The prospect of a normalization agreement between Saudi Arabia and Israel has entailed high hopes and great expectations since the signing of the 2020 Abraham Accords. While such a deal has yet to materialize, heightened interest in such an arrangement has emerged at regular intervals as a solution for the Middle East region’s most intractable problems. Multiple iterations of this have been seen since the onset of the Israel-Hamas war in 2023; most recently, the January 2025 ceasefire and hostage-exchange deal between Israel and Hamas has been cast as renewing the possibility of a Saudi-Israeli normalization and, with it, the potential of a two-state solution between Israel and the Palestinians. 

The neighboring Gulf states of Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates signed the Abraham Accords in September 2020, establishing formal diplomatic relations with Israel, later joined by Morocco and Sudan. These diplomatic breakthroughs—so the story went—would usher in a new chapter of Arab-Israeli collaboration, forge a strong regional bulwark against Iran, and advance a durable resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. “The dawn of the new Middle East,” in the words of U.S. President Donald Trump, had arrived. 

While casting many of his predecessor’s policies aside upon taking office, President Joe Biden vowed commitment to these normalization agreements and sought to expand the accords to include the region’s long-standing heavyweight: Saudi Arabia. The window for normalization to occur under a Biden presidency has closed, but Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that “much of the heavy lifting for normalization is complete, including negotiations on complex U.S.-Saudi elements of an agreement”.   

The new Trump administration is likely to continue pursuing Saudi-Israeli normalization. At the 2024 Doha Forum in Qatar, former White House Middle East Envoy Jason Greenblatt said, “There’s just no way that President Trump isn’t going to be interested in trying to expand the Abraham Accords.” The incoming National Security Advisor, Mike Waltz, described Saudi-Israeli normalization as a “huge priority”, and the “next phase of the Abraham Accords”. Meanwhile, President-elect Trump said he would build on the January 2025 Gaza ceasefire momentum to expand the accords. 

The primary actors involved in a potential Saudi-Israeli normalization have strong incentives to portray a deal as a paradigm-shifting event with tremendous, transformative potential for the broader region. This normalization agreement is often described as an all-or-nothing opportunity that will emerge triumphantly within a game-changing grand bargain or else collapse spectacularly. There is good reason to consider another scenario more closely resembling the status quo: a Saudi-Israeli normalization that is considerably less encompassing and transformative than envisioned.

A Tense Region  

The Israel-Hamas war that broke out in October 2023 induced a seismic shift in the region’s underlying dynamics and evoked fears over rising instability. For White House officials in the Biden administration, Saudi-Israeli normalization became even more necessary. It offered a potential means to secure a foreign policy win following a messy withdrawal from Afghanistan, end the deadly conflict in Gaza, enhance Israel’s regional integration, and produce a durable solution for Palestinian statehood. Less obvious objectives, like containing Chinese influence across the Middle East, have even emerged as associated policy goals.   

The governments in Saudi Arabia and Israel also appeared keen on striking a deal around normalization. The Saudis stood to play an influential role in the intractable Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while simultaneously extracting significant concessions from the U.S. These elements of the deal, which are presumably still on the table, include a strategic alliance agreement establishing Saudi Arabia as a treaty ally, a defense cooperation agreement, civil nuclear cooperation, and deeper trade and investment ties. It was also believed that Riyadh eagerly sought deeper, official ties to Israel, which boasts strong technology and security credentials, deep-pocketed investors, a steady supply of tourists, and proven experience with critical infrastructure like desalination—all useful inputs for the Saudi Vision 2030 transformation agenda led by the ambitious Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. 

Israelis have also viewed normalization through an opportunistic lens. Prior to October 7, Israel envisioned that normalization with Saudi Arabia would enhance its cooperation with the region’s largest economy and serve as a gateway to better relations with other Arab and Islamic countries without making any meaningful concessions on the Palestinian issue. In the wake of the Hamas attack, normalization became a means for addressing new challenges. For Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, normalization offers an opportunity to recraft his legacy after presiding over the biggest strategic security failure in Israel’s history and reaffirm his foreign policy credentials at a time when Israel is facing mounting international criticism. And, with much of Gaza in ruins, normalization could also serve as the pretext for drawing in Gulf actors and capital to shoulder the responsibility for post-conflict security, stabilization, and reconstruction. 

Disconnected Foreign Policy Priorities  

Yet many foreign policy priorities of both Saudi Arabia and Israel now appear increasingly disconnected from normalization. The Saudi crown prince—and de facto ruler of the country—craves global recognition. Mohammed bin Salman wants to represent Saudi Arabia at G20 summits, court tech titans and financiers from the U.S. and Europe, and deepen relations with BRICS countries. As far as the Middle East region is concerned, Saudi officials have pursued a policy of de-escalation, which include reestablishing diplomatic relations with Iran and reducing economic pressure on the Houthis. These efforts to insulate Saudi Arabia from ongoing regional tensions and conflicts are especially important for the continued progress of Saudi Vision 2030—an ambitious social and economic transformation agenda requiring a sustained influx of foreign investors, residents, and tourists. At the same time, Mohammed bin Salman is compensating for underwhelming flows of inward foreign investment by leaning heavily upon government-related entities—from the Public Investment Fund to Saudi Aramco—to fuel domestic development.  

It is difficult to see how an official relationship with Israel can help Mohammed bin Salman advance his global, regional, and domestic ambitions. In fact, it could make some things more difficult, the Houthis being a prime example. The Houthis, which even the U.S. struggles to deter and degrade, control Sanaa and northwest Yemen along the border with Saudi Arabia. Since November 2023, the Houthis have launched repeated attacks on maritime targets in and around the Red Sea, professing solidarity with the Palestinian cause and threatening Israel and its backers. In early July 2024, the Houthis released a video entitled “Just Try It”—a warning to Riyadh against supporting U.S.-led strikes against the group—with drone footage of Saudi airports and ports as well as explicit threats to the country’s economy and stability. Israel and the Houthis exchanged air and drone strikes later that month, marking an escalation in tensions. The group would strongly object to any Saudi steps perceived as strengthening an Israeli presence on its doorstep. Iran poses another potential threat. As Israel weighed retaliatory options after an Iranian missile attack in early October 2024, Iran warned Saudi Arabia that any regional support for Israel could result in the targeting of Saudi oil facilities. 

Meanwhile, Israel’s current foreign policy priorities—and those Israelis view as domestic security issues, such as rising West Bank militarism—likewise extend beyond normalization. The Israeli government and citizens continue to perceive dangerous and immediate threats on several fronts. Reeling from the profound security failure on October 7, Israel’s primary focus is on securing its borders and reestablishing a semblance of deterrence. In Gaza, Israel has been bogged down in a 15-month war against a substantially weakened but resilient Hamas. The Israeli government has demonstrated little willingness to adjust its objectives or provide cogent post-war plans. Although a long-awaited second ceasefire has now come into effect, its continuation is far from guaranteed. Israel is also concerned about Palestinian militancy in the West Bank and has conducted near-daily violent raids since October 7. In late August 2024, Foreign Minister Israel Katz referred to Israel’s expansion of air and ground operations in the northern West Bank as a “full-fledged war”.

Israel’s risky months-long game of tit-for-tat attacks with Hezbollah, meanwhile, transformed into full-on war in October 2024. A U.S.-brokered ceasefire, based on a reinvigorated United Nations Resolution from 2006, took effect in late November. Numerous violations since then, both by Hezbollah and Israel, reveal the fragility of the truce. Tel Aviv has vowed that if the war resumes, Israel would target the entirety of the “State of Lebanon”. Following the election of Joseph Aoun as Lebanon’s new president in early January 2025, there have been renewed calls on Israel to accelerate its troop withdrawal from southern Lebanon. 

And then there is Iran. While the Israeli-Iranian shadow war has lasted decades, manifested through cyberattacks, targeted killings, and foreign proxy groups, both Israel and Iran’s appetite for high-risk actions have increased since early 2024. Israel, mainly with the support of the U.S. and other partners, has largely been able to thwart Iran’s retaliatory missile and drone attacks. Israel’s successful defense against Iran’s attacks, in addition to recent tactical victories against Hezbollah and Hamas, have led a buoyant Netanyahu to push for a new security reality—a new Middle East without the threat of Iran and its militant allies. Following Syrian President Bashar Assad’s surprise toppling by HTS in early December, a direct result of the post-October 7 weakening of Assad’s regional backers, Netanyahu thus proclaimed that Israel was “dismantling Iran’s axis of evil,” creating “new and important opportunities for Israel”.

Nevertheless, even a weakened Iran is likely to pose a threat to Israel. Israel’s trouncing of Hamas and Hezbollah, coupled with the recent fall of Assad’s regime, have sparked fears in Israel that Iran will push to assemble a nuclear bomb. In the aftermath of Iran’s first-ever attack on Israeli territory, on April 14, 2024, Prime Minister Netanyahu spoke of an “Abraham Alliance”—a desired security extension of the Abraham Accords to help counter Iranian threats as part of his “vision for the broader Middle East”. But it is unlikely that Saudi Arabia—like other Arab states—would be eager to fight Israel’s battles. In fact, Saudi Arabia reportedly sought to reassure Iran of its neutrality in the Iran-Israel conflict.

The Gaza Predicament  

The tragic situation in Gaza and what lies ahead further reduces the likelihood of a transformative normalization. Indeed, international affairs expert F. Gregory Gause III wrote in Foreign Affairs that a Saudi-Israeli deal “will remain on ice” as long as the conflict in Gaza continues. Once the fighting definitively stops, the stabilization, humanitarian, and reconstruction needs associated with this conflict will be enormous. For a deep and consequential normalization to materialize any time soon, the Saudis and Israelis must come together concerning the Palestinians. In reality, these two parties hold clashing positions. 

Riyadh has long maintained its commitment to the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative (API), which conditioned normalized relations with Israel on the establishment of a viable Palestinian state. The 89-year-old King Salman bin Abdulaziz, who is believed to pose an obstacle to normalization while still serving as king, has championed the API. More recent normalization conditions put forward by the Saudis involve a ceasefire in Gaza and renewed calls for the establishment of a Palestinian state. In a speech on September 18, 2024 to Saudi Arabia’s governing body, the Shura Council, Mohammed bin Salman stated that his country would not establish diplomatic relations with Israel without a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital.

If meeting these conditions was not challenging enough, other Gaza-related developments have increased friction in Saudi-Israeli relations. Prominent Saudi officials have called for sanctions on Israeli officials involved in the war in Gaza. At an August 2024 meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the Saudi deputy foreign minister described the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran—the result of an Israeli operation—as a “blatant violation” of Iran’s sovereignty. Prince Turkey Al-Faisal Al Saud, a prominent former government official, described Israel as “not only an apartheid colonial state, but…also a genocidal one,” at the 2024 IISS Manama Dialogue in Bahrain. Shifting gears into a genuine diplomatic embrace of Israel would involve a major pivot of diplomacy.

There is little reason to think Israel will rush into a normalization agreement that necessitates a clear roadmap toward a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the creation of a Palestinian state. Prime Minister Netanyahu and his far-right coalition partners have demonstrated no impetus to make any advancement on Palestinian statehood. Instead, they have worked to further weaken the Palestinian Authority and expand Israeli territorial control in the West Bank through increased settlement construction and legalization of pre-existing settler outposts. Data from Peace Now, a settlement monitoring group, shows that 2024 marked the largest appropriation of West Bank land by the Israeli government since the 1993 Oslo Accords, further complicating the creation of a continuous Palestinian state.  

It would be a mistake to assume that a more moderate Israeli government would make meaningful concessions on Palestinian statehood. Since the outbreak of the current Gaza crisis, the Israeli parliament has adopted two resolutions opposing any creation of a Palestinian state, including through a negotiated settlement with Israel. The last resolution passed in July, which cast the establishment of a Palestinian state as “an existential danger to the State of Israel” and a “prelude to the takeover of jihadist Islam in the Middle East”, received support from Benny Gantz, Netanyahu’s key political opponent. Other lawmakers known to previously favor a two-state solution were conveniently absent for the vote, a testament to their understanding of the public’s stance on this unpopular issue.    

Public Opinion 

Israeli and Saudi public opinion is at odds with an Israeli-Saudi normalization deal. Indeed, Israelis are unlikely to support Palestinian statehood in Gaza and the West Bank as part of a package normalization agreement in the near term. As of late May 2024, almost 74 percent of Israeli Jews opposed a normalization deal that would involve the establishment of a Palestinian state, reflecting the overall lack of public enthusiasm for a two-state solution. Polling by the Pew Research Center shows that, as of May 2024, 50 percent of Israeli Jews preferred that Israel control the Gaza Strip while only 19 percent of Israeli Jews believe that peaceful coexistence with a Palestinian state was plausible—the lowest number since polling began in 2013. With the nation squarely focused on the national trauma experienced on and since October 7, there has been growing indifference to the plight of the Palestinians, including among left-wing, liberal Israelis. As the Israeli historian Omer Bartov wrote in The Guardian in August 2024, while many Israelis continue to recognize the injustice of occupation, this is not what they are focused on; in the perceived “struggle between justice and existence, existence must win out”. 

Post-October 7 polling similarly shows that Saudi public opinion is working against the creation of deep and comprehensive ties between Saudi Arabia and Israel. Saudi Arabia is a monarchy, and its citizens are unable to express policy preferences at the ballot box. But it would be a mistake to believe that the views of key domestic constituencies do not factor into the decision-making considerations of Saudi leadership. The notion that autocratic leaders are not constrained by public opinion is a myth, as Michael Robbins, Amaney Jamal, and Mark Tessler argued in Foreign Affairs. Many Saudis, especially the youth cohort, remain loyal to the Mohammed bin Salman brand of leadership and his associated reform agenda, which has spurred popular social and economic transformations. Yet this support is not guaranteed, and Israel remains an ever-sensitive topic. Many Saudi citizens—along with their counterparts across Arab and Islamic countries—are boycotting American brands because of the war in Gaza. This behavior is a display of consumer activism in a country with limited tolerance for political expression.  

Most Saudis are averse to normalization with Israel. A poll conducted by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) in December 2023 found that 96 percent of Saudis opposed relations between Israel and the Arab world. According to a Doha Institute poll published in January 2024, 68 percent of Saudis opposed Saudi recognition of Israel—the highest level of opposition to normalization recorded since 2016. Even pre-October 7 polling showed lackluster Saudi support for initial steps toward normalization. Another WINEP poll from August 2023 found that 86 percent of Saudis opposed allowing Israeli sports teams to participate in events in their country.    

Previous Normalization Deals  

Despite significant headwinds, there is regional precedent for Arab-Israeli normalization but little evidence of transformative potential, particularly on the Palestinian issue. With conflicts raging across the Middle East, it is also difficult to argue that recent normalizations and other diplomatic agreements have made the region—and Israel’s position therein—a safer and more prosperous one. This does not necessarily mean that normalization deals have exacerbated regional conflicts, though some analysts have suggested that a potential Saudi-Israeli normalization served as a motivation for Hamas’ October 7 attack. 

Past normalization deals in the Middle East and Gulf region offer a useful historical perspective for how a more limited normalization might unfold. Israel’s peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan—signed in 1979 and 1994—led to pragmatic collaboration on economic and security issues. However, widespread public anti-Israel sentiment, rhetoric, and conspiracy theories remain in place today. A poll conducted by the Arab Center Washington DC found that 83 percent of Jordanians and 89 percent of Egyptians oppose recognition of Israel as of February 2024. While both treaties have proven resilient—with the added incentive of U.S. financial and economic and military aid assistance—to repeated challenges over time, bilateral relations remain a far cry from fully “normalized”, and more closely resemble a cold peace.  

The Gulf countries of the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain offer more recent case studies for assessing a prospective Saudi-Israel normalization. Honeymoon periods following the Abraham Accords led to a flurry of memorandums of understanding, boosts in bilateral trade and investment, and largely one-directional flows of tourists from Israel. The Emirates captured much of the initial economic momentum, signing a comprehensive economic partnership agreement in 2022 that envisioned bilateral trade reaching $10 billion after five years, up from around $3 billion in 2023. Much of the commercial collaboration has cooled or become less visible over recent months. Strained diplomatic relations after October 7 did not break, but the deteriorating situation in Gaza has left Abu Dhabi and Manama in uncomfortable positions. The United Arab Emirates appears focused on leveraging its newly formalized relations with Israel and established ties with Egypt to support ongoing humanitarian initiatives for Palestinians.  

The Moroccan and Sudanese cases offer further evidence of pragmatic, but ultimately non-transformative, normalization agreements. Both countries received tangible benefits from the U.S. in return for normalizing relations with Israel. Morocco secured U.S. recognition of its sovereignty claims over the Western Sahara. Many dimensions of normalized Moroccan-Israeli ties—from sales of weapons and defense systems to tourism—had already existed previously behind closed doors. Sudan was removed from a U.S. government list of countries promoting terrorism and received commitments for loans and financing. Sudan’s announcement of formal ties with Israel in 2020 marked a significant departure from the nation’s long-held anti-Israel position. However, ongoing internal political instability has limited the potential for cooperation and effectively put planned normalization on hold.

Ironically, despite years of pressure from Washington to formalize relations with Israel, Saudi Arabia’s most recent diplomatic breakthrough was with Iran (which Israel views as an existential threat), brokered by China (a strategic competitor of the U.S.). Signed in 2023, the Beijing-brokered agreement between Riyadh and Tehran allowed for a resumption of diplomatic ties. The agreement—more renormalization than normalization—helped ease some tensions between the two countries, though it has not altered the foundations of the bilateral relationship nor reconfigured regional dynamics. A diplomatic breakthrough involving Saudi Arabia and Israel probably would not initiate a tectonic bilateral or regional shift either.

Pragmatism and Flexibility  

Some manner of Saudi-Israeli normalization is likely to occur eventually. As Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs Prince Faisal bin Farhan said in 2020, the Kingdom has always believed in “an eventual normalization with Israel”, though one that would be part of a comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Much has changed since 2020, but normalization has not been taken off the table entirely or indefinitely. The important question to consider is what form Saudi-Israeli relations will take over the coming years.  

An eventual Saudi-Israeli normalization deal might include lofty, aspirational language, but the outcomes of such a deal are likely to be closer to the status quo. Both the Egyptian and Jordanian peace treaties used near identical language to call for a just, comprehensive, and lasting “peace in the Middle East”. A durable resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict involving the creation of an independent Palestinian state is one desired outcome of normalization that is highly unlikely. The Saudis can advocate for the Palestinians, but they cannot negotiate in their stead. 

A non-transformative normalization may accomplish a narrower set of Saudi and Israeli interests. Such a normalization deal might enable closer defense and security cooperation—between the Saudis and Israelis as well as the Saudis and Americans. There is also Saudi-Israeli compatibility in the technology domain: cybersecurity, fintech, and agritech present high-priority areas for collaboration under formal relations. Water resource management is another potential area for technology and skills transfer. Those Saudi and Israeli business actors willing to engage across various industries would encounter fewer formal constraints when pursuing these commercial opportunities.

Additionally, Saudi Arabia and Israel would likely establish direct transportation and commercial linkages via air and sea as well as explore other ways to enhance connectivity. Indeed, both countries are critical nodes in the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC)—a nascent transregional initiative. The ties following normalization would likely be flexible, allowing each state and other actors to ramp up or decrease cooperation as needed. For example, while the Saudis may promote certain forms of economic cooperation, they may not rush to offer Israelis tourist visas. 

A gradual normalization would enable key stakeholders to limit associated risks and responsibilities. Such a step-by-step process may even align with the expectations of the Trump administration. In his closing remarks at the 2024 Doha Forum, Greenblatt, one of the architects of the Abraham Accords, suggested that “we don’t even have to set the prize so high at the beginning…I think cooperation between these countries and Israel and America to bring safety and security and prosperity even if there’s no formal normalization would be a big win.”

To be sure, the emergence of a Saudi-Israeli normalization within a grand diplomatic bargain remains a distinct possibility. Until this scenario becomes reality, however, it is worth considering the full range of other options and their likely implications. A complex deal doesn’t necessarily foreshadow transformative results.