On January 30, 2025, two Israeli laws banning UNRWA in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) entered into effect. While initial indications were that their implementation is slow, the second half of February 2025 saw first steps towards the forced closure of a number of agency installations in East Jerusalem. The laws could cripple UNRWA’s humanitarian operation despite its significant expansion following the recent ceasefire. Gaza is largely destroyed and even with a lasting ceasefire, the UNRWA ban could lead to the collapse of education and health care for thousands in the Strip, as well as in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. 

The first law—Law to Cease UNRWA Operations—resulted in the abrogation of the Comay-Michelmore agreement, which since 1967 has regulated the operations of the agency and its privileges and immunities in Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. The law further stipulates that Israeli authorities “shall not have any contact with UNRWA or anyone acting on its behalf”. The second law—Law to Cease UNRWA Operations in the Territory of the State of Israel—contains a specific ban on UNRWA activities “within the Sovereign territory of the State of Israel”, targeting UNRWA’s operations in East Jerusalem, which contrary to international law Israel considers part of the country. 

While the implementation of the ban will have dire consequences for UNRWA and the Palestinian refugees that it serves in the OPT, the exact effects are difficult to predict. This is both because Israel has not clearly indicated how the ban will be implemented and because the situation on the ground is volatile; the Gaza ceasefire, which went into effect January 19, 2025, significantly changed dynamics in the Strip. If fully implemented, the ban would amount to a first ever forced eviction of a UN agency by a UN Member State. Implications will vary across UNRWA’s “fields of operations” and the program sectors the agency operates in. 

The timing of the ban is particularly unfortunate because UNRWA continues to face a serious financial crisis, Thus, while adapting to a new legal and political reality, UNRWA may at some point during 2025 be faced with the prospect of being unable to pay staff, limiting their ability to pull the agency through the storm. This combined challenge is exacerbated by Trump’s return to the White House which is likely to accelerate ongoing U.S. efforts at undermining and possibly dismantling the agency.

We recently conducted a preliminary study on the consequences of Israel’s ban of the agency in the context of the ongoing financial crisis, looking at possible scenarios, and their humanitarian, political, legal and gender implications. In this article, we discuss some of our pertinent findings, complemented with an assessment of the impact of the ceasefire in Gaza and the position of the Trump administration on UNRWA’s future. 

Trump’s Return to the White House

The Biden administration’s approach to Gaza was an absolute disaster for the Palestinians. His secretary of state practically admitted as much when he defended his legacy in a New York Times interview by stating that the administration’s goals had been to free the hostages, secure a ceasefire, limit civilian suffering and stop the conflict from spreading. For fifteen long months all of these goals failed to materialise. When it came to UNRWA, the Biden approach was paradoxical. On the one hand, the United States pulled out as a donor in response to the allegations that twelve UNRWA staff had participated in the October 7 Hamas attack. On the other hand, the United States asked Israel not to implement the UNRWA ban. By then President Joe Biden was a lame duck and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could simply wait him out, knowing that the UNRWA ban could be implemented under a Trump administration. 

Trump, unlike Biden, has made no pretence of wanting to preserve UNRWA. On the contrary, the previous Trump administration explicitly sought to destroy UNRWA. Based solely on that experience we can expect a hard anti-UNRWA line. In 2018, Trump personally triggered UNRWA’s financial crisis as he blocked funding to the agency, and his “peace plan” was based on the premise that the Palestinian refugee issue was taken off the table. As expected, Trump blocked further U.S. funding to UNRWA even before the law barring U.S. aid to UNRWA came to an end. For UNRWA, this means that it will be stuck with a double crisis of perpetual underfunding and the implementation of the Israeli ban. As a consequence, UNRWA might collapse in the OPT, with ramifications also for its mandate in the other areas of operation, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan.

Trump’s statements show that he will pursue an openly more aggressive line toward Palestine in general. Most famously, this includes his claim that unless the hostages are released by his inauguration then “all hell will break out”. Similar statements have been made following Israel’s decision to block all aid entering Gaza. While this was obviously a threat aimed at Hamas, Trump’s appointed envoy also pressed Netanyahu to agree to the ceasefire agreement before he entered office. Trump was seemingly a prime mover for getting the ceasefire over the finish line, but we should also remember the wider picture of how Trump’s team views Palestine. 

In his first presidential term, Trump agreed with the Israeli position that Jerusalem is Israel’s undivided capital and he took the point of view that the settlements are not to be considered illegal. His current administration clearly follows this model. Both his appointed ambassador to Israel, Mike Hukabee, and his pick as UN ambassador, Elise Stefanik, belong to this camp. The danger is therefore very real that the Netanyahu government might move to annex parts of the West Bank without Trump opposing it. 

Trump went much further than anybody had expected when, during Netanyahu’s visit to the White House in February 2025, he outlined a plan for ethnic cleansing of Gaza. According to his plan, Gaza would be emptied of Palestinians who could move to Egypt, Jordan, and other unnamed countries. The United States would then take over the Strip and make it into the “Riviera of the Middle East”. While both Egypt and Jordan, as well as Palestine and many other countries, have strongly opposed the scheme—not to forget that it is practically impossible to foresee the United States sending the amount of boots on the ground required to secure such an operation—there is a very real danger that this greenlights the worst Israeli ambitions.   

Since a core foreign policy ideology of the MAGA-movement is that the United States should not be encumbered by the restraints of the international system, we should take for granted that the international order will be targeted, both with regards to Palestine, but also beyond that. As such, UNRWA is a perfect target. We have already seen how the United States voted to sanction the International Criminal Court for having issued an arrest warrant against Netanyahu. We can also expect a targeting of the UNHCR if, as a fallout from the UNRWA ban and the agency’s potential collapse, it becomes involved with the Palestinian refugee question. 

The only potential damage reduction with regards to Trump’s Palestine policy can stem from his desire to conclude an agreement with Saudi Arabia. However, it is extremely unlikely that the Kingdom will entertain a path toward the Abraham Accords after Trump’s Gaza plan.

UNRWA and the Israeli Ban: a Brief Overview

Since October 7, 2023 Israel and pro-Israeli organisations have extensively accused UNRWA, in various ways, of being infiltrated by Hamas. During fall 2023, dismantling UNRWA became official Israeli policy, and one year later, events culminated in the legal ban. On January 26, 2024, on the same day as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) order in the South Africa v. Israel ‘genocide’ case was issued, UNRWA made public allegations against twelve of its staff who Israel had accused of being involved in the October 7 attack. As a result, the United States and 16 other donor countries immediately froze aid to UNRWA. The allegations gained traction in the United States, the EU and most importantly within Israel, and subsequently served to trigger the UNRWA ban.

In the OPT, UNRWA operates in a dangerous and unstable context, where it has been documented that both Palestinian militant groups and the Israeli army have violated the inviolability of UN infrastructure. In Gaza, Hamas has ruled since 2007 impacting UNRWA, both as a “host government” and as part of the societal fabric. Compared to the large number of staff in Gaza, the number of alleged Hamas members amongst UNRWA staff in Gaza is low, with conclusive evidence lacking. Membership in violent political organisations is incompatible with employment in UNRWA, as a UN organisation. Accordingly, since the early 2000s, UNRWA has been increasingly concerned with developing and implementing mechanisms aiming to safeguard the neutrality of the agency and its operations. A report coordinated by former French Foreign Minister Catharine Colonna recommended improvements of internal control mechanisms, but also stated that UNRWA has more neutrality-related controls in place than any other UN organization. 

Allegations of staff involvement in terrorism have served to undermine and discredit UNRWA, which appears to have been a key aim. This is not, however, a new policy. The legal ban comes after many years of demonizing UNRWA. This is mainly because of a deeply held view that UNRWA artificially perpetuates the Palestinian refugee issue, the unresolved ‘original sin’ at Israel’s birth in 1948, when two-thirds of the local Palestinian inhabitants were displaced. The perpetuation claim is factually wrong but is a view increasingly held in Israel. Hatred for UNRWA escalated with Israel’s current extreme right-wing government, and reached unprecedented levels after October 7. While UNRWA has been a main target of Israeli legal, political, and physical attacks, other UN agencies, as well as local and international NGOs, have also been targeted. Indeed, the “securitization” of both international and local NGOs and human rights organizations, with terror claims among other accusations, is a familiar phenomenon in this context. Similar tactics were also used against the Palestine Liberation Organization in the past and continue to be used to suppress Palestinian civil society. 

Israel’s ban on UNRWA needs to be interpreted in context, and as part of the political program to extend Israel’s control over all of Palestine from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea, erasing Palestinians from the land, promoted by current Israeli government Greater Israel idealogues. Moreover, the legal ban forms part of the wide array of Israeli measures in Gaza since October 7, such as limitations on humanitarian aid, and systematic destruction of Palestinian civilian infrastructure including hospitals and schools in Gaza. 

Immediate implications

In order to understand the implications of the UNRWA ban we have to break it down into three geographical areas: Gaza, the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem) and East Jerusalem.

Assessing the likely effects of the law in East Jerusalem is more straightforward, both because the applicable law is stricter—UNRWA operations will be prohibited—and because the number of registered refugees is lower than in Gaza and the rest of the West Bank. Effective the entry into force of the ban, UNRWA’s international staff were withdrawn and the West Bank Field Office, which has also functioned as part of UNRWA HQ, was closed. On February 18, 2025, Israeli forces and personnel from Jerusalem Municipality evicted one of UNRWA’s vocational training centers and ordered the closure of three agency schools in East Jerusalem, affecting 600 students. We expect the ban to be eventually fully implemented in East Jerusalem, with closure of additional UNRWA schools and clinics in the city and in two refugee camps in “Greater Jerusalem”, Shufat and Kalandia. The same goes for the cessation of other UNRWA services including waste management in the two camps. Upon full implementation, in all likelihood, Palestinian refugee students will be transferred to the Israeli school system for Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem. Plans are underway to transform the UNRWA Field Office into an Israeli settlement. The political consequences are extremely grave as Israel will further consolidate its hold over the city, practically expelling the UN and further ‘israelizing’ Palestinian education. 

The law applying to Gaza and (the remainder of) the West Bank does not prohibit UNRWA operations as such, but implies that Israeli government officials cannot engage with the agency or other actors acting on its behalf. This means that the laws are expected to be highly detrimental, but it is unclear exactly how and when they will be applied. At the time of writing implementation has not seriously started. 

In the Gaza Strip, the UNRWA ban, if fully implemented, is expected to dramatically impact humanitarian operations, with one senior UN official describing it as “a train wreck in the making”. UNRWA will no longer be able to coordinate with COGAT (the Israeli coordinating authority in the OPT), international staff will no longer gain access, and UNRWA material will not be allowed to enter the strip. What this means in practice is that UNRWA will no longer be able to provide logistical support to other humanitarian actors and related coordination. This is worse than it initially sounds. On paper, UNRWA’s imports only constitute fifteen percent of humanitarian aid entering Gaza. This gives an erroneous impression, as Israel has restricted UNRWA import. Much of UNRWA’s needs are currently consigned to and imported by other UN agencies, such as WFP and WHO. 

For decades, UNRWA has been the backbone of the entire humanitarian operation in Gaza. Field data illustrates UNRWA’s implementing and logistical capacity on the ground and how other actors compare: UNRWA has 5000 working staff in Gaza since October 7, whilst relatively large actors like the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) has fifty-five and Save the Children has 230. UNICEF has 100-150 staff. As NRC head Jan Egeland noted, UNRWA is a larger humanitarian actor in Palestine than all the other humanitarian organizations combined and is responsible for eighty percent of all humanitarian aid in Gaza. The other humanitarian actors in Gaza depend on UNRWA for their operations. In addition to the UNRWA staff that much of the overall humanitarian operation depends on, UNRWA also administers the warehouses and the shelters which house internally displaced persons (IDPs). Even when other UN agencies initiate programmes, such as when the WHO vaccinated against polio, UNRWA implemented the operation. 

While the UN position against replacing UNRWA has primarily been a principled stance against the illegality of expelling UNRWA, it is clear that even if the UN had decided to replace the agency it would require a long time. Well-informed humanitarian actors we have interviewed have estimated that such a replacement would take two to three years to do properly. Absent such a timeline, there is no time to plan, and the Israelis themselves are not presenting one either.

While the focus on Gaza is primarily the humanitarian consequences of the ban, for obvious reasons, we should do well to remember that UNRWA’s foremost tasks are basic education and primary healthcare. In the context of the ongoing war and scholasticide, no schools are operating, creating an educational gap that only UNRWA—given its longstanding experience, infrastructure and staff—will be able to fill once the war is over. With regards to healthcare UNRWA conducts 17,000 consultations per day. An operation of that scale simply cannot be replaced, and ending it would be disastrous. 

In the West Bank, UNRWA’s international staff are no longer granted visas and UNRWA supplies will not be allowed to enter the territory if indeed the ban is fully implemented. Unlike in Gaza and in East Jerusalem, where the ban will have an immediate impact, we can expect a slower impact in the rest of the West Bank. UNRWA’s extensive education and health services, including ninety-six schools and forty-three health clinics, mainly in refugee camps, might be severely affected by the ban. Scenarios span from UNRWA temporarily being able to continue providing these basic services, to the Palestinian Authority (PA) or other actors taking over, to basic services closing down. The worst case scenario includes a wide and serious deprivation of basic human rights, and potential social and political domino effects leading to the collapse of the PA. The legal ban will play out in an already extremely insecure and volatile situation. Since October 2023, more than 993 Palestinians, including more than 200 children, have been killed in the West Bank. The Israeli military has targeted refugee camps, in particular in northern parts of the West Bank, while the PA has intensified its crackdown on Palestinian militant groups operating in some camps. 

Implications of the Gaza Ceasefire on the Implementation of the Ban

At the time of writing, implementation of the legal ban has been limited, contrary to what was expected. We see three key explanations for this that are not mutually exclusive. One, the ceasefire conditions have been dependent on humanitarian operations being largely expanded, which is impossible without UNRWA; second, behind-the-scenes international pressure has so far limited implementation of the laws; and third, Israel keeps the implementation of the laws as an overhanging threat to UNRWA’ operations and existence, and to the refugees depending on its services, thereby worsening organizational and financial stress and a further weakening of UNRWA in front of international donors and other UN agencies.

The imperatives of the ceasefire agreement between Hamas and Israel may change some of the dynamics with respect to the implementation of the UNRWA ban. The ceasefire deal requires at least 600 truckloads of aid to be allowed into Gaza every day of the initial six-week phase, including fifty carrying fuel. Half of those trucks are supposed to go to Gaza’s north, where experts have warned famine is imminent. 

As compliance by Israel with this requirement is one of the conditions for the weekly release of hostages under the first six-week phase of the ceasefire, this is likely one of the reasons implementation of the ban was delayed until the end of phase one. Further flexibility on the part of Israel may include allowing workarounds, such as ‘rehatting’ UNRWA international staff and/or placing UNRWA’s local employees in Gaza under the control of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. This might be overly optimistic, however, as the Israeli government has blocked all aid entering Gaza and the ceasefire appears to be increasingly prone to collapse. Moreover, should the ceasefire hold and the second stage begin, Israel might still simply insist that as long as enough trucks enter Gaza it is up to actors on the ground—absent UNRWA—to figure out delivery.

Obviously, in the absence of hostilities, it will be safer for trucks and workers to move around Gaza, and the need for deconfliction will be greatly reduced as long as the ceasefire lasts. As the ceasefire takes hold, and is hopefully prolonged, it is vital that UNRWA be allowed to restart education. The ban will make that extremely difficult, if not impossible, creating long-term gaps in Palestinian education and a lost generation of children.

Violations of International Law

The two new laws breaches Article 105 of the UN Charter, the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN, and UN Security Council resolution 2730 of May 2024 on the protection of humanitarian and UN personnel. As a Member of the UN, Israel also continues to be required, pursuant to Article 2, paragraph 5, of the UN Charter, to give UNRWA every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the UN General Assembly (UNGA). Israel cannot invoke the provisions of its internal laws, including the recent legislation against UNRWA, as justification for its failure to perform its obligations.

Moreover, the laws defy the ICJ’s opinion on the unlawfulness of Israel’s presence in Gaza and the West Bank, including eastern Jerusalem, and the subsequent UNGA resolution calling for Israel’s withdrawal from these areas by September 2025. As noted by the ICJ in its advisory opinion, although Israel’s occupation is unlawful it remains an Occupying Power subject to relevant international humanitarian law (IHL), international human rights law (IHRL) and general principles of international law. Nothing in these laws permit Israel, as an Occupying Power, to expel directly or indirectly, the agency from the OPT. On the contrary, Israel is obligated under the Fourth Geneva Convention to facilitate the “relief schemes” provided by UNRWA (Article 59), among other things. The fact that UNRWA has been providing services and assistance to Palestinian refugees in the OPT does not absolve Israel from its obligations to ensure that the necessary services and assistance are facilitated. In the event that UNRWA is compelled to cease its activities in the OPT, Israel would remain under obligation to ensure that the necessary services and assistance are provided.

By adopting these laws, Israel also violated the provisional measures issued by the ICJ in South Africa v. Israel in May 2024, which urged Israel to cease all its actions that create conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of Palestinians in Gaza (the group protected by the provisional measures order) and to allow for unhindered and appropriate humanitarian aid into Gaza. As UNRWA is the principal lifeline to the civilian population, banning UNRWA in Gaza can be seen as an integral component of Israel’s genocidal campaign to erase the Palestinians as a people.

Implications for the International Refugee Regime

The second law passed by the Knesset seeks a cessation of UNRWA operations in de facto sovereign Israeli territory, East Jerusalem. As Israel is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, this would automatically trigger the application of article 1D2 with the result that Palestinian refugees in East Jerusalem “shall ipso facto be entitled to the benefits” of the Convention. As the OPT is under effective Israeli control, UNRWA’s cessation will similarly trigger the application of Article 1D2 with respect to Palestinian refugees residing in Gaza and the remainder of the West Bank. Application of the 1951 Convention to Palestinian refugees in the OPT will entitle them to the benefits of the Convention which are similar to the protections they already enjoy under IHL and IHRL. Should any of these refugees need to seek protection in other States that are party to the 1951 Convention, they automatically qualify for refugee status in those respective countries.

Similarly, the cessation of UNRWA’s ability to assist and protect Palestinian refugees triggers the responsibility of UNHCR, the global refugee agency, with respect to these refugees, in line with article 7C of the UNHCR Statute and article 35 of the 1951 Convention. This does not mean that UNHCR must take over or replace the services that UNRWA has hitherto provided. UNHCR’s mandate toward refugees worldwide is very different from that of UNRWA. Contrary to UNRWA, UNHCR typically does not provide direct services to refugees; it makes use of implementing partners—host governments, other UN agencies, international or local NGOs—to provide humanitarian support. 

UNHCR’s involvement with Palestinian refugees in the OPT will nevertheless be important in three possible ways. Firstly, it will enhance the efforts to protect Palestinians in the OPT by adding a “refugee protection lens”, i.e. UNHCR will approach protection concerns of Palestinian refugees the way it does with respect to other refugees. Secondly, involvement of UNHCR will, at least theoretically, overcome the durable solutions gap faced by Palestinian refugees. Contrary to UNHCR, UNRWA does not have a mandate to pursue durable solutions for Palestinian refugees, leaving them as the only group of refugees without an institution to help them to bring an end to their plight as refugees. Thirdly, UNHCR’s involvement allows for the deployment of the ‘toolbox’ to address large scale refugee situations, including protracted ones, as set out in the New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants and the Global Compact on Refugees, including the potential development of a so-called comprehensive response framework for Palestinian refugees.

Legal Challenges to the Ban

On December 19, 2024, the UNGA adopted resolution A/RES/79/232, initiated by Norway, in which, referring to Article 65 of the Statute of the Court, it requested the ICJ to give an advisory opinion to answer the following question:

“What are the obligations of Israel, as an occupying Power and as a member of the United Nations, in relation to the presence and activities of the United Nations, including its agencies and bodies, other international organizations and third States, in and in relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including to ensure and facilitate the unhindered provision of urgently needed supplies essential to the survival of the Palestinian civilian population as well as of basic services and humanitarian and development assistance, for the benefit of the Palestinian civilian population, and in support of the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination?”

Although the question does not specifically make reference to UNRWA, the remaining text of the resolution makes it clear that the request for an advisory opinion was in fact triggered by the Israeli ban on UNRWA. In his Order dated December 23 2024, the President of the ICJ set February 28 2025 as the time-limit within which written statements by UN Member States on the question may be presented to the Court, after which the President will decide on the further procedure. Some 40 states and international organizations have submitted written statements and it is expected that oral hearings will take place in the spring and that a ruling will be rendered during the second half of 2025.

A second legal challenge to the ban was made with the highest Israeli court. On January 16, 2025, Adalah, the Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, petitioned the Supreme Court against the two new aforementioned Israeli laws that seek to shut down UNRWA. The petition was filed on behalf of ten Palestinian refugees who will be severely affected by the passage of the laws, along with Gisha, the Legal Center for Freedom of Movement. The petitioners argue that the laws violate fundamental human rights and Israel’s obligations under international law, and will have catastrophic humanitarian consequences. They seek an urgent interim injunction to delay the implementation of the laws, which came into effect at the end of January 2025. The Supreme Court denied the request for an interim injunction and ordered the state to submit a preliminary response to the petition by March 2, 2025. Based on prior case law, the chances that the Court will eventually overturn the ban are minimal.

Protection of Refugee Rights

It is important to note that the question of the status of the refugees and their rights and historical claims are not dependent on UNRWA’s continued ability to provide services in Gaza and the West Bank; they flow from the illegality of Israeli practices and policies in Palestine during and following the Nakba—as affirmed by the UNGA in Resolution 194—as well as the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, recently reaffirmed in no uncertain terms in the ICJ’s advisory opinion. 

Regardless, UNRWA will continue to update its Palestinian refugee registration records, including with respect to refugees in the OPT. In 2022, the e-UNRWA application was introduced, a mobile platform that allows refugees to access and update their records remotely. The application, through which currently over ninety-eight percent of registration requests are processed—including from refugees in the OPT—is similar to medical insurance apps for its efficiency in enabling document uploads and submissions. While Israel could implement a geo-block on that app there are ways around it such as using VPN, which was used for e-UNRWA registrations in Syria. UNRWA will also revise its registration instructions, which have not been updated since 2009.

During the current war, the agency removed thousands of hard copies of key registration documents dating back to 1948 from its Gaza HQ (and also from the West Bank) to Amman. Thanks to the dedication of UNRWA staff, the agency’s registration database is now fully digitized and stored in safe digital spaces around the world. The preservation of this backbone of refugee culture and identity will be a source of collective comfort to the Palestinian refugees. The database will assume a pivotal significance if refugees decide to pursue their rights and historical claims to which they are entitled under international law. Even if this isn’t feasible immediately, UNRWA’s fully digitized database can enable this in the future. 

The Way Forward for UNRWA and the International Community

In many ways, UNRWA stands as a test to the world’s commitment to uphold the international system. Failing to protect one UN agency will not only detrimentally affect the Palestinians, but also make other institutions and the groups they are made to protect more vulnerable. Continuing to stand up against the UNRWA ban is therefore paramount. At the same time, it is vital that all states and organizations involved in the Middle East work to ensure that humanitarian aid is distributed to those in need in Gaza and the West Bank, and that funding and support to UNRWA continues. This must be done while heavy diplomatic pressure is applied to ensure that the Gaza ceasefire holds and is expanded on. As one of us has argued in the Cairo Review before, UNRWA’s future beyond October 7 cannot be considered in isolation—a comprehensive, multi-stakeholder approach, with displacement issues at its centre, is now necessary.

While the international debate around the Israeli ban, for valid reasons, focuses on the humanitarian prospects in Gaza, it is extremely important that we also highlight UNRWA’s health and educational role, making sure that their role is protected with regard to rebuilding and reinstituting the basic education and primary health care system in Gaza once the war ends. This also extends to education and health services in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.

Together with the rest of the UN humanitarian and human rights system, UNRWA must place the protection of the Palestinian refugees’ identity, rights, and claims at the center because, contrary to service delivery, no other organization can take over this function. UNRWA’s registration system is critical in this respect. It has the potential to become the central archive and repository of evidence of the refugees, especially once the registration system gets harmonised and synchronised with the historic records of Palestinian property losses assembled by the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine. The latter would connect property loss and damages in 1947/1949 to individual refugees and their families and descendants. 

The future governance of Gaza is still, at best, unclear and uncertain, as is the prospect for reconstruction after the massive destruction the Strip suffered under Israeli attack. Trump’s statements that the United States will build a completely new Gaza are detached from reality, and are premised on ethnic cleansing in flagrant violation of international law. Any viable reconstruction must encompass the desire of the Palestinians, in line with their right to national self-determination. 

UNRWA’s wealth of expertise is critical here, too, as discussions with respect to reconstruction of Gaza are coming to the fore now that a ceasefire has been reached. The agency played a key role in reconstruction and rehabilitation of damaged housing and infrastructure in the aftermath of the five earlier Gaza wars since 2008, and this experience—along with that garnered from camp improvement and rehousing efforts in Lebanon (Badawi camp), Syria (Neirab camp), the West Bank (Jenin camp)—is invaluable. Rather than top-down solutions made in the West, it is critical that reconstruction taps into and is driven by local actors, expertise and resources. 

It is crucial that donors step up and both increase their funding and shift the timing of the funding forward, to ensure that UNRWA is not hit by the double crisis. The longer term perspective that must be kept in mind is that the only way to legally replace UNRWA is to provide a political solution to the Palestinian refugee issue by fulfilling Palestinian self-determination.