Despite the world growing more multipolar during the last two decades, the U.S. elections remain the single most important nonviolent political event every four years. This time around, the stakes are very high with active conflicts and sites for atrocities in Ukraine, Palestine, Sudan, and more. The re-election of Donald Trump has brought with it a whirlwind of changes, tension, and media extravaganza. Will U.S. foreign policy keep up with the erratic president, or will there be certain constants driven by the establishment?

As part of their ongoing conversation on issues from East to West, and from Africa to the United States, Cairo Review editor Omar Auf invited historian of West Africa Mark Deets to a discussion on the U.S. elections and Trump’s second term. Deets is the director of Prince AlWaleed Bin Talal Bin AbdulAziz AlSaud Center for American Studies at the American University in Cairo. He is also the author of A Country of Defiance: Mapping the Casamance in Senegal. 

The following Q&A was recorded in two parts to illustrate the rapidly changing developments in the political landscape. The first took place before the elections, and the second after Trump was announced president. The transcript has been edited for clarity. 

The U.S. elections are coming up.

MD: Nearly upon us, yes.

What do you think, in general?

As the director of American Studies, I need to be careful to keep my own personal opinions out of it. But I do think that it’s a very interesting time, and it’s a very consequential election. We say that about every single election. Every single time that there’s another presidential election, then that is the most important election in history. But I think that one could make the claim that this one is up there because of things that are going on in the world stage right now, like with Gaza and Lebanon and the Palestinian issue, and like with Ukraine. And so many of these conflicts, they get crowded out of the front page. The conflict in Sudan is still going on. It’s horrible. Scenes sort of rekindled in Darfur that were reminiscent of 2004. 

So these are very consequential issues. We’ll see how much any of those things change if Donald Trump is elected. Of course, that has been one of his arguments, is that the world is on fire now because of the lack of leadership of Joe Biden and Kamala Harris.

A very populist appeal. 

It is a very populist appeal. And, you know, it assumes that somehow American leaders can control other international leaders, as if those other leaders don’t have their own ideas and their own agency. But I think there is a recognition that the United States is a very influential country, that it has a lot of power. Whether you like it or not, that’s just the way it is right now on the international scene.

And those are very important issues. Unfortunately, for the average American voter, they don’t vote on those issues. The average American voter is not going to vote on U.S. policy toward Africa or the Middle East. They’re going to vote on domestic issues. Some of them will vote on a number of issues, but some of the key issues right now—if you look at the polling—abortion is a big issue. That’s kind of back on the ballot because of all of the things, especially with the overturning of Roe v. Wade under the Trump administration. So for a lot of women, and a lot of men too, actually, the issue of reproductive rights is very important. But the main issue that is really going to drive votes is the economy.

And out of all the countries on the face of the planet that went through COVID, the United States probably came out the best in terms of its economy. There was horrible inflation going on at the time, and the United States brought that inflation down. The economy has actually continued to grow. The unemployment rate has gone down. So if you just look at economic indicators, it sounds like this has gone quite well for the Democrats, like the economy has done well.

And I remember the phrase James Carville said with the Clinton campaign in the 1990s,, “It’s the economy, stupid.” And I think we’re kind of back at that point now. I mean, one could argue that it’s always the economy to some extent. What do people feel when they go to the grocery store and have to pay for food, and have to pay for diapers, and have to pay for equipment, or whatever the case may be? And so, yeah, that’s going to be the driving issue. And it’s going to be a knock against Kamala. Now, people argue that the most inconsequential position in the U.S. government is that of vice president—you have very little power unless it’s breaking a tie in the Senate. So it’s not as if this is all Kamala’s fault, but because she was with the Biden administration, of course, the Trump campaign has been trying very much to tar her with that reputation.

And so I think that’s going to be really tough for Kamala to overcome. And she’s had to be very diplomatic about how to establish herself as a Democratic candidate without completely trashing her boss. Because there was this interview last week—you may have seen it or heard about it—where the journalist asked her, like, “What are you going to do different from Joe Biden?” And she had kind of a hard time. She said some things in general, but she had kind of a hard time answering that in detail. And so I think that’s tough for her.

And even though the inflation numbers have come down, the perception people have still is that things were a lot better under Trump. And so it almost seems like it’s coming down to, okay, do you want the political circus that you have under Trump with a really strong economy and people able to afford things at the gas pump and at the grocery store? Or do you want this more progressive candidate who has some strong policy proposals in terms of trying to stop price gouging by various stores? 

She’s got a plan to enable new homebuyers coming from middle-class and lower-class backgrounds to help them purchase homes and things like that. So she does have solid policy proposals. But those are the kinds of challenges the Democrats face. 

The issue of Kamala being a woman of color—I know there’s been some things in the news lately about former President Obama kind of jumping on the case of Black men to get them to turn out and support Kamala and get over the fact that she’s a woman. I just don’t know that it’s that. I might be ignorant here, I might be sitting here in my white male privilege. But I just don’t think it’s that big a deal to the people who are going to vote for Kamala or not.

You know, it’s always interesting to see what all this polling data and all these projections say before the election, and then to see what actually takes place on the day of the election, when each individual man or woman walks into that voting booth, in the privacy of that voting booth, and marks a certain candidate.

We’ll see.

What about foreign policy when it comes to Africa? You said there’s a crowding out effect of some issues, and I think for Africa at large—which is not a monolith—that is the case. Can you enlighten me on U.S. policy regarding the African continent historically speaking and the differences between Democrat and Republican?

I don’t see things changing a whole lot vis-a-vis Africa policy, regardless of who gets elected. In general, usually when a Republican gets elected, then there’s more pro-business kinds of policies, more kinds of free trade kinds of policies, things that are viewed as being good for business, and that if there’s any kind of concern about human rights or democracy or anything like that, then that’s usually coming from a Democratic administration, although there have been exceptions, right? Like the administration of George W. Bush focused a lot on democratization, not only in Africa, but also in the Middle East, and some would argue with disastrous consequences.

But anyway, I don’t think that there’s going to be a huge change in African policy, and I think we’re going to continue to see efforts from the BRICS countries to balance U.S. power, and so China is not going away. China views Africa as a very important zone for its imperial action and for its investment and for its international power and clout, and that’s going to continue. And I think there’s going to continue to be a certain kind of alliance bundling, if you will, between China and the Russians and the Iranians, to some extent. And South Africa is also part of this, right? South Africa is a majority country, run by the majority, like it doesn’t always follow U.S. policy like it did during the apartheid days. 

So I think that there has been a desire to balance American power around the continent. I don’t think that America is necessarily withdrawing into some kind of isolationism, but I do think that there’s been a certain amount of sort of questioning, like, where is it actually in the U.S. interest to be involved and how? The thing that I think, in addition to these BRICS countries, has gotten a lot of attention, at least for me, and especially because I work on West African history, but it’s been this series of these rolling coups in West Africa and in the Sahel. And some of those regimes, whatever you want to call them, that have taken power in these countries, like Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, they have told the United States to get out, right?

Niger is, I think, the most famous case of this lately. The United States had to have special forces that are conducting various kinds of military training with the host nation, and the United States also had drones that they were flying in West Africa out of that location and to interdict and to conduct surveillance on the various armed extremist groups that the United States government is concerned about because they create instability in these countries. And so you have a number of these countries, and especially these few in West Africa, that have actually left ECOWAS, who’ve told America, we don’t need you anymore. Like, move on. We’ve heard your story about our need for democracy and our need for development and all these things for years and years and years, and you promised development and it hasn’t come, and we’re done with you. And so I think that the U.S. is kind of having to figure out how to deal with that.

I mean, of course, we have to leave. If a sovereign country tells us to leave, we have to leave. So in the case of Niger, we’re doing that. We’re packing up all the drones, packing up all the military supplies, and all that stuff. And yeah, the United States is going to leave, but I don’t think that means that the United States is completely withdrawing from the region or that it’s not going to continue to monitor what’s going on in the Sahel with some of these Islamist groups that are driving some of this conflict. That’s one area that I just don’t think that whether it’s a future President Harris or whether it’s a future President Trump, I don’t think it’s going to change that much in terms of U.S. policy toward Africa.

Now, that doesn’t mean that both sides won’t try to use what’s going on in international events to try to criticize the other side or to try to make their case that they’re somehow better at dealing with these things, which is exactly what the Trump people have been doing lately, pointing at all the problems in Ukraine and Gaza and Lebanon and the West Bank and all this stuff with Palestine. And Iran and North Korea and Russia, like all these people that the United States is concerned about, they’re still going to try to say that it’s the fault of the Biden administration. 

The rest of the Q&A was recorded after Trump was elected president. 

From what we’ve seen so far, how do you think U.S. foreign policy will differ under Trump? How does he perceive what U.S. interests are, and how does he go about pursuing them? 

This is a great question. I mean, in the big scheme of things, I still stand by what I said before, that there aren’t going to be huge changes. But I think that there’s a lot of people who are thinking that if you thought that Biden was really pro-Israel, then just stand by and see what Trump is going to be like.

Partly, I think there’s an assumption that because of the influence of his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, who’s Jewish, and also because of the influence of the Christian evangelical right, they’re going to be looking for an even more favorable approach to Israel. But it’s hard to imagine how it can get much more favorable, but I’m sure that Trump will show us how that can be done. He has already, during his last term. 

But one of the things that I think is so interesting—there’s a certain amount of this kind of shuffling between every administration, especially when it’s changing parties from Republican to Democrat or Democrat to Republican. People are really interested to see how this is going to change the policies and the outlook and the approach. I do think there are going to be strong differences. But one of the things that has been really interesting to me is the movement that we’ve seen already before Trump took office. In the old days, there used to be a certain amount of deference between the different administrations. Of course, people anticipate that things will be new with a new administration, but there was a little decorum between the parties—”we’ll let you finish your term, and then we’ll come in and start doing what we’re going to do.” But it seems like Biden has just been ineffective and weak.

So everybody, even more so than in the past, has been acting like Trump has already been president, even though he’s not going to be inaugurated until tomorrow. And that’s one of the strange things about the American system—the long time between the election and the inauguration. I’m told this results from the technology available in the 19th and early 20th centuries. If a guy from the Midwest won the election, he needed a month or so just to get to Washington, D.C., to take office and move his personal effects.

Thankfully, we’re no longer depending on horse and buggy, but this bizarre legacy in American politics remains. Biden has definitely been a lame-duck president. And another thing that has really tarnished his legacy, it seems like he spent most of his time pardoning people, including his son. The level of corruption with some of these pardons has been gross. I know a certain amount of this goes on at the end of every administration, but it seems worse this time. It seemed like the only thing Biden could do effectively at the end of his term was issue these pardons, which look dirty and corrupt. Even though nobody contests that, under the Constitution, he has the power to do these things.

The jury is still out on whether this ceasefire in Gaza will actually hold. It’s been really interesting to see Trump essentially taking over as president before his term. I kind of think that Hamas and Hezbollah couldn’t care less about threats from the U.S. president. In fact, they would probably welcome it—it gives them attention and makes their cause the focus. And I don’t think anybody really believes the U.S. will start bombing or invading Gaza or Lebanon.

So when Trump says they better work out a deal or there’s going to be hell to pay, what does that actually mean? Drone strikes? Airstrikes? Boots on the ground? What does that mean in practical terms? It’ll be interesting to see how the region reacts to all this. You know, he comes up with these blustery kind of statements. There’s a lot of speculation that all of this bluster was just to distract from his cabinet nominations. Right now, they’re starting the confirmation hearings for positions like Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, and in the Department of Justice. Some think he created a media storm to shift the focus away from these appointments.

Anyway, we’ll see what happens. But those are some key factors moving forward. 

It’s a lot to think about, especially since he has been very active on different fronts. My last question to you is regarding the West African states such as Senegal and the Alliance of Sahel States. What can we expect on the economic dossier, especially regarding these states that are more socialist in orientation, like Senegal?

Yeah, they may be ideologically incompatible, but at the end of the day, there are businessmen in Senegal who want to do deals. Part of the attractiveness of the Chinese to African governments and businessmen is that they come in and say, “We don’t care about your human rights record. We want to do business.” There will probably be more of that with Trump. He can’t completely discard American policy for years and some State Department institutions that deal with these things, but in general, I expect him to be a very pro-business president with a pro-business administration. African governments can expect that, regardless of how socialist they are.

Senegal is very much a social democratic, Western European brand of socialism. I don’t see Senegal joining the axis or going in the direction of welcoming the Russians and the Chinese at the expense of Western investment. They’re already doing it somewhat with France, kicking out the French, but they still want Western investment. I can’t imagine Senegal turning down investment from France, the United States, and other NATO countries. That will continue.

The Senghorian model of socialism is very much democratic socialism, very Western European. I have friends like Sheik Babu at the University of Pennsylvania who talk about the Jacobin tradition of Senegalese politics. There’s a brand of Marxism—it’s not really Marxism, it’s this sort of European socialism—that goes along with that French Jacobin approach and will still be salient in Senegal. Even though Faye has been complaining about the presence of the French battalion in Senegal and has basically kicked them out, that culture and those institutions will not completely go away.

Trump’s transactional nature—the guy who’s always willing to make a deal, who’s always pro-business—will continue, and that will work well with leaders in West Africa who are also very pragmatic. Even though they’ve invited in the Chinese and the Russians, they’ve done it to make deals, not because they’re real Marxists. I don’t think they care about that political and economic ideology. How far are we from the end of the Cold War now, anyway?

I don’t think West African countries working with the Chinese and the Russians are doing it out of loyalty to Marxism. They’re doing it because they think it’s in their interest to make deals with people bringing capital, development, and what they think of as security. I would argue that the mercenaries Russia has brought into West Africa have made it less secure rather than more secure. But pragmatism wins the day, and Trump’s transactional nature lends itself well to this situation.

West Africa isn’t huge in the U.S. foreign policy sphere, but when there are opportunities to make deals, Trump will take them. The new generation of young African leaders appreciates that.