On July 8, the United Nations Security Council convened in response to a call by Tunisia, its Arab non-permanent member, to discuss Egyptian and Sudanese objections to Ethiopia’s unilateral launch of the second phase in the filling of the mega-dam reservoir—the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)—before reaching an agreement between the three riparian states.

The Council had two positions before it: the first being Ethiopia’s, which had informed Egypt and Sudan in official communication that the second stage of filling had commenced in time with the start of summer rainfall. The 18.4 billion cubic meter reservoir would take two years to fill, during which 6.9 billion cubic meters are intended to be stored in July and 6.6 billion in August 2021. This unilateral announcement came with an invitation to share information and an offer to arrive at an acceptable solution for the hydroelectric dam’s operation through progressive negotiating stages under the auspices of African Union president, Felix-Antoine Tshisekedi. Ethiopia also asserted that the right to operate the dam is an internal and technical matter and declared that negotiations should occur at the African level and no other.

The second position—the Arab one—was pushed by Egypt and Sudan and conveyed in Tunisia’ draft resolution. It called for all parties to refrain from unilateral measures and appeal negotiations to a wider framework, at the joint invitation of the African Union president and Secretary of the UN and with the presence of active observers, to reach a binding agreement surrounding the dam’s operation in six months and to enable Ethiopia to generate electricity without harming downstream countries. The resolution urged the three Nile Basin states to refrain from making any statements, or taking any action, that may jeopardize the negotiation process and called on Ethiopia to stop the second stage filling of the GERD reservoir. It also invited  the Secretary General to present reports to the Security Council on the implementation of the resolution.

Egypt and Sudan anticipated  the Security Council meeting with extensive communications with member states and UN officials. French Ambassador Nicolas de Riviere, the Council’s president for July, issued a statement that the Council does not have sufficient expertise to deal with the issue. Other statements from the UN and the United States cautioned against unilateral actions, saying that the filling complicates the progress of negotiations.

Throughout their session, Council member states called for Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia’s cooperation in arriving at a solution within an African framework, independent from the UN Security Council. The Norwegian delegate was the most blunt and straightforward on this point. Speakers avoided direct demands for Ethiopia to cease its unilateral activity and sufficed to call on the three riparian states to avoid actions or rhetoric that would complicate the talks. The Russian delegate, who completely avoided touching upon Ethiopian conduct, was the strongest in voicing opposition to any threat of the use of force. The U.S. ambassador pointed to the Declaration of Principles in 2015, but deliberately overlooked a draft agreement in 2020 forged under the care of the previous U.S. administration, which Ethiopia did not sign. All parties avoided discussion of the ideal goals of negotiation as well as its timeline.

Egypt issued a strong statement at the Council, and Sudan explained its position in precise and frank terms, even with regard to the somewhat different perspectives between the two. That said, both countries showed a high degree of flexibility and agreement even before the start of official discussions .They had decided to ask that negotiations be held in a broader, four-way setting given that the African talks have so far gone nowhere. However, the two countries , in the draft resolution submitted , accepted  continuing talks in the African framework, supported by the United Nations and other active observers.

Egypt and Sudan succeeded in casting light on the delicate and potentially dangerous ramifications of the GERD on their water supply, especially Ethiopia’s wish to exercise unilateral decisions on the course of the Blue Nile. But the Council deliberations in the first meeting  did not end in a proposal to change the framework of the negotiations or their present sponsor, the African Union. Neither did the Council move to support the presence of auxiliary parties to the talks, such as the United Nations or active observers. The council did not include, in its deliberations or in the statements of its members, a call to reach a binding agreement about the water release by a defined time period. All of these are elements proposed by the Tunisian resolution.

It is thus quite difficult to imagine that Egypt and Sudan were satisfied with the results of the meetings, especially since they were the ones who requested the council address this issue. Even if we observe in the coming days some international effort, whether inside the Security Council or out, to protect such as through supporting the role of observers in the negotiations or defining a timeline—there will be little cause for celebration so long as the main points of contention remain unresolved. Of chief importance is that there be joint, trilateral decisions surrounding the water release according to legally binding rules for all, complete with a mechanism to settle disputes.

In fact, a political reading of member state positions in the Security Council and the international arena indicates how difficult it is to expect binding decisions from the Council that fulfill the requests of the draft resolution. This is more apparent in light of the quotidian disputes of member states. The options available to Egypt and Sudan for recourse are dwindling , whether that means taking harsher measures or changing their tactics to facilitate and move negotiations forward. This strategy however holds great risks, for it means accepting, even implicitly, Ethiopia’s fait accompli. Consequently, sooner or later confrontation seems inevitable, unless we see a sudden and unexpected change in Ethiopia’s position.