On April 15, 2023, armed conflict broke out in Sudan between two opposing military factions led by General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, head of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as “Hemedti”, who leads the paramilitary group called the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The two men have led Sudan’s ruling council of generals since the 2021 military coup that removed a transitional government led by a civilian-military coalition. The coalition was established as a result of the 2018-2019 revolution, which was characterized by months of civilian-led protests and social organization that ended in a coup against President Omar Al-Bashir by a military faction. The current fighting erupted as a result of mounting tensions and recent disagreement over how and when the RSF would be integrated into the military.

Since fighting broke out, civilians have suffered the brunt of hostilities: over 1,800 people have been killed, and over one million have been internally displaced or forced to seek asylum abroad. The once-peaceful capital Khartoum has become a warzone between the SAF and RSF, while areas such as the Darfur region have seen a return to intercommunal violence. Ceasefires urged and brokered by foreign powers have proven unsuccessful to stop the fighting.

In addition to the human and material losses already brought on the Sudanese people, the conflict has significant implications for bordering states such as Egypt.

The history of relations between Egypt and Sudan is long and varied. In 1956, Sudan gained independence from Anglo-Egyptian rule. Since then, the relationship between Sudan and Egypt has at times been tumultuous. Shared borders and intertwined histories simultaneously brought a sense of solidarity and the potential for tension over resources. Since 2011, relations between the two countries have been generally more diplomatic, despite remaining issues such as the territorial dispute over the mineral-rich Halayeb Triangle. 

In a conversation with the Cairo Review, former Egyptian Foreign Minister Nabil Fahmy noted that due to Egypt’s “neighborly situation” with Sudan, Egypt “doesn’t have the option of not getting involved”. With Egypt being one of the primary destinations of Sudanese refugees, and its stakes in regional issues possibly threatened by the conflict, the implications of Sudan’s conflict for Egypt are a significant area of exploration.

Water at Risk
Egypt’s degree of involvement and stakes in the conflict comprise its role in the welcoming of refugees and threats to regional security. However, “over and above” all of this, Fahmy said, “there is always the issue of water”; the Nile River flows through both Sudan and Egypt, and both countries rely heavily on the river as a resource for water, food, transportation, and other areas of the agricultural sector.

Over the past decade, Egypt and Sudan have been at odds with Ethiopia over the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile, a major tributary of the Nile. Colonial-era treaties gave Egypt and Sudan effective ownership over the Nile, and the Nile remains critical to Egyptian life—95 percent of Egyptians live within twenty kilometers of the river, and the river supplies most of Egypt’s water. 

The UN predicts that overpopulation and climate change mean that Egypt’s water could run out by 2025, a risk exacerbated by the construction of the GERD. A decrease in water supply would have disastrous impacts on Egypt’s food supply, and it would risk the economic livelihoods of millions who are part of Egypt’s agricultural sector. Though Ethiopia has claimed that the GERD will pose no risk to downstream water availability, the future of the Nile remains a major area of concern for Egypt.

With a few points of exception, Egypt and Sudan have historically been united against Ethiopia concerning the construction of the GERD, as both downstream countries are at risk of changes in water supply. More recently, with the GERD being almost completed, Sudan’s stance appears to have shifted into agreement with Ethiopia over the potential benefits of the dam. Still, the solidarity between Egypt and Sudan on the issue of water availability has had an impact on methods of rapprochement between the two countries in recent years. For example, Egypt and Sudan signed a joint military cooperation agreement in March 2021, deepening military ties between the two countries by way of military training and border security. This led to 177 Egyptian soldiers having to be evacuated from Khartoum when fighting broke out on April 15, while an additional 27 air force personnel were evacuated to the Egyptian Embassy in Khartoum. Egyptian officials stated that the soldiers had been present for planned joint military exercises with Sudan, which have become more common with the recent rise in diplomatic tensions with Ethiopia.

This tension with Ethiopia, and the potential impact of an unstable Sudan, are a significant part of Egypt’s stake in this conflict.

With Sudan focused on resolving domestic conflict, Egypt may be losing an important ally in Khartoum in the time-sensitive matter of addressing the GERD. As Ethiopia has expressed opposition to a legally binding agreement on operating the dam and has announced that the dam is 90 percent complete, there is little time for Egypt and Sudan to ensure that their interests are aligned and being met.

An Unprepared Host State
The shared Nile waters are only one piece of the connection between Egypt and Sudan. “It is blood that flows between the two countries, not just the Nile River,” said Ibrahim Mudasir, a Sudanese-Egyptian man helping new arrivals in Egypt, in an interview for NPR. Egypt is a major destination for people fleeing Sudan, while others make the journey to Chad, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and across the Red Sea to Saudi Arabia.

As of May 30, 2023, over 170,000 people had arrived in Egypt from Sudan since April 15, and it is estimated that 300,000 will arrive over the coming months. These numbers include not just Sudanese nationals, but also foreign students, migrants, and refugees living in Sudan who are now forced to flee.

Despite a sense of solidarity between the two peoples due to shared histories, cultures, and sometimes family ties, “at a macro-level Egyptians also fear a strain on already scarce resources due to a potential exodus of refugees into their country. The situation in Sudan is portrayed in the Egyptian media as a security threat,” Alice Verticelli, a visiting lecturer of international affairs and political science at Northeastern University, told the Cairo Review. 

Egypt’s strained economy leaves both Egyptians and migrants with urban areas “characterized by high youth unemployment, overcrowded public schools, and weak health infrastructure,” leading to a lack of “rights and protection for incoming refugees,” Verticelli added.

While the UNHCR recently introduced its Sudan Emergency Regional Refugee Response Plan, which will provide over $140 million in funds to organizations in Egypt and other receiving countries supporting arrivals, the appeal is only 1 percent funded. In a meeting with the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi called for increased support from neighboring Arab states, especially Gulf countries. “The government, the Egyptian Red Crescent and the people have been very generous in supporting arrivals,” said Grandi. “We urgently need to mobilize more resources to help them to maintain this generosity.”

Complications Crossing the Border
For the people that remain within Sudan, the situation is dire. While humanitarian operations are expanding, looting of supplies has become a significant issue. Amira Ahmed, a professor and researcher at the American University in Cairo, said in a recent talk that there is an “absence, not shortage” of basic necessities in Khartoum.

The SAF uses the airforce to conduct strikes on civilian areas, while the RSF overtakes neighborhoods, homes, and public spaces like banks, schools, and hospitals. Those who have the resources and ability to flee the fighting describe a dangerous and expensive journey to the Egyptian border. At the Egypt-Sudan border, they are exposed to extreme heat—with little to no access to water, food, or sanitation—and attacks by armed gangs. 

Many describe arriving at understaffed border crossings, waiting for days with little support. According to the UNHCR, journey times in May could range from one to fifteen days, with longer journeys due to processing wait times. Ahmed attributes much of the initial prolonged waiting times at the border to the lack of experience of Egyptian officials to deal with such a large number of arriving asylum seekers. Though Egypt has long been a destination for asylum seekers, the scope of the current crisis is unprecedented. In an open letter, the activist group EyesOnSudan.net called on the Egyptian government to provide greater support to Sudanese asylum seekers, outlining many of the issues that new arrivals have faced at the border. Difficulty in loosening Egypt-Sudan border restrictions has been an ongoing challenge, due to prevailing security and economic interests. Over the past decade, this has led to Egypt’s militarization of the border, as well as difficulty for people on both sides to secure visas.

Even after they enter Egypt, legal and other challenges persist for Sudanese arrivals. Verticelli explained that, while Egypt has signed and ratified the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, implementation by the UNHCR in Egypt has been informed by a restrictive interpretation of the agreed-upon obligations. Additionally, Egypt has never fully implemented the “Four Freedoms Agreement”—a 2004 bilateral agreement between Egypt and Sudan meant to guarantee freedom of movement, residence, work, and property ownership. UNHCR reports confirm that Egypt’s interpretation of its legal obligations has left many Sudanese asylum seekers unable to meet requirements to qualify as refugees. According to Verticelli, the restrictive interpretation of these rights leaves individuals with “no access to humanitarian protection, education, healthcare, and opportunities.”

Through interviews, the UNHCR found that most asylum seekers had some sort of familial or community connection to Cairo and were planning to stay in the capital for the time being. Ahmed explained that this rise of the refugee population in Cairo means that officials must now be prepared for the border’s humanitarian crisis to shift to the capital. Because Egypt does not provide refugee camps, nor does it have local integration policies, added Ahmed, many new arrivals are left in Cairo with very little support.

The situation may become even more critical with the newest wave of asylum seekers, who are mostly women, children, and elderly individuals who have little to no resources left after making the journey out of Sudan.

Verticelli predicted that “it is likely that newly arrived Sudanese will largely remain in legal limbo but somehow find their way through the chaotic and largely informal Egyptian society and economy”. She noted that the biggest short-term focus must be to ensure that the principle of non-refoulement—which prevents states from returning asylum seekers to a country where they could be at risk of persecution—is upheld. In the longer term, the international community must work to resolve the conflict so that people can safely return to their homes.

A Regional Crisis Ahead?
Risks to water security and civilian safety may only be worsened by the potential regionalization of the conflict. Fahmy stated that “the fundamental risk is that it shifts from being a domestic national issue to being a geopolitical issue with different players playing into the game for their own interests.” This is an especially potent concern for a region that has seen this pattern play out in cases such as Syria, Libya, and Yemen, all of which have experienced internal conflicts that have become regionalized due to the involvement of foreign actors.

In a policy analysis for the Arab Center Washington DC, Senior Fellow Khalil Al-Anani concluded that the involvement of so many foreign actors of competing interests has “fueled the conflict and exacerbated its complexity, a fact that underscores the challenges facing Sudan in its quest for lasting peace and stability”. Given Sudan’s size, geostrategic position, and rich resources, many actors took Sudan’s 2019 coup as an opportunity to forge connections within the country. In the past, Cairo has had strong contacts with Al-Burhan, which Fahmy explained as Egypt traditionally being “careful to engage neighboring countries only through formal authorities.” Egypt has not explicitly thrown support to either Al-Burhan or Hemedti in this current conflict, and the involvement or potential involvement of many foreign actors with ties to both factions is certainly a concern.

Ahmed described Hemedti’s circle of power since the RSF’s creation by Al-Bashir as a sort of “state inside a state,” as he was able to forge international connections between foreign states and the RSF. Since 2017, the Wagner group, a Russian paramilitary group, has been trading military and intelligence training to the RSF in what appears to be an exchange for control over Sudanese gold mines. In the past, Egyptian officials have urged Al-Burhan to address Wagner’s operations in Sudan, specifically taking into consideration the way that Wagner may be using Sudan as a base for its operations in bordering countries such as the Central African Republic.

RSF fighters were also deployed in Yemen to fight with the coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Before the current conflict, the UAE was perhaps Hemedti’s most important regional ally. The Gulf state provided Hemedti with avenues to channel his finances, as well as provided public relations support to the RSF. As part of the Quad—which also includes the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Britain—the UAE has not publicly taken a side in this most recent crisis. 

The Quad, in addition to organizations such as the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and the United Nations, have taken on a mediation role in Sudan’s conflict, urging de-escalation and the protection of humanitarian interests. U.S.-Saudi-led talks in Jeddah between the warring factions have faced obstacles due to ongoing fighting despite ceasefire agreements meant to ease the humanitarian crisis. Some have also expressed concern over the predicted quality of decision-outcomes given the current attendees. In an article for Reuters, Confluence Advisory director Kholood Khair is quoted as saying, “key domestic and international stakeholders are not there like Egypt and the UAE, who are the only ones so far who have proven that they can guarantee a ceasefire […] that no civilians are present recreates failings of previous political negotiations”.

Ahmed explained that the Sudanese are not rooting for one side or the other—people who have been there since the revolution are “victims of both of them”. 

What the Sudanese people do want, she added, is for “the war to stop so peace and security can return to Sudan”.

Though Cairo is currently in contact with both Al-Burhan and Hemedti, Fahmy emphasized that if Egypt plays any role in mediation, “it will be with the objective of creating an environment for the Sudanese to make decisions themselves”.

“But you can’t allow a conflict to break out and be transformed into civil war on your borders and simply ignore it. It’s simply too risky,” Fahmy added. Egypt is therefore in the difficult position of having high stakes in the conflict and its outcome, but having to balance its own vulnerabilities with the real risk of making things worse. 

As Fahmy put it, “It is a delicate balance.”