Israel regards as a threat to its security. To take away the status of the Occupied Territories as recognized Palestinian land is to take away their choice to pursue a two-state solution, and has been clearly stated by the ICJ to be illegal. The progress made so far through Oslo toward a two-state settlement will not be in vain as it should be regarded as the minimum—but not the automatic—solution the Palestinians will pursue upon expression of their collective will. In this regard, Resolution 2735’s rejection of “any attempt at demographic or territorial change in the Gaza Strip, including any actions that reduce the territory of Gaza” is critical.

Here, it is worth noting two possible points of contention to an approach that prioritizes Palestinian self-determination before taking additional steps in the peace process. First is the concern that the Palestinians choose an entity that pursues armed resistance to occupation, like Hamas, which is regarded as a terrorist organization (a political categorization) by some Western states and their allies. To this, it should be noted that some of the violence directed at Israel by Hamas was for the purposes of gaining legitimacy by cultivating an image of the party that fights for the Palestinian people. A legitimate elections process would result in a reduction of this type of violence. It would also mean a reduction of authoritarian violence against Palestinians to maintain control. Moreover, it is crucial to note that whoever accedes to power will be bound by international law. Equally crucial to note is that any violations of international law should be dealt with through legal avenues, not unlawful force. If force is to be used in Palestine, it is much more pertinent and legitimate to invoke Chapter VII of the UN Charter today, based on Article 94(2), to halt Israel’s actions in Gaza—especially as Israel has clearly ignored the ICJ’s three previous orders for provisional measures.

Second is the concern that allowing the free expression of Palestinian self-determination, could somehow, violate or go against Israeli self-determination. Legally speaking, if Palestinians are entitled to self-determination, then their right is equally valid as that of the Israelis. On a policy level, one must note that if the Palestinians decide on pursuing a secular democratic one-state solution, something some Israeli policymakers may regard as the destruction of Israel, it does not mean that the Israeli state will be destroyed once they vote on such a pursuit. The Palestinians will still have to reckon with the prevailing realities including the existence of the state of Israel, illegal settlements in the oPt, U.S. bias toward Israel, a decimated Gaza, a traumatized people, and a host of other challenges. But it is their choice to make.

Such a basic notion—that a nation’s own people should decide how to pursue its political manifestation—becomes complicated in the case of the Palestinians not only because they have had to compete with a Zionist nationalism exported from Europe on the same land, but also because their agency has been historically and consistently denied to the point that to act otherwise would be to alter the status quo.

A New Idealism is Needed

The status quo has already been shattered by the shock of the October 7 attacks and again by the inhumanity of genocide. It is possible that, without international action against Israel, the current unbearable reality leads to a significantly worse state of affairs in the long run. It is also possible that it leads to something in the context of an automatic two-state solution that is marginally better than before but still deeply flawed. However, it is in the hands of the international community to exert maximum effort to alter the trajectory of the status quo to one that is in the long run more positive than the pre-October 7 situation. This would be done by embracing an approach that first acknowledges Palestinian self-determination. The very fact of doing so would subtly but deeply alter the international system itself because it would mean embracing an approach that looks to law before politics and to decoupling the nation-state. It would also mean endowing a people previously but not currently concentrated in one geographical area with agency. It provides the international community with a blueprint for addressing historical injustices by engaging with those marginalized by the state-centered system.

Such an outcome may appear to some to be far-fetched, to say the least. But it is an unfortunate truth that the international system is driven to the greatest change during times of shock and tragedy. What would be a tragedy compounded is if the ongoing genocide of the Palestinians does not sufficiently push the international system to change itself to a point where it can effectively support the Palestinians in finding overdue peace and justice.

Yet, this rhetoric of the international system “changing itself” is flawed. A system does not change itself—individuals do, both from within and without the state structures that the system is based upon. To look at it from a macro, state-based point of view is to adopt the same narratives that perpetuate the plight of the Palestinians. The first step for individuals to change the system is to recognize themselves anew—that is, their perspectives, the language they use, their ambitions.

As such, a new idealism is needed—one brought forth by an approach not to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, but to Palestinian rights as a first, necessary step. This approach is given momentum through the ideals which trust that the fundamental respect of and for human rights will lead to better outcomes.

It is an idealism that endows the oppressed people of a nation with a certain degree of sovereignty without the necessity of statehood. It does not expect oppressors to decide to stop, or colonizers to act altruistically, but entrusts the oppressed with the tools to their own emancipation. It is an idealism that anchors itself in human security and human development paradigms, one that is grounded in reality but not bound by it—taking things as they are but more critically setting them up to be better. Moreover, it is an idealism where the lack of change in response to new challenges is in itself a security threat.

This idealism is both a route to and a result of adopting an approach that is centered around upholding Palestinian self-determination before anything else. Beyond idealism, however, such an approach simply makes policy, legal, and moral sense.